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Abstract
Despite much research into vegetarianism, the psychological relationship 
between eating meat and evaluating animals remains relatively neglected. Through focus 
groups, questionnaires and experiments, this study investigated whether people 
experienced psychological inconsistency in this relationship and, if so, how they handled 
that inconsistency.
Unlike vegetarians’ attitudes, the content o f meat-eaters’ attitudes towards 
eating meat rarely included animals. Meat-eaters’ positive attitudes towards eating meat 
were consistent with their eating behaviour; however, their attitudes towards farm 
animals were more positive than their attitudes towards eating meat. It therefore depends 
upon which attitudes are salient at any given time to determine whether psychological 
consistency is maximised overall.
By focusing on the relationship between their own genuinely-held attitudes 
towards farm animals, animals’ slaughter, and eating meat, meat-eaters’ cognitive 
dissonance increased. Their attitudes towards eating meat were expected to become 
more positive in order to restore consonance between their attitudes and eating 
behaviour. However, meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat became less positive and 
their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter became more negative. In contrast, their 
attitudes towards farm animals resisted change. Therefore meat-eaters’ attitudes towards 
farm animals became relatively even more positive than their attitudes towards eating 
meat and animals’ slaughter. Hence, the attitudes stimulated by this research, in an 
environment which prevented psychological denial strategies, caused (a) meat eaters’ 
attitudes to become more inconsistent with their behaviour and (b) the consequent lack 
o f consonance restoration.
This study both helps to understand the empirical relationship between eating 
meat and evaluating animals and extends cognitive dissonance theory’s explanatory 
power to real-world complex phenomena.
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CHAPTER 1
Psychological relationships between 
evaluating farm animals and eating meat
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Chapter 1 - Psychological relationships between valuing animals and eating meat
On a hot summer’s day a village hall housed a focus group o f three men and 
three women. They had been chatting comfortably; but suddenly silence fell. One 
woman finally broke the silence to exclaim: “O h that’s interesting isn’t it”!
Their attention had been drawn to two statements to which they had all 
previously agreed: “I eat meat” and “I like animals”. Earlier these statements had been 
disconnected, but when they were presented together the group’s easy conversation was 
arrested. The statements had not changed; what had changed was the relationship 
between them. This relationship is the focus for this study.
Contributors to the tenth anniversary issue o f the journal Society & Animals 
(2002) lament the state o f ‘human-animal1 studies’. The consensus is that, despite 
blossoming interest, the area remains under-researched and under-recognised 
(Shapiro, 2002). According to Fiddes (1994), vegetarians and other non-orthodox eaters 
have been scrutinised, while the Western mainstream diet has been relatively ignored. 
This is to science’s detriment because the ‘normal’ can be as revealing as the ‘abnormal’, 
and all the more perplexing because many people argue that widespread meat-eating and 
high regard for animals is inconsistent. The thesis here is that i f  meat-eating is 
psychologically inconsistent with positively evaluating animals, then there will be 
evidence o f that perceived inconsistency. This evidence, if it exists, must demonstrate 
how inconsistency is handled to allow both meat-eating and positively evaluating animals 
to co-exist within the same culture and the same people.
The focus on meat-eaters demands a shift in focus, away from what has 
traditionally stood out to Western researchers— vegetarianism— and towards what has 
often been ignored and treated as invisible. This shift, elevates the dominant ideology 
from ‘the invisible norm’ and values it both as an alternative that is full o f content and 
meaning against which vegetarians are studied, and as a research topic in its own right. In 
seeking to understand meat-eaters, they are compared with vegetarians to identify 
differences that might illuminate both groups in the context o f one another. In this 
sense, the study echoes political and feminist psychology (e.g. Iyengar and McGuire, 
1993) that interrogates the culture in which research and its topics are embedded.
1 For the sake of brevity, “animals” throughout this thesis refers only to non-human animals. 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that humans are also animals.
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The main theory used here to investigate this evidence is cognitive dissonance 
theory (see section 3.2). As Chapter 3 outlines, the empirical topic benefits from being 
originally explored via an established theory, while the theory’s explanatory power is 
tested by a real-world phenomenon. This study therefore contributes to social 
psychology both empirically and theoretically.
This Chapter unpacks the issues before the next Chapter outlines the work that 
has already been done on this topic.
1.1 Definitions
‘Meat’, ‘evaluating animals’, ‘consistency’ and ‘inconsistency’ are defined here to 
explain how they are used in this thesis.
M eat
A supermarket list o f  products sold in the category “meat and poultry”
(Anon, 2005) provides a list o f “meat”:
Bacon
Beef
Chicken
Lamb
Offal (kidneys, liver, hearts)
Organic (chicken, beef, pork, lamb, sausages)
Pate
Pork
Sausages
Speciality poultry (duck, poussin)
Turkey
Prepared meats (including burgers, meat in sauces and coatings)
It means both cooked and uncooked meat. While this list is not exhaustive, fish 
or other species, for example, are unlikely to be ordinarily included without making 
this explicit.
E valuating anim als
Attitude theories are explored in more detail in section 3.1. Here two of the 
dimensions on which attitudes towards animals may vary are explored, these are intrinsic 
and instrumental dimensions.
Instrumental reasons for positively evaluating animals focus on animals’ 
perceived uses or benefits to people, such as animals’ appearance, affection, company, 
biodiversity, pest control abilities, monetary value, rarity, status symbols, protection, or
12
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for the products that can be made from their bodies. Intrinsic reasons for positively 
evaluating animals focus only on the animals themselves, emphasising, for example, 
animals’ souls or essences, experience o f life, sentience, intelligence or abilities 
(e.g. Singer, 1993).
‘Loving animals’ brings to mind theories o f other human relationships, for 
example those that emphasise exchange and equity (e.g. Homans, 1961; Hatfield, et. al., 
1985). Exchange and equity are instrumental ideas and may indeed be good models for 
human-animal relationships and people’s love for animals. But they exclude the range of 
other possible instrumental and intrinsic reasons for positively evaluating animals that 
people may have.
C onsistency and inconsistency
When this thesis asks whether someone’s views are consistent, this means: are 
their views consistent by their own standards?
Stone (2001) defines psychological inconsistency, “ ... as an intermediate 
discrepancy between behaviour and a specific attitude . . .” (2001, p.57). This is a narrow 
definition from the field of cognitive dissonance theory that will be explored more fully 
in Chapter 3 and, although it is relevant to this thesis, a wider definition is helpful at this 
stage to frame the topic. More generally, ‘inconsistency’ means lacking in consistency, 
agreement, or compatibility. It embodies the idea that the consistent application o f 
principles means not making exceptions without good reasons (Warburton, 1999).
‘Consistency’ also demands that the things about which one can be consistent 
or inconsistent are related. That is, if someone supported the principle o f ending world 
poverty one minute but did not the next, then, all other things being equal, this would be 
inconsistent. But if that person was thrifty with their own money, these things are not 
necessarily related or, therefore, inconsistent. Yet again, if they believed that they could 
help end others’ poverty by donating to charity, then failing to donate would be 
inconsistent with their ideals, while donating would be inconsistent with their frugal 
accounting. This is where W arburton’s (1999) ‘exceptions with good reasons’ come to 
the fore. The thrifty campaigner would make an exception to one o f their proclivities. 
They would inevitably be consistent in one respect and inconsistent in another.
If  someone cared more about world poverty than their own money, then, all 
other things being equal, they could be expected to make an exception to their frugal
13
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behaviour and donate. Conversely, if they cared more about their own money than world 
poverty, then, all other things being equal, they could be expected to make an exception 
to their ideals and not donate. This maximises consistency overall.
O f course, world poverty and one’s own money are just two things that might 
be opposed under certain conditions. People daily make such choices: hitting the alarm 
clock’s snooze button or getting to work on time, for a start. Bigger choices make news 
headlines, particularly in politics. In the run-up to the 2005 general election, the 
Conservative Party manifesto promised to spend on public services and lower taxes. 
O ther parties claimed that this was impossible; it was inconsistent with what everyone 
knew about spending and taxation, which were opposed in nature. The point here is to 
discover whether people believe that their own attitudes towards eating meat and 
evaluating animals involve similar oppositions.
The inclusion o f denial in this study (which is explored in Chapter 3) involves 
an assumption about the topic; an assumption that, for some people at least, the life and 
death behind meat is unpleasant to think about. Further, that this unpleasantness cannot 
be easily resolved or removed; it is something with which the owner has to live, perhaps 
uncomfortably. Put like this, the problem does not seem inconsistent. There is nothing 
inconsistent about finding death unpleasant. Where any inconsistency might arise is in 
the relationship between disliking death and endorsing, or even demanding, it.
People may eat some meat but not others. I f  they like the taste o f white meat 
but dislike the taste o f red meat then they are not inconsistent because taste is a sound 
reason on which to decide what to eat. But cultural differences provide some less clear 
examples where one meat is eaten but another avoided depending on from which part o f 
the body, or which species, it came. For example, horse meat is generally avoided in 
Britain, in contrast to neighbouring France, while meat from similar hoofed animals 
(e.g. cows) is eaten in Britain. One o f the questions that this thesis poses is whether 
eating some meat and avoiding others is consistent by people’s own standards.
1.2 Competing cultural commentators
In Britain many people eat meat and also like animals. How this relationship is 
represented in our culture might indicate whether its members experience it as 
inconsistent. The following published representations o f this relationship demonstrate 
(a) how consistency affects the issue, (b) that there are different representations in
14
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circulation, and (c) that the topic is ‘live’: it is on, at least some, people’s minds, being 
discussed and debated. The following five cultural commentators’ views will be used as 
frameworks for comparing against ordinary meat-eaters’ views throughout this study.
Scruton (2000)
Using arguments later called “logic-of-the-larder” (Matheny, et. al., 2005), 
Scruton (2000) is explicitly concerned with consistency:
... I find myself driven by my love of animals to favour eating them. Most 
of the animals which graze in our fields are there because we eat them.
Sheep and beef cattle are, in the conditions which prevail in English 
pastures, well fed, comfortable and protected, cared for when disease affects 
them and, after a quiet life among their natural companions, despatched in 
ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. There is 
nothing immoral in this. On the contrary, it is one of the most vivid 
triumphs of comfort over suffering in the entire animal world. It seems to 
me, therefore, that it is not just permissible, but positively right, to eat these 
animals whose comforts depend upon our doing so. (Scruton, 2000, 
pp.218-9)
First Scmton (2000) claims to be consistent by loving animals and therefore 
creating them. Many animals only exist because they are eaten, therefore, we should eat 
them in order for animals to be created. Second, he argues that ‘correctly’ farmed 
animals are happy. Again, if it is good to create happy lives, and this is only possible due 
to people eating animals, then we should eat meat. Third, he argues that the animals’ 
manner o f death is enviable. He implicitly claims that there is nothing wrong with killing: 
killing an animal does not harm them. Fourth, he argues that as this manner o f death is 
so good, people should consistently receive it too. Scruton (2000) proclaims himself to 
be consistently both an animal-lover and a meat-eater.
Feam ley-W hittingstall (2004)
O ther commentators demonstrate the flexibility o f people’s approaches to 
consistency. Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004) is ambivalent about killing an animal but is 
determined to be informed about, or even involved in, it. He takes a more ‘cost-benefit’ 
approach than Scruton (2000) and sees others’ ‘hypocrisy’ as worse than his own 
perceived inconsistency.
I’m a carnivore, and I enjoy eating meat. I also enjoy the process of getting 
my own meat. It’s an emotional thing to kill an animal for the pot. It’s a 
combination of the holistic satisfaction that you’ve bagged something 
yourself, tempered by a pang. But it feels better than buying an anonymous
15
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piece of factory-farmed meat in a supermarket... it’s hypocritical to draw a 
veil over the fact that meat is a result of killing. It enables us to treat animals 
badly, because we want it out of sight and mind. (Fearnley-Whittingstall,
2004 p. 146)
Even though Feamley-Whittingstall (2004) would be willing to kill whatever he 
ate, he still has opposing feelings. This is evidenced by the ‘pang’ at killing, which he 
accepts as an unavoidable side-effect. He does not explain why he feels this pang but 
believes that animals should be ‘treated well’. This suggests that he is concerned for 
animals’ experiences, and therefore that he holds intrinsic cognitions about farmed 
animals. Indeed he went on to publicly challenge supermarkets about the suffering o f 
broiler chickens in particular (e.g. Fearnley-Whittingstall, 2009). However, in his view, 
the benefits o f eating meat outweigh the costs o f killing an animal. Thus his approach is, 
for him, the most consistent possible while accommodating some inconsistency.
Johnson (2004)
Johnson (2004) is an ex-vegetarian, tempted back to meat because he loves it 
so. But in a BBC2 television programme he learnt more about the film-engulfed meat 
that many people encounter every day. Johnson (2004) visited a free-range beef farm 
where, he admitted, cattle were better cared for than on more common intensive farms. 
He found choosing a cow for slaughter difficult. A calf reminded him o f his own child, 
while the cow he chose (a decision based on her thick rump) felt warm: like his dog 
rather than meat. When the cow was killed in a small slaughterhouse (unlike the more 
usual large-scale slaughterhouses where, he tells viewers, workers are paid by piecework), 
Johnson (2004) cried. Despite the point o f the investigation being to follow the meat 
from animal to plate, in the end, Johnson (2004) simply could not bring himself to eat 
the meat that he had seen being prepared. He remains, however, a committed meat-eater 
and in 2006 presented advertisements for Birds Eye 100% beefburgers.
The fact that Johnson (2004) did not eat the steak suggests that his ordinary 
behaviour was out o f tune, or inconsistent, with his experience; so much so that he 
physically could not ‘stomach’ the meat. But not eating that particular steak was entirely 
consistent with the empathy he felt for this cow and his distress at her killing.
Cohen (2000)
In contrast, Cohen (2000) is less troubled by his attitudes towards meat and 
animals than by what he sees as his own inconsistency between these attitudes and his
16
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ethical principles. The quotation below comes from his book which explores the denial 
that enables people to avoid challenging social wrongs.
I have Pooked] at my own reactions to environmental and animal rights 
issues. I cannot find strong rational arguments against either set of claims.
But emotionally, they leave me utterly unmoved. I am particularly 
oblivious—in total denial— about animal issues. I know that the treatment 
of animals in cruel experiments and factory farming is difficult to defend. I 
can even see the case for becoming a vegetarian. But in the end ... my filters 
go into automatic drive: this is not my responsibility; there are worse 
problems; there are plenty of other people looking after this. What do you 
mean, I’m in denial every time I eat a hamburger? (2000, p.289)
Cohen’s (2000) consistency-inspired reasoning bears the hallmarks o f utilitarian 
philosophy, but his lack o f ‘emotional movement’, he believes, leads him to ignore, or 
‘deny’, his intellectually-derived logic. Cohen (2000) seems bemused by what he sees as 
his own inconsistency. Overall his book bemoans people’s tendency to deny others’ 
suffering and thus to prevent ending it. In this quotation he demonstrates that he too is a 
victim o f the same tendency.
Adam s (2000,1995)
Adams (2000,1995) has also been struck by people’s ability to reach different 
conclusions about the same issue:
Meat eaters see themselves as “eating life”. Vegetarians see meat eaters as 
“eating death”. (Adams, 2000, p.15)
Vegetarians and corpse eaters approach the same phenomenon— the 
consumption of dead animals—and come to opposite opinions: is it “meat” 
or a corpse? life or death? humane slaughter or murder? delicious or 
repulsive? nutritious or fat-laden? departure from tradition or return to 
tradition? Corpse eaters see vegetarianism as a fad; vegetarians see eating 
animals as a larger fad. Corpse eaters see vegetarians as Puritans, legislating 
others’ enjoyments; vegetarians see animal eaters as resisting awareness, 
indulging in fantasy about where flesh comes from. Corpse eaters generally 
accept the cultural construction of the farm as benign, friendly, and family- 
based. Vegetarians see an alternate view: industry-owned, cruel and 
factorylike ... While vegetarians regard the word vegetable with respect..., 
flesh-advocating cultures see it as an appropriate term for brain-dead 
individuals. (Adams, 1995, p.26)
1.3 Framing the problem
The cultural commentators have shown that there are different ways o f 
thinking about the relationship between eating meat and evaluating animals, and that 
some people are thinking about, and publicly representing, the issue. They also
17
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demonstrated that consistency is not an all-or-nothing affair. People may accept some 
inconsistency as an unavoidable consequence o f a balance-sheet approach that 
maximises consistency overall, experience great emotional angst, feel intellectually 
befuddled, or be utterly oblivious. People may reject any discomfort, or they may change 
their whole lifestyles.
In some cases, it is easy to see inconsistency: Johnson’s (2004) inability to eat 
meat while being fervently pro-meat-eating seems paradoxical and his strong emotional 
response suggests that, at the time at least, even he might have been unable to offer any 
‘reasonable exceptions’ to consistency. A stronger example still is Cohen’s (2000) own 
befuddlement that he rejects suffering and the denial that allows it, appreciates the 
arguments for animals’ ‘rights’, and yet remains emotionally unmoved by animals’ 
suffering. He sees his own ‘denial’ and knowingly does not apply his own principles 
and theory.
The question remains whether there are patterned private phenomena 
underlying these public representations o f the issue. The task in this study is to identify 
ordinary meat-eaters’ attitudes to these issues, which can be compared against these 
cultural commentators’ public representations.
Already there is disagreement over the central question o f whether or not 
people find the relationship between eating meat and evaluating animals to be 
inconsistent and whether or not people are troubled, either by their perceived 
inconsistency or their use o f animals. The cultural commentators have demonstrated that 
strong views exist on both sides. As outlined on p .l l ,  the thesis asks whether people are 
psychologically inconsistent. If  they are, then this in turn leads to question what they do 
with this inconsistency: how they handle it and whether psychological theory can explain 
the evidence from real people.
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The British have a reputation as a nation o f animal-lovers, from the media 
appetite for wildlife programmes, to the number o f welfare organisations clamouring for 
donations— and getting them— to demands for a bill o f rights for pets. A MORI opinion 
poll confirmed that 97% of British adults believed that animals have ‘rights’ and 45% 
considered that animals’ ‘rights’ should be respected as much as humans’ (Ryder, 2000).
The British are also a nation o f meat-eaters. Although British meat-eating is 
epitomised in the traditions o f Christmas turkeys and Sunday roasts, British meat-eaters 
consume their own weight in meat each year (Gellatley, 2000).
Table 1: Number of animals eaten by an average British
meat-eater during a lifetime (excluding fish)
Cattle 5
Pigs 20
Sheep and lambs 29
Chickens 780
Turkeys 46
Ducks 18
Rabbits 7
Geese 1 Z i
(Gellatley, 2000, p.3)
So, the question is: do these culturally empirical phenomena interact to create 
any psychological inconsistency? Ryder (2000) argues that the relationship between using 
and positively evaluating animals is paradoxical:
Two themes stand out in the extraordinary history of Homo Sapiens’ relationship 
to the other animals: first its perennial importance in the human psyche and, 
secondly, the ambivalence and inconsistency of that relationship. (2000, p. 15)
His observations may lack scientific rigour, but Serpell (1996) agrees with 
Ryder (2000):
Many meat-eating consumers react with horror to the sight of a recently 
butchered carcass, and it is clear that people do not like to be reminded that 
the plucked and trussed-up chicken, or the leg of lamb they had for Sunday 
lunch was once a warm-blooded sentient life-form like themselves.
(Serpell, 1996, p.195)
This identifies the key issue o f disconnection between the animal and meat, 
which recurs in many o f the following theories.
Some o f the following theories have tended to concentrate on one half o f the 
problem: meat-eating. Attitudes towards animals are just as important, but these are
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missing from many current theories (exceptions being Ryder’s, 2000, Serpell’s, 1996, and 
Eder’s, 1996, explanations). The central problem identified by this thesis is the 
relationship between eating meat and evaluating animals (although both may be worthy 
research topics individually).
2.1 Comparing meat-eaters to vegetarians
This study focuses on meat-eaters, however, vegetarians make a point of 
contrast against which meat-eaters can be better understood.
Povey, et. al.’s (2001) research enabled participants to express their own views 
towards their diets. Meat-eaters were more ambivalent towards their own diets than 
towards vegetarian diets and were the only respondents to report anything positive about 
eating meat. Their views emphasised taste, fattening, nutritional or balanced qualities of 
meat in a diet, the wide and varied choice they experienced and concern over health 
scares. Comparing their views with vegetarians’ about eating meat shows that “cruel and 
barbaric”, “inhumane” and “murderous” were missing from the meat-eaters’ 
spontaneous expressions, as was any acknowledgement at all o f the animal in their meat. 
This shows that meat-eaters may not consider the animals in their diets at all unless 
prompted. Health, however, was evident in their concerns. So a key difference seems to 
be that vegetarians automatically equate meat with killing animals; meat-eaters do not. 
Consequently, what many vegetarians see as the greatest advantage o f their diet— animal 
welfare— does not naturally occur to meat-eaters. Hursthouse’s (2000) recollection o f 
how she became vegetarian both demonstrates the shift in thought between meat-eating 
and vegetarian perspectives and the benefit o f studying the contrast between them, one 
in the context o f the other, rather than seeing them as isolated groups:
I saw my interest and delight in nature programmes about the lives of 
animals on television and my enjoyment of meat as side by side and at odds 
with one another, instead of as totally distinct and having no bearing on 
each other. (2000, p. 165)
McEachern and Schroder’s (2002) Scottish interviewees showed little concern 
for ethical issues when purchasing meat and held inaccurate beliefs about livestock 
production. Their findings, along with Povey et. al.’s (2001), agreed with Serpell’s (1996) 
view that people prefer not to connect meat to an animal.
Lea and Worsley (2002) confirm intuitions that meat-eaters primarily eat meat 
because they like its taste. Their meat-eaters emphasised health as the main benefit o f a
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vegetarian diet. Health benefits came first, second and third. Fourth came animal 
welfare/rights benefits. So although these meat-eaters were concerned about animals, 
changing animals’ fates was not the primary advantage o f avoiding meat in their view. In 
contrast, Wright and Howcroft (1992), McDonald (2000) and Santos and Booth (1996) 
found that vegetarians were vegetarian for ethical (welfare) reasons, while Kenyon and 
Barker’s (1998) vegetarian sample were generally unconcerned with any health benefits 
o f their diet. This evidence all supports Povey et. al.’s (2001) work.
Therefore the greatest difference between meat-eaters and vegetarians, 
identified by a number o f independent researchers, is that vegetarians, unlike 
meat-eaters, connect animals to meat. Meat-eaters resist this connection even when 
prompted. However, perceived advantages o f a vegetarian diet also differ between 
vegetarians and meat-eaters, with vegetarians citing ethical (welfare) reasons as 
paramount, and meat-eaters citing health reasons.
This could suggest that vegetarians care more for animals than do meat-eaters. 
However, as will be explored, McEachern and Schroder’s (2002) study is one o f many to 
find that meat-eaters’ understanding o f the meat industry is largely incorrect, with 
animals’ experiences considered to be more natural and positive than industry and 
independent reports suggest is the case. Consequendy, if many meat-eaters, perhaps like 
Scruton (2000), think that farmed animals lead satisfactory lives, then they are unlikely to 
be concerned for their welfare. Thus it cannot be said from this research that one group 
evaluates animals differendy to another as the differences may lie in understandings o f 
the meat industry, or indeed elsewhere.
More importandy, though, meat-eaters’ lack o f spontaneous connection 
between animals and meat, and resistance to that connection when it is made for them, 
also cautions against simplistic assumptions. These findings are supported by other 
research following in this Chapter, and prompt this study’s interest in cognitive 
dissonance theory to explore the potential reasons for this motivated lack of connection 
that has so far been identified but not explained.
2.2 Locating potential inconsistencies
Broom (1999) analyses the severity o f animals’ suffering and concludes that 
farm animals represent by far the greatest number o f animals who experience the most 
pain and distress across all industries. Yet this contrasts with the public perception and
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concern for animal suffering in other settings, like the wild, laboratory, or in abusive/ 
neglectful conditions. This analysis is supported by Britain’s many animal welfare groups 
whose supporters care about animals and eat meat: RSPCA, Cats Protection League, 
National Canine Defence League, etc. Taylor’s (2004) ethnographic research conducted 
over three years found that welfare workers in British animal sanctuaries cared 
passionately about animals. In some cases they broke the law to protect animals. And yet 
all but two of these welfarists ate meat. At the other end o f the spectrum, however, 
Serpell (1999) found that all o f the vivisectors in his survey emphasised that they disliked 
killing animals and many were vegetarian.
There is evidence to raise concern for the mental health o f such workers. Rholf 
and Bennett (2005) found quantitative evidence o f Perpetration-induced Traumatic 
Stress (“PiTS”) in those who euthanase animals. This included “recurrent thoughts, 
nightmares and feelings (intrusion) and avoidance o f emotions and ideas” (2005, p.214). 
Emotional numbing, distressing recollections, sleep disturbances, an increased startle 
response, difficulty concentrating and irritability have also been reported through 
qualitative research in the same area (Arluke, 1992; White and Shawhan, 1996). These 
symptoms (similar to post-traumatic stress but with the added stressor o f feeling 
personally responsible) are like those suffered by soldiers and police officers who have 
killed people (Rholf and Bennett, 2005). Such research might explain why people do not 
conventionally want to be involved in, or even know about, animals’ slaughter, 
irrespective o f how much they love meat or how necessary they deem the slaughter to 
be. Hence, consistency can be maximised overall, yet acting against (inconsistently with) 
a strong view can still cause extreme discomfort. For some people, this discomfort can 
threaten their mental health.
Pious (1993) found that most survey respondents report (1) that they are 
concerned for animals’ well-being and (2) that they support the selective use o f these 
same animals, particularly for food and research. Braithwaite and Braithwaite (1982), 
who surveyed 302 Australian students about animals’ suffering, found that many 
respondents who disapproved o f eating meat continued to eat meat. Respondents also 
frequently condemned production practices (e.g. “force-feeding geese to make their 
livers swell . . .” , 1982, p.43). However, the same respondents endorsed the consumption 
made possible by these practices (e.g. “eating pate produced by the force-feeding o f 
geese”, 1982, p.43).
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Hills (1993) also found that her sample o f the Australian ‘urban public’ agreed 
with both ‘equality’ and ‘dominance’ arguments about animals. That is, they felt that 
animals should receive consideration equal to people, and be dominated for people’s use. 
Although some respondents saw this as inconsistent, Hills (1993) concluded that the 
issue was unimportant to respondents and so the inconsistency was easily tolerated.
Other respondents either did not see, or acknowledge, their views as inconsistent.
Pious (1993) argues that psychological mechanisms reduce the conflict resulting 
from the collision o f people’s perceptions o f themselves as compassionate with the 
realisation that they, albeit indirectly, harm animals. For Pious (1993) this is the core 
inconsistency. Pious (1993) suggests that the most common conflict reduction 
mechanism when such a collision occurs is avoiding the topic, but a range of 
rationalisations can also support the use o f animals. Alternatively people may eat less 
meat.
Like many others, Knight et. al.’s (2003) interviewees demonstrated that eating 
meat and evaluating animals are often unrelated to each other, but Knight et. al. (2003) 
also identified people’s ‘backwards’ approach to answering questions:
... rather than people considering the “facts” and then forming an attitude 
based on these factors, it seems that people often work backward. Although 
they like animals, they also eat meat and, therefore, need to justify this 
contradictory behavior. Thus, they “build” their argument to justify their 
existing view or behavior, rather than forming an attitude based on the 
arguments. Therefore, information is actively sought after, or actively 
avoided, depending on whether it supports or undermines the existing 
attitude or behavior. (2003, p.313)
Generally, the more Knight et. al.’s (2003) interviewees liked animals, the less 
they supported using them and the more participants knew about animals’ lives on farms 
and in laboratories, the less they agreed with these uses o f animals. However, as the 
quotation demonstrates, interviewees are prone to rationalisations. The fact that Knight 
et. al.’s (2003) interviewees worked backward, ‘building’ their arguments from their 
behaviour, supports a cautious interpretation o f this data. Although it seems sensible that 
liking animals would precede low support for using them, it is possible that these 
variables are not so causally related. Vegetarians may be animal-lovers, but this alone 
does not necessarily distinguish them from meat-eaters. Scruton (2000) may be an 
extreme case, but he ably demonstrates this point. Because there is no distinction in
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Knight et. al.’s (2003) work between whether animals are intrinsically or instrumentally 
evaluated, it is also difficult to identify what their ‘liking for animals’ might mean.
Like Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004), Knight et. al.’s (2003) interviewees often 
weighed up the perceived costs o f using animals against the perceived benefits. However, 
many interviewees admitted that they knew litde about the costs (e.g. distress/pain) and 
said that they did not want to know. This further supports McEachern and Schroder’s 
(2002) research discussed previously. Knight et. al. (2003) conclude, like the Braithwaites 
(1982) and McEachern and Schroder (2002) before them, that the small amount of 
supermarket space dedicated to free-range and organically farmed meat indicates that 
people’s shopping behaviour does not reflect their desire for farmed animals to be 
treated and killed humanely. This is supported by Serpell’s (1999) research with farmers 
who complained that they were forced to rear animals intensively because consumers 
demanded cheap meat, eggs and dairy products.
2.3 Avoiding the meeting of animals and meat
Sufficient studies have now agreed that meat-eaters do not spontaneously 
connect animals to meat, and do not want the connection to be pointed out to them. 
Although theorists have thus far not labelled the phenomenon as such, Cohen (2000) 
argues that this motivated disconnection is typical in cases o f ‘denial’, where one must 
simultaneously know and not know something (this is explored further in the next 
Chapter). Knight et. al.’s (2003) interviewees exemplify this phenomenon:
... most participants claimed that they didn’t know about the procedures 
because they didn’t want to know. Participants talked about avoiding 
information concerning animal use because it led to unpleasant feelings 
o f discomfort... Thus, dissociation—avoiding knowledge of animal use, or 
repression, in terms of somehow failing to remember such knowledge—are 
often the preferred options. ... the process o f avoiding information is less 
of a form of repression and more a deliberate strategy developed to manage 
emotion and justify behaviour. (2003, p.317)
This is exactly the problem that Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004) identified for 
people who avoid meat’s origins; it is also the ‘denial’ that Cohen (2000) feared afflicted 
him.
Pious (1993) claims that cultural dissociation variables conceptually abstract 
meat from animals. Consequently, the work o f Pious (1993) and other authors in this 
area (see below) suggests that these variables are differendy motivated from division o f 
labour practices in other industries that are driven by economic motives. Dissociation
25
Chapter 2 <• Theories o f  psychological and cultural avoidance o f  the life and death behind meat
variables include surreptitious farming, renaming meat (e.g. pig/pork), differences in 
media interest and portrayals between species, and children’s socialisation. Dissociation 
variables might lead to animals becoming what Adams (2000) calls the ‘absent referent’ 
in meat; that is, animals are conceptually missing from the end product.
Pious (1993), Wood (1971) and Serpell (1996) have all independently argued 
that the remoteness o f animal industries conceals them from consumers. Serpell (1996) 
emphasises that farming’s buildings, transportation and slaughterhouses are more 
surreptitious, far-removed and closed-off from the public than are other industries. 
Parker (2005) also observed that farming animals is traditionally a media-shy industry. 
Pious (1993) emphasises the renaming of animals into meat, and marketing publications’ 
advice to farmers regarding the packaging and presentation o f themselves, their animals 
and meat to the public, to demonstrate the roles that language and appearance play in 
this dissociation. Serpell (1996) independently agrees and, like Pious (1993), reinforces 
his ideas with industry evidence:
We talk about ‘beef, ‘veal’ and ‘pork’ rather than bull-meat, calf-meat or 
pig-meat because the euphemisms, in every sense, are more palatable than 
the reality. The meat industry is only too well aware of this. A recent edition 
o f the British Meat Trades Journal recommended a change in terminology 
designed to ‘conjure up an image of meat divorced from the act of 
slaughter’. Suggestions included getting rid of the words ‘butcher’ and 
‘slaughterhouse’ and replacing them with the American euphemisms ‘meat 
plant’ and ‘meat factory’. (1996, p. 195)
Further endorsing this is a British Government report that concluded that 
animal welfare messages should not be directed towards consumers because of: “the risk 
o f reducing demand by reminding consumers o f the link between animals and meat” 
(MAFF, 1999). Here the Government body responsible for agriculture and food 
endorses the concept o f dissociation variables, and demonstrates their manipulation.
Serpell (1996), the British Meat Trades Journal (Serpell, 1996) and MAFF 
(1999) support Plous’s (1993) concept o f dissociation variables, the reasons for them 
(because people dislike the idea o f slaughter) and the part that language plays in this 
dissociation. Kenyon and Barker (1998) also include ‘meat’ itself in such dissociation.
Children’s socialisation is another dissociation variable. Sanders and Hirschman 
(1996), like Pious (1993), argue that the basis for inconsistent beliefs lies in contrary 
social messages which emphasise animals as objects o f both affection and consumption. 
Children therefore eat meat before they are aware o f its origins and are consequently
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committed consumers without inconsistent beliefs. Here is a simple explanation of 
Plous’s (1993) finding that young children do not consider ‘pig’ and ‘pork’ to be related.
As children are taught both to love and consume animals, it is hardly surprising 
that Pious (1993) finds social characteristics which aid this learning. Children are 
socialised to believe that meat is nutritionally necessary in their diet, and that farmed 
animals are happy. Pious (1993) contrasts the materials from which children learn 
(storybooks and trips to visit old-fashioned farms) with health authorities’ statements 
and intensive factory farms. Unsurprisingly, Pious and Doty (see Pious, 1993) found that 
many children are unaware o f how farmed animals are used and believe that they lead 
happy lives (Pious, 1993, implicitly disagrees, therefore, that farmed animals are happy). 
Consequently, the different learning contexts associated with children’s exposure to, and 
experience of, animals and eating meat can account for the acquisition o f seemingly 
inconsistent attitudes. This is explored in more detail in section 3.1.
2.4 Can historical patterns predict the future?
Ryder (2000) notes that from the 17th to the 19th centuries, England was 
exceptionally carnivorous. Then, meat was thought essential to the human diet, a status 
symbol, and an assertion o f the difference between ‘Englishmen’ and ‘brutes’. However, 
Ryder (2000) found writings on vegetarianism dating from the 16th century, and the first 
modem evidence o f revulsion at the slaughter o f animals and eating o f meat in the late 
17th century, when the first animal protection laws also arose. Organised vegetarianism 
appeared in the early 19th century, coinciding with humane children’s publications, the 
concealment o f slaughter from public view, the obscurance o f the animal origin o f meat 
dishes, the introduction o f effective legislation, and the foundation o f the SPCA (to 
become the RSPCA).
Ryder (2000) argues that Queen Victoria’s patronage of the RSPCA ensured its 
conservative, fashionable and aristocratic respectability. In contrast to their European 
contemporaries, who looked up to scientists, Victorian Britons were pre-occupied with 
emulating the upper-class. The upper-class championed the abolition o f cruelties to 
animals— as long as these cruelties were working-class aberrations. At the same time, 
greater affluence and personal security allowed people the luxury to contemplate 
morality. And they had plenty to contemplate, with the findings that pain could be 
controlled causing a change in attitude toward suffering, and the theory o f evolution
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becoming widely known. However, Ryder (2000) also notes that overcoming reluctance 
to inflict pain was seen as a sign of rationality and manliness.
The animal welfare movement recovered from the 20th century’s world wars 
with literary attacks on factory farming in the 1960s. According to Ryder (2000), post- 
1960s’ ideologies emphasise compassion, questioning machismo and patriarchy, while 
science, including psychology, started to demystify the human species and discover more 
about other animals’ intelligence and sentience. However, the 20th century also produced 
technology and science, making greater demands on other species than ever before.
Although research into patterns of vegetarianism is often funded by special 
interest groups, meaning that it must be interpreted cautiously, it does seem to show 
increasing vegetarianism over time.
Chart 1: Vegetarians in the British population
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H eigh t o f  
BSE crisis
The Realeat Surveys (Anon, 2002) were conducted by Gallup from 1984 until 
2001 (see Chart 1). The surveys show increasing vegetarianism and an increase in people 
reporting that they were eating less meat than they used to. A Mintel report estimated a 
38% rise in the meat-free foods market from 1999 to 2004 and Taylor Nelson Sofres 
identified a 6% rise year-on-year (Anon, 2005). Supermarket giant Safeway (now owned 
by Morrisons) also funded research predicting an estimated 2,000 people a week 
becoming vegetarian (Anon, 2003b). Serpell (1999) argues that minority groups’ 
criticisms o f the treatment of animals have now extended to widespread public 
controversy. Hursthouse (2000) concurs:
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If  you are over forty, you might remember how many people used to wear 
real fur coats in the winter; you do not see many now in Britain. British 
supermarkets now offer free-range chickens and free-range eggs; they didn’t 
twenty years ago. People working in university laboratories in Britain used to 
experiment on living creatures without any formalized constraint; now their 
experiments (supposedly) have to be approved by ‘ethics committees’. In 
some circles at least, vegetarianism has increased dramatically. I never 
knowingly encountered a vegetarian at the philosophy conferences I went to 
twenty or more years ago; now they are quite common, and at some ethics 
conferences ... they are the rule rather than the exception. (2000, p. 12)
Foot and mouth disease, BSE, bird flu, blue tongue and salmonella have made 
our use o f farmed animals front-page news. The BBC’s ICM poll conducted in April 
2001— the height o f a foot and mouth crisis— showed that just over a quarter o f the 9% 
of vegetarians in the sample had stopped eating meat recently. BBC Radio 4’s Today 
programme (Anon, 2001) reported on the Vegetarian Society being inundated with 
enquires from traumatised news viewers in response to images o f animals being 
slaughtered.
However, the last two Realeat Surveys show a decline in vegetarianism from 
the 1997 high o f 5.4% (Anon, 1999). While the latest report explains this as a return to 
pre-BSE levels, as those who rejected meat for health reasons resume consumption as 
their fears subside, it is possible that were the research to have continued it might show 
continued decline in vegetarianism.
Further, despite a reduction in animal experiments in Britain since 1976, having 
almost halved over the last 30 years, there were increases in the preceding six years to the 
last available figures in 2007 (Anon, 2009a). Animal procedures rose by 18% between 
1995 and 2007. Passariello (1999) also points out that the UK’s huge pet industry 
demands the slaughtering o f many animals to feed heavily carnivorous pet animals. And 
a few years after the publication o f Hursthouse’s (2000) book, from which her above 
quotation was taken, fur and leather are back in fashion (Anon, 2003e; Marsh, 2004). 
Consumers are reported to know, but be uninterested in, the cost to animals; they just 
want to look glamorous (Anon, 2003a).
Finally, Dolins (1999) highlights the direct conflict between humans and, 
especially endangered, animals as a “ ... delicate balancing act [that] attempts to keep 
itself upright amidst an onslaught of human needs, desires, and at times, greed” (1999, 
p.3). Lawrence (2009) also comments on the conflict o f pressure to produce more meat 
to feed a globally growing population, which in turn creates more efficient agriculture
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and therefore increased pressure on animal welfare. Young (1999), agreeing with 
Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004) and contradicting Scruton (2000), draws attention to the 
routine deprivation o f farm animals’ basic psychological needs. While Lawrence (2009) 
argues that it is the job o f economics and biology to find the optimal balance, he also 
accepts that animal welfare concerns have recently moved from being a northern 
European concern to a global concern, including developing countries. While British 
animal welfare has enjoyed a good reputation globally for many years, other countries are 
now considered to be catching up, hence, Lawrence (2009) argues, Britain is not 
‘levelling down’, but the rest o f the world is ‘levelling up’. There have been a number o f 
global conferences already this year on animal welfare in farming.
The historical anlayses and sometimes conflicting modern observations o f our 
relationship with meat and other animals have not definitively answered the question o f 
whether individual people find this relationship consistent or not. Neither have they 
identified a clear behavioural trend.
2.5 The roles of nature and nurture
Serpell (1996) argues that because humans lived as hunter-gatherers for more 
than 90% o f their history, it is natural for modern people to empathise with animals and 
to feel guilt at harming them, as these are contemporary hunter-gatherers’ sentiments. 
Further, most hunter-gatherers kill limited numbers o f animals and make some form of 
symbolic reparation, while animals’ economic exploitation is a modern, Western 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, even in Western laboratories Serpell (1999) found that 
individual animals can be nurtured, named and spared experimentation by scientists who, 
he argues, in some way attempt to atone or compensate for their treatment o f less 
fortunate, anonymous animals. Serpell (1996) suggests that hatred for animals may be 
psychologically abnormal across all cultures (in contrast to meat-rejection), and argues 
that significant health benefits o f living with companion animals (e.g. Serpell, 1991, 
Anderson, et. al., 1992, Friedmann and Thomas, 1995, Rogers, et. al., 1993) demonstrate 
the effects o f evolved tendencies to feel positively towards animals.
In contrast, Cooper’s (1999) analysis o f people’s sentiment towards wildlife 
suggests that there is nothing evolved about our concern for wildlife in general, and that 
it is, in fact, a recent phenomenon.
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In any case, Serpell (1996) and Ryder (2000) agree that most people cannot 
normally harm animals with indifference. Serpell (1996) suggests that the natural 
tendency to interpret other people is automatically extended to animals. Ryder (2000) 
claims that people’s compassion for animals arose from increased familiarity, especially 
once other species had been domesticated. Ryder (2000) thus postulates that compassion 
is innate due to natural selection, but that so too is the contrary drive to dominate based 
upon our ancestors’ dependence on other species’ bodies for food, clothing and tools. 
Thus, inconsistency is a natural human inevitability.
I f  Ryder (2000) is right, and dominating and compassionate tendencies are 
innate, then this could explain the recent decline in vegetarianism and the return o f fur to 
the fashion industry. Changes in recent years could represent minor oscillations around a 
stable balance that is resistant to change, as in an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’ where a 
proliferation o f one force inadvertendy allows its opposite force to prosper before the 
balance tips and the original force is once again advantaged.
Hills’s (1993) survey effectively independendy tests Ryder’s (2000) theory 
because these theorists use ‘equality’ and ‘compassion’ synonymously. Hills (1993) 
concludes that:
... it is as if equality and dominance exist as two orthogonal dimensions for 
the urban public, while for animal rights supporters, and to a lesser extent 
for farmers, they have become opposite poles of a single dimension.
(1993, p. 124)
In other words, ordinary meat-eaters may not recognise themselves in Ryder’s 
(2000) description, but there is some evidence for his theory. Nevertheless, both Ryder 
(2000) and Serpell (1996) include cultural influences in their theories.
Meat is regularly consumed by a minority o f the world’s people (Fiddes, 1994). 
Willard (2002) and Eder (1996) independendy observe that animal products are the most 
regulated and most commonly avoided foods in the world.
Perhaps the best example of cultural differences in perceived ‘edibility’ (at least, 
to those in the West) is the dog:
In a culturally malleable, dynamic system, humans seem simultaneously to 
anthropomorphize and yet polarize other animals, recognizing both the 
close links and the dilemmas inherent in the intimacy. The dog can be best 
friend, or frightening assailant, or even dinner, largely depending upon 
cultural constructions, and depending on how the identity and power issues 
of the dog are specified by the humans involved. (Passariello, 1999, p.12)
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In Britain, as in other countries, eating many animals remains taboo. If the 
reasons for this can be understood, it may explain how consistency is, or is not, applied 
between animals. In recent years British interest has flickered in ‘exotic meats’
(e.g. ostrich, kangaroo, reptilian) and ‘nose-to-tail’ eating. But this has not revolutionised 
the prevailing meat-and-two-veg and hamburger cultures. Figure 1, proposed by Leach in 
1964, identifies ‘edible’ animals through dichotomies. It was still relevant for Eder (1996) 
and, on the whole, remains so today. (Clearly horses, dogs, cats, many insects and so on 
are ‘edible’, but according to taboos in Britain these species are ‘inedible’.)
Figure 1: Food taboos in modern society
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Eder (1996) argues that food taboos are communicative actions that bind a 
society, fostering solidarity and integration. If food taboos help define the social order 
across space and time, then morality, nationhood, history, tradition, ancestry and family 
life are all embedded in what a people do and do not eat. As a result, Eder (1996) argues
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that food taboos express an unconscious collective moral feeling, or moral norms, that 
represent the symbolic foundations o f social order and are pre-requisites o f a prevailing 
moral consciousness. According to Eder (1996), the variety o f species lend themselves to 
classification and order, making animals good to think about, as well as to eat and 
prohibit. This ‘thinking about’— classifying and ordering—produces a model o f social 
order and morality for a society’s members. So, rather than being just a receptacle for, or 
manifestation of, pre-ordained moral codes, the way in which people treat animals is 
actually part o f the foundation o f morality.
In this view, meat is not just a food that could be substituted for another 
protein. Rather, a way o f life that features right and wrong, liberty and choice, not to 
mention status and wealth, is tied up with meat. Indeed, Kenyon and Barker (1998) 
found that some teenagers associated meat with good times, important meals, quality 
food and status.
So what makes some animals taboo and others meat? Eder (1996) answers that 
universally, cognitively anomalous animals are taboo (although what defines a feature as 
anomalous is culturally-specific). Therefore, at the heart o f Eder’s (1996) social 
constructionist theory is an evolved, cognitive ability. Disorder is avoided by 
distinguishing anomalies from convention. For example, turtles that have four legs, yet 
lay eggs; snakes that are land animals, yet grow no feet; pets that are part animal, yet part 
human ... Eder (1996) concludes, as shown in Figure 2, that:
... edible animals are those that occupy an intermediate position between
those closest to human beings and the predators. (1996, p.82)
Figure 2: What makes taboos taboo?
Distance to the self Near M------------------------------------------------------------------► Far
Pets Livestock (farm) G am e (field) Wild
Food taboos Taboo Edible Edible Taboo
Source: Based on Eder (1996) p.82
Predators are very remote from ‘the self. Across cultures, myths oppose their 
bestial nature with humanity. Predators are killers who break cultural regulations, 
ignoring the special ritual and symbolic control and justification o f killing. Eating a 
predator would imbue an ordered society with the predators’ own disorder. On the other
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hand, pets are very near to the self and often anthropomorphised in fairy tales. So, 
animals that are similar to people also contradict a constructed order o f nature.
Serpell (1996) argues that most Westerners assume an ‘economic’ attitude 
towards farmed animals while animals kept as pets are exempt from the same treatment 
for no obvious reason. He claims that the result would be morally and psychologically 
intolerable if both types o f treatment were equally important, so one type o f treatment is 
labelled abnormal and therefore unimportant. Thus, Serpell (1996) argues that we have 
assumed a disparaging and condescending attitude toward pet-keeping so that the 
economic use o f animals may remain unchallenged.
Eder (1996) also includes modern slaughtering techniques in his theory. Like 
the theorists already introduced who emphasise the dissociation o f slaughter and animals 
from meat, Eder (1996) independendy asserts that there is more to the modern 
specialisation and abstraction o f slaughter from society than can be explained as simply 
the way o f Western business. But in contrast to the other theorists, he argues that it is a 
moral ritual.
2.6 The explanatory power of existing theories and their views 
of consistency
The theories do not explain the public representations from Chapter 1 of 
Scruton (2000), Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004), Johnson (2004), Cohen (2000) or Adams 
(2000) very well. The greatest problem is that, according to the theories, such 
representations should not be available. Dissociation variables should prevent people 
from confronting the issue altogether. Indeed, it is questionable whether people 
experience inconsistency if dissociation variables do their job properly. Perhaps there is a 
reason why the representations o f the cultural commentators are articulated and 
published, while other people’s are not. It could be because other people have not 
addressed the issues, at least to the same extent. Perhaps it is no wonder, then, that the 
cultural commentators seem braver and more knowledgeable than the theories in this 
Chapter give people credit for. While the commentators demonstrate that simultaneously 
feeling in opposing ways is not necessarily psychologically intolerable in itself, they may 
not speak for those of us, perhaps the majority o f us, who would rather not think about 
the issues or our potential inconsistency.
34
Chapter 2  ^ Theories o f  psychological and cultural avoidance o f  the life and death behind meat
Only Ryder (2000), Serpell (1996) and Eder (1996) address the question o f why 
people positively evaluate animals. All the other theorists take this for granted when 
asking why animals are used as they are. Ryder (2000), Serpell (1996) and Eder (1996) 
argue that people’s concern for animals is either an evolved disposition, or evolved 
ability to construct order out o f socially-defined animal features. Ryder (2000) and Eder 
(1996) offer psychological explanations for the continued Western consumption o f meat 
and concern for animals, but at different ends o f the nature/nurture dimension. At one 
end are the innate drives o f dominance and compassion, and at the other end is the 
communicative and moral structure o f the cultural unconscious that binds together a 
society and its people. For other theorists, e.g. Pious (1993), the emphasis falls on meat- 
eating as the crucial phenomenon to be explained.
Eder’s (1996) emphasis on taboos sees consistency defined in the different 
cultural roles fulfilled by animals. For Pious (1993), Ryder (2000) and Serpell (1996), 
however, dissociation variables are evidence that our uses o f animals are psychologically 
inconsistent.
So the questions remain: does the relationship between people’s attitudes 
towards farmed animals and meat-eating cause any psychological inconsistency? If  
people do experience any psychological inconsistency, then how do they handle this and 
what effect does it have? Just as importantly, if people do not experience any perceived 
inconsistency, then how do they differ to the theories just investigated?
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Chapter 3 How psychology can help to understand attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat
This Chapter explores theories that may contribute to understanding the 
psychological relationship between eating meat and evaluating animals. The dominant 
theory is cognitive dissonance theory. However, complementary theories that can enrich 
both cognitive dissonance theory and the topic are also included. Attitude theories are 
introduced first.
3.1 Attitudes and behaviours
One way to conceptualise the topic is through attitudes: one attitude towards 
meat, another towards farm animals, and another towards animals’ slaughter. Billig 
(1996) introduces attitude theory as problematic:
Certainly within the history of social psychology, the notion of an ‘attitude’ 
has been a troublesome one. Different psychologists have offered different 
definitions. Some have argued that our attitudes reflect our emotions, whilst 
others stress that our attitudes are habits of thinking. For other 
psychologists our attitudes are neurological states of readiness. All these 
psychologists will dispute with those others who see our attitudes as 
abstractions dreamt up by ‘attitude theorists’ ... (1996, p.205)
For those who accept that the attitude construct is helpful, however, an 
uncontentious view is that attitudes demonstrate people’s preferences. Zanna and 
Rempel (1988) offer this description:
... an attitude [is] the categorisation of a stimulus object along an evaluative 
dimension based upon, or generated from, three general classes of 
information: (1) cognitive information, (2) affective/emotional information, 
and/or (3) information concerning past behaviours or behavioural 
intentions. (1988, p.319)
Much early attitude research failed to predict behaviour (see Potter, 1996). 
Myers (1993) concludes that the correlation between attitudes and behaviour is 
optimised when the attitude is salient and specific to behaviour, and the influences on 
how people express their attitudes, and influences on the behaviour itself, are minimised.
However, Potter (1996) argues that accounting for situational and normative 
factors means that the usefulness o f the general attitude notion is diminished. As Knight 
et. al. (2003) found (and Bern and McConnel, 1970, before them), people may construct 
their attitudes backwards from their behaviour. Research findings o f a strong connection 
between attitudes and behaviour are therefore hardly surprising, but also 
hardly informative.
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Nevertheless, attitude theory draws on well-established measurement 
techniques and, when used carefully, can predict people’s actions.
Ajzen’s (2002) theory o f planned behaviour is one o f the best-known theories 
that aims to draw together attitudes and behaviours, explaining why they may match, or 
fail to match, depending on a number o f variables. Relevant variables include normative 
beliefs (perceived expectations o f others) and the subjective norm (perceived social 
pressure). But it is Ajzen’s (2002) concept o f behavioural beliefs that is most interesting 
here.
Yablo (1992) highlights the difficulty o f assuming psychological causal 
relations. The intention o f eating meat does not cognitively demand the act o f killing 
animals. Most Western meat-eaters do not kill animals in order to eat meat, so killing 
animals is not an intentional or unintentional act. Thus animals and their slaughter may 
not constitute ordinary behavioural beliefs o f eating meat for most meat-eaters. This 
could explain the findings o f Povey, et. al. (2001), explored in section 2.1, that meat- 
eaters, in contrast to vegetarians, do not normally think o f animals in relation to meat.
Attitudes are considered to be formed through cognitive, affective and 
behavioural processes, and to have similarly varied responses (Eagly and Chaiken, 2005; 
Zanna and Rempel, 1988), which may be malleable by situational influences and inner 
states. Hence, as discussed in section 2.3, children’s socialisation may account for 
apparently inconsistent attitudes towards animals and eating meat (Sanders and 
Hirschman, 1996; Pious, 1993) as children’s experience o f animals is as objects o f both 
affection and consumption.
Campbell (1963) envisages an attitude as an experience resulting from some 
interaction with the perceived attitude object. This experienced response leaves a mental 
residue, predisoposing the owner to a similar response on subsequent encounters. If  the 
tendency o f evaluation has developed over many encounters with the attitude object at 
different timepoints, different aspects o f that residue o f past experience may form the 
basis o f attitudinal response under differing circumstances.
Eagly and Chaiken (2005) agree that people can hold multiple attitudes towards 
the same object (see also Bassili and Brown, 2005). The evidence shows that positive and 
negative responding has different physiological correlates and that negative aspects of 
people’s attitudes often exert stronger influence on behaviour than positive aspects
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(Cacioppo, et. al., 1997). Eagly and Chaiken (2005) therefore support the view of 
attitudes as coexisting positive and negative tendencies.
Learning mechanisms such as classical and instrumental conditioning (e.g., see 
Toates, 1986) are some of the ways in which attitudes are formed, along with the 
presentation o f complex verbal information (Eagly and Chaiken, 2005). Greenwald and 
Banaji’s (1995), explanation o f why people positively or negatively evaluate something 
draws on two established theories, the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) and 
subliminal attitude conditioning (e.g. Krosnick, et. al., 1992). Greenwald and Banaji 
(1995) describe the mere exposure effect as, “the relationship between frequency o f 
encounter and liking for a wide variety o f stimuli in a wide variety o f contexts” (1995, 
p.10). This is precisely the reason Ryder (2000) gave to explain how people historically 
came to like other animals.
Assuming that most people encounter meat often, and more frequently than 
they encounter farmed animals or their slaughter, then, on the basis o f the mere 
exposure effect alone, people should evaluate meat more positively than farmed animals 
or their slaughter. The second favourite target should therefore be farmed animals, 
followed by animals’ slaughter as the least favourite. The conditioning effect may also be 
particularly powerful for eating meat.
These effects mean that people’s familiarity with meat, and the conditioning 
effects o f eating meat, may cause them to ‘like’ it. The same effects apply to anything 
with which people come into contact (unless the experience is negative), including other 
animals. These effects go unrecognised by people who may attribute their liking for meat 
to the intrinsic qualities o f meat itself in a form of ‘genuine liking’ belief. This takes a 
well-known phenomenon, the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Ross, 1977) (where, for 
example, people erroneously attribute intentions to other people), and extends its 
explanatory power into previously discrete concepts.
Modelling — where children naturally mimic the behaviour o f role models, such 
as parents (e.g. VandenBoss, 2006) — reference groups, made up o f people with 
perceived similar attitudes, values and relationships to oneself (Forsyth, 1996) where 
conformity to that group’s social norms can be expected (Asch, 1955) also influence 
attitude acquisition. As animals and meat-eating are culturally rich phenomena, the social 
norms to hold positive attitudes towards animals and eating meat are likely to be strong. 
Other developmental socialisation sources specific to animals and meat-eating were
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explored in section 2.3. As the resulting attitudes are not usually combined or compared, 
different contexts o f being exposed to animals and meat-eating would be expected to 
produce different attitudes towards the same objects, which may also be activated in 
different contexts.
Attitude researchers generally assume that people have conscious access to 
their attitudes and can reasonably explicitly express them (e.g. Aiken, 2002), but this too 
may not be the case. Greenwald and Banaji (1995) believe that traditional attitude 
researchers have ignored social behaviour that works implicitly, or non-consciously.
Results from the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) (Greenwald and Banaji, 
1995, see p.70 for an outline o f the Test) suggest that, along with the perception of 
something, comes automatic unconscious comprehension and an emotional opinion 
about it. This happens in milliseconds. Thus, “hedonic valence” (Barrett et. al., 2007, 
p. 190) (a positive/negative, pleasant/unpleasant evaluation) is largely automatic.
Damasio (1996) also concludes from his work with people who have suffered brain 
injuries, that emotional opinions are as involved in reasoning as is thinking. Few 
decisions can, in fact, be ‘rational’ without emotion to guide us. The way these theorists 
use ‘emotional opinions’, ‘hedonic valences’ and ‘implicit attitudes’ is synonymous as far 
as their relevance here is concerned.
Implicit and explicit attitudes may be, but need not be, the same. That is: what 
people consciously think they think, may not be how they respond when they’re ‘not 
thinking’. This is in tune with the discussion previously o f multiple attitudes. Greenwald 
et. al. (1998) offer an example where ‘White’ experimental participants genuinely believed 
themselves to be free from racial prejudice and to like ‘Black’ and W hite’ people equally. 
However, their implicit attitudes demonstrated that many participants strongly preferred 
W hite’ over ‘Black’ people. The Implicit Associate Test (“IAT”), as outlined in more 
detail on p.70, compares the speed o f responses between categories and allows the 
researcher to conclude that categories that are strongly associated with positive words, or 
poorly associated with negative words, ascertained by ease, or speed, o f responses are 
implicitly preferred to categories that are less well associated with positive words, or 
more strongly associated with negative words. Thus the speed o f responses to categories 
when associated with positive or negative words produces a relative implicit attitudinal 
preference (as outlined by Greenwald, et. al., 1998, p.1,474).
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Implicit attitudes are more robust against some of the criticisms o f attitude 
theory. For example, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) do not claim that implicit attitudes 
will mirror people’s fluctuating evaluations in everyday discourse in a variety of 
situations. In fact their appreciation o f ‘self presentation forces’ (trying to appear— even 
to oneself—in a certain way) explains how implicit measures may not match explicit 
measures and how explicit attitudes are vulnerable to change (precisely because o f the 
context and its effect on how people present themselves, say). Implicit attitudes are more 
stable, possibly objectionable to their holder, and are likely to influence behaviour in 
subtle ways where they can avoid confronting conflicting explicit attitudes. There is 
nothing abnormal about having simultaneously opposing attitudes towards the same 
object in this view. Both implicit and explicit attitudes are ‘true’ but apply in different 
contexts and in different ways (Nosek et. al., 2007).
Haidt (2001), Bargh (2007) and Greene (2007) explore similar concepts to 
implicit attitudes in researching how people make moral judgements. Bargh (2007) and 
Haidt (2001) conclude that people’s moral arguments are often mere post-hoc 
justifications to support intuitive judgements. Although people lack access to the real, 
non-conscious, reasons behind such judgements, that does not stop them vehemently 
defending judgements with justifications that they believe to be true. Haidt (2001) 
therefore concludes that an ‘intuitionist model’ o f judgement-making is more plausible 
than a ‘rationalist model’. He, like Bargh (2007), sees the intuitive (implicit, 
non-conscious) process as the default, quickly and easily handling everyday judgements. 
Reasoning, then, works mainly as a post-hoc justification to defend prior moral 
commitments, rather than to create reasoned judgement or private reflection.
The sudden appearance o f a judgement through moral intuition includes an 
implicit attitude, whether it is good or bad, liked or disliked, without any conscious 
awareness o f how this happened. The judgement seems to make itself. Plentiful evidence 
exists for biased post-hoc reasoning to support intuitive judgements. For example, 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) found that people searched for plausible theories to explain 
their behaviour, although the responsible cognitive processes were not consciously 
accessible. Nosek, et. al. (2007) argue that, “ [wjith the ability to introspect comes the 
palpable feeling o f ‘knowing’ o f being objective or certain, o f being mentally in control 
o f one’s thoughts, aware o f the causes o f one’s thoughts, feelings and actions, and of 
making decisions deliberately and rationally” (2007, p.265). But they agree with Wegner
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(2003) that experienced intentions are merely erroneous attributions, without causal 
power, and that, in fact, underlying processes give rise to both felt intentions and acts. 
Many other examples come from the decades o f cognitive dissonance research explored 
in the next section.
O f course, the debate about how much of action is consciously instigated, or 
even whether the ‘true’ reasons for action can be known, is not new. For example, 
Deecke, et. al.’s (1976) EEG  measurements demonstrated that simply flexing a finger 
demanded unconscious preparation before the intention to flex a finger became 
conscious. They concluded that the unconscious makes the decision to act and that 
feelings o f will are illusory. This makes evolutionary sense, as our ancestors’ survival had 
more to do with finding food and mates, while avoiding predators, than with how well 
they ‘saw’ the world.
However, Uleman and Moskowitz (1994) found that some control can be 
exerted over processes that seemed unintentional and non-conscious. Barrett, et. al. 
(2007) agree that an automatic-controlled dichotomy (such as that favoured by Goleman, 
1996) is oversimplistic and further argue that the assumption that emotions are always 
due to an automatic process, and that their regulation is always due to a controlled 
process, is wrong. Some control can be exerted over emotion (e.g. failing to experience 
anger when we want to impress someone, even when they are rude).
Although Bargh (2007) urges that conscious and non-conscious elements are 
involved in many processes, he agrees with Damasio (1996) that most social behaviour 
originates through impulses, not a conscious intention, and Dijksterhuis, et. al. (2007) 
argue that it would be mystifying if behaviour did start consciously. This contradicts 
much traditional attitude research that assumes people have access to the reasons for 
their views. The data gleaned by methods like the IAT benefit from being drawn directly 
from non-conscious reactions.
3.2 What role might cognitive dissonance play?
One o f the most influential theories in social psychology is cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Dissonance is an uncomfortable state caused by 
people’s awareness o f inconsistency among their own beliefs, attitudes or actions.
Section 3.1 explored the ways in which people may acquire different attitudes towards 
the same objects, but, o f course, attitudes towards different objects may also appear to
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be at odds with each other: like positive attitudes towards animals and eating meat under 
certain circumstances. Stone (2001) argues that cognitive dissonance theory predated the 
formal introduction of social cognition into psychology in the 1970s and that few ideas 
in social psychology have generated as much theoretical and empirical interest as 
cognitive dissonance theory.
Aronson (1999) views dissonance as an unpleasant drive state: as basic as 
hunger, thirst, or pain. Harmon-Jones (1999, 2000) agrees that the negative emotion 
caused by cognitive dissonance works like pain, providing information and prompting 
action towards an adaptive or functional response (although, as with chronic pain, the 
consequences can sometimes be maladaptive or dysfunctional). While much behaviour 
may be performed automatically, the challenge that gives rise to dissonance may threaten 
optimum behaviour. Dissonance therefore directs conscious attention to ensure that the 
best course o f action is followed.
Cognitive dissonance theory has been the focus of much theoretical and 
empirical controversy. For example, impression management theory (Tedeschi, et. al., 
1971) suggests that participants only present themselves as having changed their attitudes 
in order to be viewed favourably by experimenters. However, there is much evidence 
that dissonance processes do produce genuine cognitive changes. A confederate, 
ostensibly disconnected to the experimenter, has measured attitudes by observing 
participants’ behaviour (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Linder et. al., 1967) and attitude 
measures have also been taken in private situations (Harmon-Jones et. al., 1996). 
Physiological changes (Brehm, et. al., 1964) and research results in the free-choice 
paradigm (see page 50, following, and Wicklund and Brehm, 1976) are also difficult to 
explain from the perspective o f impression management. Experiments on peripheral 
blood flow and electrodermal activity (e.g. Cacioppo and Petty, 1979) show that 
dissonance increases somatic responses reflective o f negative emotion. Wicklund and 
Frey (1981) also summarise a host o f evidence, particularly where research participants 
selectively expose themselves to information, which cannot be explained without the 
notion o f a ‘tension state’ which must be actively reduced. Although there remain 
variations within the field, Wicklund and Frey (1981) maintain that dissonance theorists 
across the spectrum now agree that genuine cognitive changes can occur in 
dissonance studies.
43
Chapter 3 How psychology can help to understand attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat
The wealth o f cognitive dissonance literature can be split into two broad 
streams. One stream concerns the nature and processes o f cognitive dissonance itself 
and typically involves an induced-compliance experiment (Worchel and Cooper, 1979). 
Although such methods usually measure participants’ own views initially, they then 
divert participants’ thinking away from their genuinely held beliefs. The methods 
therefore suffer from a lack o f ecological validity. Indeed, Aronson, et. al. (1999) lament 
the loss o f cognitive dissonance’s wide scope since the 1970s through the induced- 
compliance paradigm.
The other stream in the cognitive dissonance literature, applies the theory to 
explain natural phenomena, like so-called ‘native inconsistencies’ (McGregor, et. al., 
1999), that are not induced by a researcher. While these applications demonstrate the 
wide explanatory power o f the theory, the theory is often applied in a post-hoc manner 
without attempting to test the validity o f its application (e.g. Chapanis and Chapanis, 
1964). Consequently there is a gap between the laboratory research which, for all its 
empirical power may not represent real life, and the real life observations that 
lack testability.
Agreeing, Leippe and Eisenstadt (1999) argue that attitude-discrepant 
behaviour and dissonance are common, daily experiences, but that how people deal with 
dissonance under day-to-day conditions while maintaining stable identities and attitude 
systems remains to be understood.
Although physiological research powerfully demonstrated that dissonance 
causes arousal, it yielded inconclusive results about the core assumption that 
psychological distress is experienced and the nature o f dissonance reduction. For 
example, Devine, et. al. (1999) argued that there was little evidence that any discomfort 
that may have been created by dissonance induction was alleviated following attitude 
change. This is crucial to understanding the mechanism underlying the dissonance 
process. When Elliot and Devine (1994) created their self-report measure o f dissonance 
based on Festinger’s (1957) original work, it not only solved the failings o f the somatic 
measures by rooting the experience o f discomfort in their experiment, but demonstrated 
that this experience eases to comfort quickly following consonance restoration through 
attitude change. Elliot and Devine’s (1994) measure was soon employed by others, who 
independently validated it, and praised by many more (e.g. Harmon-Jones and Mills,
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1999; Cooper, J., 1999; Leippe and Eisenstadt, 1999; Sakai, 1999; McGregor, et. al.,
1999). For these reasons, their measure has been adopted in this study (see Chapter 4).
Different theories interpret dissonance motivation differendy. For example, 
some focus on the perceived aversive consequences o f behaviour (Cooper and Fazio, 
1984), some on the threats o f inconsistency to the integrity o f the self-belief system 
(Steele, 1988), while others retain the original focus on inconsistencies between 
behaviour and a specific attitude or belief (Festinger, 1957, Harmon-Jones, 1999, 2000). 
The self-affirmation theory is closest to Plous’s (1993) view, discussed earlier, that 
harming an animal, albeit indirecdy, is at odds with people’s compassionate self- 
concepts.
Each o f these theories is insufficient alone to explain all o f the cognitive 
dissonance evidence, and consequendy Stone (2001) argues that each perspective 
describes an important part o f the cognitive dissonance process. Stone and Cooper 
(2000) proposed the self-standards model to synthesise these theories. It argues that the 
motivational basis o f dissonance depends pardy on the attributes or standards that 
people use to interpret and evaluate their behaviour, which may be construed in different 
ways, based on attitudes, self-concepts or cultural rules, say.
Stone (2001) argues that people with different expectations o f their behaviour 
may differ in terms o f perceiving discrepancies between their behaviour and self­
expectancies. Thus, perhaps meat-eaters and vegetarians have different self-expectations. 
This means that social norms and idiographic conceptions may influence whether or not 
dissonance is experienced, and these variables may, in turn, be influenced by what 
information is salient in the context o f a given behaviour. Thus there is great malleability 
in the interpretation and evaluation o f behaviour. Consequendy, Stone (2001) claims that 
it is more appropriate to consider dissonance motivation as a function of qualitatively 
different processes, dependent on the information made accessible in the context of 
behaviour, rather than a function o f one master motive.
Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) theory also allows for idiographic and contextual 
differences in dissonance. They argue that a person free from dissonance may be curious 
about new or incongruous information:
... if the motivational version of consistency theory is understood as a 
theory of waxing and waning of tensions, there is then no reason to read 
such a theory as implying that there can be no curiosity, thrill or 
surprise-seeking. ... The perspective does not argue that in general, tension
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must always be minimised, but rather that tension with respect to an 
ongoing commitment must be minimised. It is important then to know 
precisely what the person’s goals are at any time, for it is just in these focal 
areas that the individual will strive to eliminate tension. (1981, p.159)
In other words, a state o f nil arousal is not necessarily desirable and the active 
approach to tension states is flexible.
Hills (1993) (see page 24) found that although some people were ‘highly 
ambivalent’ about their meat-consumption, they were pre-occupied with other worries. 
This fits with Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) explanation: Hills’s (1993) respondents’ 
thinking capacities may have been simply too full to deliberate problems of this nature. 
Indeed Shah, et. al. (2002) show that the activation o f a given goal inhibits the 
representation o f alternative accessible goals that compete for attentional resources, and 
Dijksterhuis et. al. (2007) argue that it is probably only when goal-achievement is 
obstructed that goals become consciously experienced at all.
There are two ways in which perceived inconsistency may cause dissonance. 
The first way relates to a need for information or stimulation, which may itself 
vary between individuals. Wicklund and Frey (1981) suggest that dissonance is more 
likely to arise if someone seeks stimulation; and a propensity for seeking stimulation may 
itself be related to personality, as extroverts are more likely than introverts to do so (e.g. 
Eysenck, 1970). For example, boredom may drive people towards contentious topics for 
entertainment or distraction. Kruglanski (e.g. 1989, 2006) also identified that people 
differ along a continuum from needing to attain, to needing to avoid, cognitive closure. 
Calogero, Bardi and Sutton (in press) found that individual differences in people’s need 
for cognitive closure affected people’s underlying values, for example, leading them to 
prefer more traditional values, or to seek stimulation. Again, this might enable some 
people more than others to cope with dissonance or to achieve consonance through 
different routes.
The second way in which perceived inconsistency may cause dissonance is if 
some external stimulation makes the issue salient. It tips over a threshold, bringing it into 
the centre o f attention, perhaps at the expense of other concerns, which fall, or are 
pushed, into the non-conscious background. A similar process has been proposed 
previously by Treisman (1960,1964a, 1964b) to explain the so-called ‘cocktail party 
phenomenon’ (Cherry, 1953) where people, engrossed in one conversation, suddenly 
hear their name in another conversation o f which they were previously unaware.
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Treisman argued that people’s attention thresholds are set at lower levels for words like 
their own name, or ‘fire!’ But salience, importance and urgency may project knowledge 
over the boundary between the non-conscious and the conscious focus o f attention. The 
threshold could be raised or lowered depending on the capacity o f consciousness to 
accept dissonant issues in need o f attention. An example is when the 2001 foot and 
mouth epidemic grabbed media attention and burst onto public agendas, forcing animals’ 
slaughter into individuals’ consciousness. However, problems need not stay conscious 
until they are resolved. Depending on other matters in hand, they may once more fall 
into the non-conscious.
Emphasising goal directed motivation also draws together schools o f thought 
that argue that living with inconsistency is normal and healthy (e.g. Cohen, 2000) and 
those that disagree (e.g. Scruton, 2000); both may be correct. Wicklund and Frey (1981) 
identify when perceived inconsistencies are easily tolerated or ignored, and when they are 
treated as aberrant and wrestled with until one opponent submits. It depends on the 
burdens faced by limited conscious capacity, combined with the importance o f goals 
challenged by inconsistencies. I f  achieving an important goal is thwarted by 
inconsistency, then lesser worries may be cast aside in favour o f quashing hindrances to 
that goal’s attainment.
Thus Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) theory may add other factors, missing from 
the self-standards model, to an overarching theory of cognitive dissonance. Stone and 
Cooper’s (2000) synthesis where all sub-theories root dissonance in the interpretation of 
the meaning o f behaviour can comfortably integrate these ideas.
Hardyck and Kardush (1968) proposed possible responses to dissonance: 
stopping thinking (‘forgetting’), changing a cognition (the one least resistant to change), 
restructuring or, as a last resort, simply tolerating it. Attitude-consistent behaviour may 
also be enhanced. This could explain the violent behaviour o f farm and slaughterhouse 
workers (e.g. Serpell (1996), Eisnitz, 1997, and Gellatley and Wardle, 1996). This is 
supported by the inverse findings that people tend to dislike others more after causing 
them harm (Glass, 1964, Davis and Jones, 1960). Personal responsibility for 
inconsistency can also be minimised (e.g. Darley and Latane’s, 1970, evidence that 
responsibility is diffused, see page 55 following). And using alcohol (Steele, et. al., 1981) 
or drugs can reduce dissonance. Here may be an explanation for the high levels of 
alcohol and drug use among slaughterhouse workers (Eisnitz, 1997) and animal
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technicians in vivisection laboratories (Arluke, 1992; Anon, 2000). Although these 
findings have not previously been explicidy linked to the Perpetrator-induced Traumatic 
Stress (“PiTS”) work identified in section 2.2, there is much symmetry between the 
results. Arluke (1992) has emphasised the feelings o f guilt experienced by animal 
technicians and the resistance o f their industries to acknowledge this and provide 
psychological support for these workers.
Blanton and Cooper (1995), Simon, et. al. (1995) and Stone and Cooper (2001) 
found that people tend to use the first dissonance reduction route they find. This 
suggests that discomfort may sometimes prioritise speed over accuracy o f resolution. 
Stone, et. al. (1997) found that direct methods o f reducing dissonance (such as changing 
inconsistent beliefs) are preferred over indirect methods. Self-affirmation is easier for 
people with many alternative positive self-concepts from which to choose (Steele, et. al., 
1993) in a domain unrelated to the dissonance-causing event (Blanton, et. al., 1997).
The likelihood that a cognition will change to reduce dissonance depends on its 
responsiveness to perceived reality and the extent to which it is consonant with other 
cognitions. The likelihood that a behaviour will change to reduce dissonance depends on 
the satisfaction derived from the behaviour and the extent o f pain or loss from ceasing it 
(Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). Most previous dissonance experiments have found 
attitude change to be the prevalent dissonance reduction technique (Harmon-Jones, 
1999). However, these experiments may have left participants with litde possibility for 
avoidance (forgetting or denial) and this is explored later on p.51.
The different motives identified by theories that Stone and Cooper (2000) 
integrate have consequences for the restoration o f consonance. Stone (2001) argues that 
the intensity o f the affective experience, and discrepancy reduction, depends upon the 
level at which dissonance arousal is experienced. Qualitatively different states o f 
dissonance motivation could influence people’s strategies to reduce their discomfort. For 
example, the type o f psychological inconsistency on which Festdnger (1957) focused 
between behaviour and a specific attitude, may cause a less intense affective experience 
than discrepancies that involve higher, more abstract standards for behaviour, such as 
those that relate to the self or to norms for behaviour. It may be both more important, 
and more difficult, to restore consonance at higher levels than at lower levels. Hills’s 
(1993) observation that her participants were highly ambivalent, but the issues were 
unimportant to them, suggests that any dissonance was not experienced at a high level o f
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personal relevance. In contrast, Pious (1993) argues that the issues do stimulate a need 
for consonance restoration at a high level o f self-beliefs and that this is why there is so 
much support for the cultural status quo in the form of dissociation variables. Clearly 
this debate needs further exploration.
Festinger (1957) related the level o f dissonance to the attractiveness o f the 
rejected alternative. The more attractive the rejected alternative (say, ‘farmed animals’ for 
meat-eaters, or ‘meat’ for vegetarians), the more dissonance will be experienced. 
However, dissonance is limited because if the rejected alternative is, or becomes, more 
attractive than the chosen option, all things considered, then the decision will be 
reversed. But this does not destroy dissonance; reversing the decision reduces dissonance 
while the dissonant cognitions remain, albeit in opposite positions o f ‘chosen’ and 
‘rejected’.
In this sense, vegetarians may not be qualitatively different to meat-eaters; 
rather they may occupy opposite sides o f the same coin. (Note that this is a different 
level o f analysis to Stone’s (2001) earlier arguments concerning qualitatively different 
dissonance motivations stemming from how the meaning o f actions was interpreted.) 
Those vegetarians who are ex-meat-eaters probably experienced great dissonance to the 
point where they ‘flipped over’ into vegetarianism. This dissonance could have been 
caused by new beliefs resulting from exposure to new information (as McDonald (2000) 
proposed was the case for her vegan interviewees, see section 2.1). Yet all the attractive 
cognitions in favour o f eating meat remain. Support for this view comes from the 
expanding range o f vegetarian meat and dairy replacement products. This also explains 
how vegetarians lapse: meat-eaters who have experienced levels o f dissonance to the 
point o f ‘flipping’ at least twice. According to the Realeat Surveys (Anon, 2002) 
discussed in Chapter 2, such people could account for more than 1.4% o f the 
current population.
But this contrasts with McDonald’s (2000) finding from her vegan interviewees 
that ‘once you know something, you can’t not know it’. A new belief seemed to 
qualitatively change McDonald’s (2000) participants forever. This problem is, however, 
readily answered by cognitive dissonance theory. First, new information, which 
stimulated the change o f eating patterns, may tip the balance considerably in one 
direction, reducing dissonance. Second, dissonance creates the need to deny itself, as if, 
like a fictitious ghoul, the anxiety feeds on its victim’s acknowledgement. Many
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researchers, including Festinger (1957) and Harmon-Jones (1999), observed the tendency 
to seek information and social support which enhance the attractiveness o f the choice 
made, reducing dissonance. In the same way, consonant arguments are likely to be 
readily accepted and receive less scrutiny than discordant ones. Nisbett, et. al. (2001) also 
note that people become more extreme in their judgements in order to overrule their 
perceived inconsistency. Similarly, Blanton, et. al. (2001) found that people tend to be 
“more confident than they are correct” (2001, p.373). Hence inconsistency is harder to 
tolerate than a simplified and more polarised view of the world.
This phenomenon has been investigated under the ‘free-choice paradigm’
(e.g. Brehm, 1956). The free-choice paradigm is attractive here because it works with, 
rather than against, research participants’ genuine views, unlike the induced-compliance 
methods that dominate dissonance research. It also sticks closely to Festinger’s (1957) 
original thesis, which still has much support. Under the free-choice paradigm, choosing 
between roughly equally attractive alternatives produces greater dissonance than 
choosing between alternatives o f unequal attractiveness. This is demonstrated by ‘the 
spreading o f alternatives’ (e.g. Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999), where participants 
enhance their attraction to the chosen item, and decrease their attraction to the rejected 
item, although they found the items similarly attractive before being offered the choice 
o f one to keep.
However, variations occur between cultures. Heine and Lehman (1997) 
observed no tendency to justify their choices among Japanese students, in contrast to 
Canadian students, in a free-choice experiment. The implications are that the arousal and 
resolution o f cognitive dissonance is more variable and complex than first envisaged by 
Festinger (1957), and that contributions are still being made to the understanding o f this 
powerful theory.
Nevertheless, it is possible that if McDonald’s (2000) and Knight et. al.’s (2003) 
Western vegetarian interviewees experienced dissonance, then they enhanced their 
attraction to animals and decreased their attraction to meat. This means that, contrary to 
McDonald’s (2000) and Knight et. al.’s (2003) theories, positively evaluating animals and 
avoiding using them may be simply correlated, not causally-related— or at least not 
causally-related in the accepted direction. Thus, in the same way that harming others may 
lead to disliking them more, as discussed previously, Aronson and Mills (1959) found 
that people tended to enhance their attraction to others for whom they have suffered. If
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being vegetarian in a meat-eating culture can be said to involve some sacrifice or effort, 
then these results suggest that vegetarians may enhance their liking for farm animals as a 
result o f their vegetarianism, not preceding or causing vegetarianism. However, 
vegetarians would be likely to naturally experience the causal relationship in reverse due 
to consonance restoration processes and the backward justification o f behaviour that has 
now been well established.
This also means that, on the one hand, vegetarians and meat-eaters may be 
opposite sides o f the same coin because o f their shared cognitions and the experience of 
dissonance. But, on the other hand, dissonance may be motivated differently, depending 
on their interpretation o f behaviour, and dissonance may cause vegetarians and 
meat-eaters to actively create different beliefs, qualitatively moving themselves further 
away from each other. So it is unsurprising that vegetarians’ experience is often to 
completely reject meat and report their disgust towards it. O f course, the same may apply 
to meat-eaters in the other direction.
While there is much agreement about the validity o f cognitive dissonance 
research and the robustness o f the theory, it has grown since its conception into a 
broader theory, able to accommodate different dissonance motivations, depending on 
the context and content o f stimulation, creating different interpretations o f the meaning 
o f actions at different levels o f personal relevance. The theory is sufficiently established 
to allow some re-interpretations o f existing research about the relationship between 
attitudes towards farmed animals and eating meat already, as discussed, but it also has 
much more to contribute, and, indeed, this topic tests the further extension o f cognitive 
dissonance’s explanatory power.
3.3 Are people in denial about the life and death behind meat?
Johnson’s (2004) distress at witnessing a cow’s killing and all o f the theories 
emphasising, in their own ways, dissociation variables, suggests that, without dissociation 
variables, with slaughter in front o f our eyes, many of us might react like Johnson (2004). 
This section considers whether it is possible that people could be ‘in denial’ about the life 
and death o f meat. In other words, is the slaughter that so affected Johnson (2004) 
something that many people would rather not know, and so they pretend that it is not 
true, is not known, or does not exist?
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Hills’s (1993) and Knight et. al.’s (2003) research results, introduced previously, 
both implicidy use the language o f denial. Cohen’s (2000) definition o f denial is the 
“need to be innocent o f a troubling recognition” (2001, p.25). He uses ‘denial’ when 
referring to the present and ‘repression’ when referring to the past (not to be confused 
with the Freudian inner/outer world definitions). According to Cohen (2000), ‘denial’ 
covers a range o f phenomena:
People react as if they do not know what they know. Or else the 
information is registered—there is no attempt to deny the facts— but its 
implications are ignored. People seem apathetic, passive, indifferent and 
unresponsive— and they find convenient rationalisations to explain 
themselves. (2001, p.x)
Denial then includes cognition (not acknowledging the facts); emotion (not 
feeling, not being disturbed); morality (not recognising wrongness or 
responsibility) and action (not taking active steps in response to knowledge).
(2001, p.8)
Cohen (2000) describes the denial paradox:
In order to use the term ‘denial’ to describe a person’s statement ‘I didn’t 
know’ one has to assume that she knew or knows about what it is that she 
claims not to know—otherwise the term ‘denial’ is inappropriate. Strictly 
speaking this is the only legitimate use of the term denial. (2001, pp5—6)
Denial is always partial; some information is always registered. This paradox 
or doubleness— knowing and not-knowing—is the heart of the concept.
(2001, p.22)
Cohen (2000) disagrees with the view that denial is an aberrant state and argues 
that it is a normal state o f affairs that ‘deletes’ rather than ‘saves’. Monitoring, selective 
perception, filtering and attention spans explain how people simultaneously notice and 
fail to notice things. This, claims Cohen (2000), is better social science.
Denying some knowledge means that it remains as a cognition, and may 
influence behaviour, or become consciously ‘known’, but, at the time that it is ‘not 
known’, it is outside awareness. The implicit attitude research discussed in section 3.1 
suggests that knowing and not knowing feels distinct and dichotomous, but may be 
more o f a gradual continuum with the default set at non-conscious.
Awareness o f unpalatable information, like starving children, is overwhelming 
and so a conscious decision to ‘switch o f f  from it makes life bearable. But denial is not 
always a conscious choice. Cohen (2000) claims that: “There seem to be states o f mind, 
or even whole cultures, in which we know and don’t know at the same time” (2000,
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pp.4—5). He muses that this may have been the case for villagers living around nazi 
concentration camps. The experience o f people in this state o f denial is to be vaguely 
aware o f choosing to avoid the facts, but not quite conscious o f what it is that they 
are avoiding.
Thus Cohen (2000) highlights the tensions in arguments about denial centred 
around how much people really know about the object o f denial and how consciously 
instigated denial might be. As section 3.1 has already discussed some of the ideas 
surrounding implicit/explicit, non-conscious/conscious, intuitive/reasoned attitudes and 
judgements, it is no surprise to find similar debates in this subject. Cohen (2000) 
considers different types o f denial demand flexibility to accommodate the variations 
found in people’s behaviour that nevertheless share the core “need to be innocent o f a 
troubling recognition”.
Victims, too, can be denied: they are not ‘victims’ if  they lie outside the 
boundary within which values and rules apply. So, the boundaries o f moral concern vary 
between people, drawing not just on psychological proclivities but “on a wider discourse 
about responsiveness to the needs o f strangers” (Cohen, 2001, p.18). This wider 
discourse brings cultural norms and differences into the equation, but boundaries of 
concern for others suggests that here Cohen (2000) is talking about quantitative, not 
qualitative, differences between the drawers o f these boundaries. In this view, we all have 
broadly the same quality (type, structure and motivation) o f concern for others. This 
means that meat-eaters and vegetarians are qualitatively morally equal, but that their 
boundaries o f moral concern may be contracted or extended to exclude or include 
other species.
Cohen (2000) claims that what seems apparent to others, may have different 
meaning for the person in denial. According to Cohen (2000), even whole democratic 
societies may slip into collective modes o f denial about things that are ‘known’, but not 
openly acknowledged, like the nuclear arms race. In the case o f Bill Clinton denying that 
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky was ‘sexual’, Cohen (2000) argues that analogies 
and linguistic tricks constitute a language o f denial, “constructed in order to evade 
thinking about the unthinkable” (2001, p .l 1). This language is not necessarily intended to 
create or maintain ignorance, but to prevent the equation with existing knowledge of 
what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and resonates with many emphases on dissociation variables 
explored in Chapter 2.
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Cohen (2000) admits that behaviour is hard to change, partly because it 
automatically imbues an investment in (or, in behavioural terms, reinforces) the reasons 
for that behaviour. Changing behaviour implies that one’s previous behaviour was sub- 
optimal: it questions earlier decisions. For this reason alone it is sometimes preferable to 
continue on a set course than to confront earlier behaviour. So becoming vegetarian says 
that the previous decisions to eat meaty meals were wrong somehow. Eagly and Chaiken 
(1993) argue that challenging major beliefs questions a person’s world view and their 
sense o f security, invoking anxiety. Thus, according to Elster (1999) sometimes testing a 
belief is prohibitively risky or costly. It is easier to ignore the question, despise the 
questioner and reinforce existing behaviour. This fits perfectly within cognitive 
dissonance theory and provides a clear explanation o f the motive behind research 
findings o f why attitudes are often brought into line with behaviours rather than the 
other way around, which is missing from cognitive dissonance theory itself. Thus the 
theories are complementary.
Prioritising their own loved ones does not make people “morally repellent 
‘bystanders’” (Cohen, 2000, p.194). According to Cohen (2000), the psychological and 
moral distance o f suffering naturally enables denial.
Intervention is less likely when responsibility is diffused ... when people are 
unable to identify with the victim ... and when they are unable to conceive 
of effective intervention— even if you do not erect barriers of denial, even if 
you feel genuine moral or psychological unease, this will not necessarily 
result in intervention. Observers will not act if they do not know what to do, 
feel powerless and helpless themselves, don’t see any reward, or fear 
punishment if they help. (Cohen, 2000, p.16)
In the same way that, “ [t]elevised images o f distant misery don’t seem to 
belong to the same world as our familiar daily round” (Cohen, 2001, p.17), Chapter 2 
argued that slaughterhouses and intensive farms are, for many people, abstract ideas: 
things that belong to other people in other places. They are unrelated to the hermetically 
sealed meat in smart packages on designer supermarket shelves. So, even if people found 
the processing o f animals into meat objectionable, a behavioural response to this 
objection is not automatically demanded.
Latane and Darley’s (1970) theory about how people fail to respond to those in 
need has been well-researched. In agreement with Cohen’s (2000) quotation above, 
Latane and Darley (1970) found that the invisibility o f someone in need o f help enabled 
experimental participants to avoid taking responsibility for helping her. In a similar way,
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the invisibility o f animals in meat may prevent people from feeling concern for the 
animal who became meat and other animals who are in the process o f becoming meat 
(this is similar to Adams’s, 2000, notion o f the absent referent.)
Latane and Darley (1970) also found that the number o f people who could 
help someone in need is actually inversely related to the likelihood o f them providing 
help. This peculiar result seems to be caused by the fact that if many people could help, 
most people think that someone else will help, and so avoid taking on the responsibility 
themselves. Almost three decades after Latane and Darley’s (1970) research, Glover
(1999) observed that the fragmented technologies o f late 20th century warfare mean that 
distant, unknown people can be killed while everyone from politicians who declare war, 
to manufacturers making weapons, to soldiers who deploy them can maintain their lack 
o f responsibility for individual deaths. Consumer and industry demands, ‘factory 
farming’ and fordist de-production techniques in slaughterhouses mirror these 
observations (e.g. Eisnitz, 1997).
Serpell (1999) provides evidence from farmers who seemed to experience a 
similar diffusion o f responsibility regarding their animals, which is also similar to 
consumers’ denial strategies highlighted earlier by Knight et. al. (2003):
Few of the farmers interviewed slaughtered their own animals, even for 
home consumption, and they therefore did not feel entirely responsible for 
their demise. Indeed, some specifically avoided inquiring too deeply into the 
fate of the animals once they left the farm. As the owner of a large egg 
production unit put it: ‘I think they get turned into meat pies, but frankly I’d 
rather not know what happens to them’. (Serpell, 1999, p.27)
O f course this extrapolates Latane and Darley’s (1970) theory to an area that 
they had not considered, and to which their experiments cannot be directly applied. In 
the real meat-eating world, research participants do not sit in a laboratory next door to 
an animal being slaughtered who screams for help! Nevertheless, Latane and Darley’s 
(1970) experiments have been applied to explain real-world situations involving people. 
As both circumstances represent an unknown ‘other’, it is reasonable to suppose that 
their robust research findings could also be relevant to this topic. This work thus lends 
empirical credence to Cohen’s (2000) theory o f denial, and consequently further 
complements cognitive dissonance theory.
Unger (1996) found that people believed that it would be wrong to abandon a 
bleeding hiker by the roadside to preserve one’s leather car seats, but that it was 
acceptable to spend money on luxuries when that money could be used to save the lives
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o f impoverished people. Similarly, people often approved o f saving five people stranded 
on a railway line by flicking a switch, which diverts a mnaway trolley onto a side-track 
where it will kill only one person. And yet people usually disapproved o f throwing 
someone off a bridge in front o f a mnaway trolley, where it will kill the person pushed, 
but save five others (Thomson, 1985).
Like Latane and Darley (1970), Greene (2007) argues that the bleeding hiker in 
Unger’s (1996) dilemma is ‘up close and personal’, while the donation dilemma is 
impersonal. Likewise, flicking a switch is not as personally relevant as hurling someone 
off a bridge. Greene (2007) found that personal moral dilemmas involved activity in 
brain areas that are associated with emotion and social cognition. In contrast, impersonal 
and non-moral dilemmas produced increased activity in areas associated with working 
memory. Further, participants were slow to approve o f personal moral violations but 
quick to condemn them, while impersonal moral and non-moral judgments took about 
the same time. Greene (2007) argued that participants had to overcome negative 
emotional responses when approving o f personal moral violations which were not an 
issue for less emotionally charged actions. Greene (2007) therefore argues that utilitarian 
judgements require cognitive control when they conflict with emotional responses that 
drive intuitive judgements, like the implicit decisions and attitudes discussed earlier. He 
claims that our ancestors evolved in an environment where their altruistic sacrifices were 
made in favour o f those ‘close-by and personal’. Hence such situations today push our 
emotional buttons, unlike those that are far-off and reaching out to us via a charity’s 
letter, or a televised appeal.
3.4 Drawing together theories of consistency
Attitude theories, and particularly Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) appreciation 
of implicit and explicit attitudes, can explain ways in which dissonance can arise.
Typical hypocrisy experiments (e.g. see McGregor, et. al., 1999) find that: 
“Individuals seem to have a remarkable capacity for avoiding awareness o f 
inconsistencies unless their noses are quite vigorously rubbed in them” (McGregor et. al., 
1999, p.331). McGregor et. al.’s (1999) contention is that real life, in contrast to 
laboratory conditions, is rife with spontaneous distractions enabling inconsistency to 
evade awareness. Denial here has been explored as a sub-theory to dissonance (although 
this is not what Cohen (2000) intended). In fact, the hypocrisy experiments and theory of
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denial work well together as features o f dissonance, being almost synonymous but with a 
different focus on experimental versus experiential, anecdotal and observational 
methodologies. Cohen’s (2000) theory o f denial is broader in scope, but benefits from 
the empirical supporting evidence o f the hypocrisy and unresponsive bystander 
experiments.
It makes most sense, in this context at least, to see consonance (in the 
‘harmonious’, or ‘cognitively comfortable’, view, if not the ‘agreement’ view) as the goal, 
not consistency per se. Consonance can be achieved through the illusion o f consistency 
via a range o f strategies, and especially denial, rather than always striving for true 
consistency o f attitudes with behaviours.
The mechanism behind the paradox identified by Cohen (2000) o f how 
simultaneously knowing and not knowing something can be hypothesised by employing 
a synthesised approach to cognitive dissonance theories which allows for variations in 
the context, content and motivation of dissonance (see Figure 3 following on p.59). For 
example, Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) view that dissonance is prevalent if goals are 
blocked by inconsistencies suggest that ‘not known’ things do not obstruct the path to 
goals and therefore exist as a cognition, but not consciously. Elkin and Leippe (1986) 
even reported a “don’t remind me” effect resulting from unresolved and ‘forgotten’ 
dissonance, which is a classic symptom of denial in Cohen’s (2000) view and perfectly in 
line with the hypocrisy experiments. Reminders may force these denied or ‘forgotten’ 
issues into consciousness. When they do, the person is aware o f having ‘sort-of known 
them all along; when they do not, ‘forgotten’ dissonances may remain in the 
non-conscious background while more pressing problems occupy consciousness. 
Dissociation and denial variables may help to keep knowledge from consciousness.
Thus, cognitive dissonance theory, as it is used here, is based on Stone and Cooper’s
(2000) self-standards model which already draws together alternative theories o f 
dissonance motivation depending on the interpretation o f the meaning o f behaviour. It 
further includes here Cohen’s (2000) theory o f denial, hypocrisy, unresponsive bystander 
and Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) theories about conscious processing capacity and the 
importance o f blocked goals.
O n the other hand, thought-suppression experiments seem to contradict these 
theories. Wegner, et. al. (1987) found that being instructed not to think about something
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actually interfered with another conscious task more than being given no instruction and 
being asked to deliberately think about the same object. This suggests that actively trying 
to deny thoughts, may only serve to create an obsession with them. However, Wegner et. 
al. also found that if participants were given an alternative specific thought to distract 
them while trying to suppress the object thought, they were more successful at avoiding 
pre-occupation with the thought to be suppressed. Thus the ‘spontaneous distractions’ 
available in real life, on which McGregor et. al. (1999) commented, may be sufficient to 
avoid such pre-occupations.
There is an apparent debate between hypocrisy experiments that find people 
largely oblivious and highly resistant to any perceived inconsistency, and 
thought-suppression experiments, where trying not to think about something only 
focuses attention more certainly upon it. For example, the thought-suppression research 
matches McDonald’s (2000) finding that ‘once you know something, you can’t not know 
it’. As meat-eaters, her interviewees experienced discomfort and tried denial tactics, 
before feeling compelled to investigate the topic further and become vegan. From 
thereon, they may have followed conventional consonance-restoration patterns, seeking 
support for their chosen behaviour and so on. However, this example can draw the 
apparently competing theories together, supporting the view of cognitive dissonance 
theory as a flexible, wide-ranging concept that demonstrates how well the theories of 
thought-suppression, denial and cognitive dissonance may dovetail in practice (although 
the psychological experience o f these processes is unlikely to be so harmonious).
Hence polarisation in either direction is theoretically possible; research into 
cognitive dissonance has shown one direction, while research into thought-suppression 
has shown another. Evidence for dissociation variables and denial, explored in Chapter 
2, supports cognitive dissonance theory, but some evidence for thought-suppression 
research might come from McDonald’s (2000) work with vegetarians. It is possible 
therefore that thought-suppression effects are motivated by another ‘level of 
interpretation o f the meaning o f action’, in Stone’s (2001) terms. This could explain the 
different outcomes, and enable thought-suppression to be accommodated within a 
theory o f cognitive dissonance which is broader than even Stone and Cooper (2000) 
envisaged.
Figure 3 shows how some variables identified here may influence consonance- 
restoration. These variables’ relevance, and therefore power, in different contexts and
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with different contents is likely to change. Individual variables or combinations of 
variables may dominate, or they may all play a part and even interact in unique ways to 
influence the outcome. Thus, although laboratory research into cognitive dissonance has 
proved reliable and valid, variations should be expected in the real world, but this need 
not fatally challenge a theory of cognitive dissonance that is equipped for life beyond the 
laboratory, such as an enhanced version of Stone and Cooper’s (2000) synthesis.
Figure 3: Variables influencing behaviours and attitudes
Stimulus Unique interactions between variables Possible responses
Perceived
Threat to  personal Investm ent
G oals existing relevance C ognitive in existing Available
un/b locked  behaviours o f  behaviour capacity behaviours d istractions Behaviour ch a n g e
A ttitude ch a n g e
Denial
Distraction
I
■— * Self-affirm ation
The greatest challenge to such a wide-ranging theory is that it may have 
become untestable. If a theory can explain opposing results, then it may become weaker 
in this respect, rather than stronger. However, cognitive dissonance theory has a 
powerful testable indicator o f causing experienced discomfort that is expected to occur 
under dissonance, irrespective of what happens to that dissonance thereafter. Hence 
dissonance itself remains testable: it can still be identified in research, and ensuing 
outcomes can therefore be attributed to the operation of a combination of the variables 
stimulated by dissonance.
The theory proposed here is that, because of the highly culturally embedded 
nature of meat-eating in Britain, the traditional findings of cognitive dissonance 
experiments will be repeated and meat-eaters will enhance their evaluation of meat-eating 
and devalue animals in the research, while vegetarians will show the opposite response, 
reflecting their similar investment in previous vegetarian behaviour.
All of the theories in this Chapter could contribute to understanding the 
relationship between eating meat and evaluating animals. These theories are not discrete.
59
Chapter 3 i How psychology can help to understand attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat
The language and paradigmatic frameworks often disguise theories that blur into each 
other, can be accommodated within each other, or are even virtually synonymous. For 
example, denial, the theories relating to the unresponsive bystander, and hypocrisy 
experiments, have all been treated here as complementary to, and incorporated within, 
cognitive dissonance theory. Even theories o f thought-suppression can complementarily 
work alongside cognitive dissonance theory. There are areas o f tension, for example the 
disagreement over the accessibility, and location, o f the causes of behaviour. The theory 
o f planned behaviour sees some behavioural beliefs as available to consciousness and 
causal; the IAT suggests that often by the time any such beliefs arrive in consciousness, 
they may be post-hoc constructions. This issue needs to be resolved empirically if the 
psychological relationship between eating meat and positively evaluating animals is to be 
understood.
3.5 Debates and contributions
Before the next Chapter introduces the methods and precise research 
questions, this final section sums up some of the theoretical debates that have been 
identified in the first three Chapters, and how this research can contribute both to the 
empirical topic and the psychological theories.
Standing out from the first Chapter is the diversity and disagreement o f how 
the topic is understood and framed in the real world. The cultural commentators 
demonstrated a debate based on premises that were often directly opposed. But the 
problem remains to ascertain whether unpublished, ordinary meat-eaters’ attitudes 
resonate with any o f the cultural commentators’ to identify patterned phenomena that 
can steer a path through this debate. The cultural commentators’ views will therefore be 
treated as potential analytical frameworks.
The second Chapter noted flaws in previous work. First, much research on 
vegetarians has failed to compare results to meat-eating control groups and hence, when 
conclusions such as “vegetarians love animals” are drawn, there is no way of evaluating 
whether this does indeed set them apart from meat-eaters or is a rationalisation, worked 
backwards from vegetarians’ behaviour. Consequently causal relationships are assumed 
but, like the studies themselves, are rooted in the context o f the normality o f meat-eating 
behaviour. The often-assumed causal relationship between liking animals and 
vegetarianism has been questioned by the theories here, but even before they were
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developed, it stood out that meat-eaters like animals too, so this assumption, no matter 
how apparently well-supported by research lacking control groups, demands testing.
This Chapter has also raised methodological flaws in the study o f cognitive 
dissonance due to an over-reliance on the induced compliance paradigm or post-hoc 
explanations. The method used here plugs that gap by measuring dissonance before and 
after focusing participants’ attention on their own, genuinely held attitudes.
One o f the major questions throughout this study is: do people experience any 
psychological inconsistency in their attitudes towards eating meat and positively 
evaluating animals?, followed with perhaps the more psychologically-interesting question: 
and if so, how is the inconsistency handled? The theories create tension even on this 
basic issue. For example, the cultural roles o f some animals may categorise them 
consistently, or Scruton’s (2000) logic-of-the-larder argument may liberate people’s 
attitudes from inconsistency. In contrast, dissociation variables suggest that widespread 
inconsistency exists at psychological and cultural levels, demanding denial strategies for 
modern meat-eating to thrive.
The crucial psychological problem identified by attitude theories in section 3.1 
is where to ascribe behavioural causation: consciously reasoned or implicitly judged? The 
theory o f denial, too, raises tensions concerning how much people really know about the 
denial object and how consciously instigated denial is. There is also a lack o f agreement 
concerning the underlying architecture o f consciousness and non-consciousness. No-one 
understands how physical processes in the brain cause conscious experience, nor 
whether consciousness causes action or is merely a by-product o f a non-conscious 
process. Empirical evidence is mixed (e.g. Bar, et. al., 2001 and Sergent and Dehaene, 
2004) and this study does not aim to resolve the debate, but to be mindful of it during 
analysis.
Tensions also centre around where any inconsistency might be located. For 
example, different attitudes and behaviours might be at odds with each other, or implicit 
and explicit attitudes towards the same object may differ. This study also tests the 
relevance o f attitude theory in this area, evaluating how explicit and implicit measures 
compare to each other. The view taken here is that a synthesis o f theories o f cognitive 
dissonance is superior to any single theory. However, this study will evaluate whether 
attitudes towards eating meat, evaluating animals and animals’ slaughter are sufficient to 
cause cognitive dissonance (psychological inconsistency, e.g. Festinger, 1957, and
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Harmon-Jones, 1999) or even aversive consequences (Cooper and Fazio, 1984), or 
whether Plous’s (1993) focus on the compassionate self-concept is necessary to cause 
dissonance in this topic. This should resolve the debate between Hills (1993) and Pious 
(1993) who reached opposing conclusions about the perceived importance of this topic 
to their respondents.
Contributions should therefore also be made to the development o f cognitive 
dissonance theory. So far other theories have emphasised meat-eaters’ resistance to a 
cognitive connection between farm animals and meat and it has been proposed that 
cognitive dissonance theory may explain the reasons for this. But whatever the findings 
o f this study, it remains to be seen whether the view of cognitive dissonance theory 
proposed here can completely and comfortably accommodate the full 
empirical phenomenon.
Cognitive dissonance theory, hypocrisy experiments and Cohen’s (2000) theory 
o f denial occupy the same academic space but without reference to each other. This 
study should ascertain whether they can be beneficially drawn together, as has been 
proposed thus far, and whether any debates between these theories and the 
thought-suppression research can be resolved. If  these theories’ explanatory strengths 
can build a theory together, then they, and the empirical world, may benefit, perhaps 
explaining variable responses to stimuli, for example.
There also remains the question about whether people’s attitudes towards 
eating meat and farm animals are evolutionary predispositions, enforced upon us by 
social parameters, or individually chosen after careful consideration. Many theories 
already discussed suggest that the attitudes may be evolved, but (as with much evolved 
life) remain socially malleable to some extent (e.g. the individual content of 
edible/inedible animal definitions between cultures). This study hopes to contribute 
some empirical findings to the theoretical work.
Perhaps some of the most exciting contributions possible following this study 
will be the ‘real world’ applications and implications. While Cohen (2000) argues that 
denial is normal, the evidence for PiTS raises concerns about the mental health o f people 
experiencing inconsistency.
There are also implications for policy-makers. Frank (2002) worries that 
so-called ‘blissful ignorance’ is inappropriate for social policy:
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Ignorance of animal suffering plays a particularly strong role in food 
consumption decisions. This brings to bear interesting questions such as 
how economically to treat true information that yet decreases welfare 
(knowledge of suffering), since information normally is considered an asset 
with positive value. With knowledge o f suffering, welfare declines, regardless 
o f what the person chooses to do with this information. Yet, is it 
appropriate to consider ignorance a preferred state for society? This has 
potentially far-reaching implications. It seems plausible that a significant 
portion of the population would change its consumption behavior if it were 
fully aware of the process for creating animal products. Perhaps the 
government has an obligation to provide information—as it does with other 
consumer products—to help consumers in making informed decisions 
about animal product issues. (2002, p.423)
Frank’s (2002) assertion o f widespread ignorance and people’s reaction to the 
truth, is partially supported by the earlier contrast made by Broom (1999) (see p.22) of 
the severity o f animals’ suffering in farming with the public perception o f animal 
suffering in other situations. Frank (2002) is right that policy-makers lack much 
psychological understanding o f meat-eaters’ views because there is such litde research in 
this area. Haidt (2001) makes a similar point with regard to understanding how moral 
judgements are generally made. This topic is just one area where people’s judgements are 
not currently understood. Acquiring a greater understanding may also enlighten how we 
make other everyday judgements and stimulate change to improve decision-making.
Finally, Ryder (2000) emphasises that because o f our ancestors’ reliance on, and 
fascination with, other species, these relationships underpin our economic, artistic, 
religious, folklore, philosophical, literary and scientific histories. Dolins (1999), too, 
argues that our relationships with other animals are multi-faceted, with the conflict of 
competing needs representing only one type o f relationship among many possibilities. 
Ryder (2000) states:
Changing all this will have revolutionary consequences, affecting what we 
wear, what we eat, the price of food, the development of science, the 
appearance of our environment, the character of industries and the way we 
spend our leisure. (2000, p.5)
Clearly Ryder (2000) thinks that people’s relationships with animals will change. 
This study should contribute to this knowledge, suggesting how far and wide any change 
might, or might not, spread.
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4.1 Research questions
The research questions stem from the thesis introduced on page 11. Some of 
the cultural commentators reviewed in Chapter 1 emphasise the apparent psychological 
inconsistency between eating meat and having high regard for animals. The thesis here is 
that, if  they are right, there will be evidence o f this inconsistency which must 
demonstrate how the inconsistency is handled to allow the same people to both eat meat 
and positively evaluate animals. This entails asking:
(a) What are people’s attitudes towards farmed animals and eating meat—  
independently, as well as in the context o f each other?
(b) D o people’s explicit attitudes match their more automatic (non-conscious, 
or implicit) attitudes, and do any attitudes match people’s reported behaviour?
(c) In what relevant ways do vegetarians’ and meat-eaters’ attitudes differ, and 
in what ways are they similar? (Vegetarians’ attitudes are only used here as a point o f 
contrast against meat-eaters who are the focus o f this study.)
(d) Does simply focusing on genuinely held, relevant attitudes 
cause dissonance?
(e) Is consonance restored through attitude change and, if so, do attitudes 
move in expected directions?
4.2 Choice of research methods
Focus groups explored the topic and identified key questions to follow up in 
later research. They were ideal designs for this topic because competing arguments could 
be offered more naturally by members o f a group than by a researcher. The groups were 
particularly used to assess research question (a) What are people’s attitudes towards 
farmed animals and eating meat—independently, as well as in the context o f each other? 
They also started to explore how these attitudes related to behaviour (part of question 
(b)), whether previous research about vegetarians and meat-eaters’ attitudes can be 
supported, developed or challenged (question (c)), whether participants naturally 
expressed any perceived inconsistency or feelings o f discomfort, indicative of dissonance 
(question (d)), and how people manage this dissonance in a group discursive context 
(alone not specific enough to answer question (e), but starting to provide some 
background for an answer and later research).
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The later quantitative stage tightened up on the issues identified by the focus 
groups through explicit attitude questionnaires and two experimental methods. The 
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) measured implicit 
attitudes towards farmed animals, their slaughter and meat. These implicit attitudes were 
cross-referenced with the explicit attitudes to see if people’s explicit and implicit 
responses and reported behaviour matched. The implicit and explicit attitude measures 
therefore assessed research questions (a), (b) and (c), as well as focusing participants’ 
attention on their attitudes to facilitate the final experiment. This used Elliot and 
Devine’s (1994) discomfort measure to evaluate how simply participating in the research 
(which concentrated participants on their attitudes) might have affected their experience 
o f dissonance and whether any dissonance was resolved through attitude change. This 
experiment assessed research questions (d) and (e), and enabled patterned variations in 
responses between meat-eaters and vegetarians to be identified, again assessing 
question (c).
All methods were piloted, improved upon and, where necessary, piloted again.
4.3 Focus groups 
D esign
Focus group designs need not test hypotheses, manipulate variables or 
necessarily even produce results which claim to be representative o f the wider population 
(e.g. Banister, et. al., 1994). Here they explored variety in people’s sense o f the topic. 
Nevertheless, the designs were fairly structured to cover the issues raised by the 
theoretical Chapters. The main advantage was that participants’ answering processes—  
thoughts and deliberations— as far as could be articulated, became explicit through the 
discussion. This was stimulated by the dialectical format o f many tasks.
Perhaps the greatest restriction o f focus groups is that they rely on conscious 
articulation while the answers sought might be hidden from their owner’s consciousness 
(as, indeed, has been proposed by much o f the preceding theory). However, the aim was 
to uncover only explicit conscious views at this stage. As such, the groups identified 
issues on which quantitative methods could concentrate that would not otherwise have 
been highlighted. N o other method could have easily provided the wealth o f data 
necessary at this stage.
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Procedure
22 people took part in the focus groups, 7 men and 15 women, with ages 
ranging between 41 and 80. They formed four groups. Three groups took place in a 
village hall, one took place in two o f the participants’ homes. Appendix I details each 
groups’ members, time and location. Two groups were recruited from leaflet drops, one 
group from the Women’s Institute, and one group via an acquaintance’s friends. A pri2e 
draw was run as an incentive to participate.
All participants were told that they would be ‘discussing a range o f social 
issues’, but that they should be aware that the topics being discussed might prompt them 
to consider some of their views that they may find confusing or contradictory.
Four designs explored the topic from different angles to ascertain whether 
responses converged on similar ideas. This kept the lengths manageable and time limits 
were imposed to ensure that participants did not suffer from fatigue.
All groups were tape-recorded and the recordings subsequently transcribed 
(transcripts are provided in Appendix I). The instructions for each task were read to 
participants, and hard copies were presented so that the group could refer to them 
throughout the tasks. This helped to keep the discussion on track.
The debriefing emphasised the normality o f participants’ views, with which all 
the participants seemed content; many offered to take part in another group if this 
was possible.
Schedule overviews
See Appendix B for detailed schedules.
The first group comprised five women and two men and lasted one hour. The 
group discussed what sort o f things occupied their thoughts and why. The answers 
contributed to evaluating the claims that consciousness is often simply too overwhelmed 
to consider matters o f dissonance, and that only obstacles to achieving goals may receive 
attention, at the expense o f less important issues. Group members also discussed what 
reasons they had for and against eating meat and evaluating animals and how good they 
thought these reasons were.
The second group comprised three women and three men and lasted two 
hours. The group discussed their general ethical ideas and compared them with their 
attitudes towards eating meat and animals.
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The third group comprised one woman and three men and lasted one and a 
quarter hours. The group discussed farmed animals’ treatment and the group’s attitudes 
towards farmed animals and eating meat.
The fourth group comprised five women and lasted one hour. The group 
discussed ideas about potential inconsistencies in eating meat and evaluating animals.
Materials
Materials included two tape recorders, a series o f questions presented as a 
questionnaire, post-it notes, pencils and printed copies o f the discussion questions. 
Refreshments were provided.
The analytical method and results are presented in Chapter 5.
4.4 Quantitative methods
Three explicit overall attitude measures, two detailed questionnaires, a 
dissonance measure and the IAT were drawn together for the quantitative research stage. 
See Appendix D  for the research guide.
E xplicit attitude and detailed questionnaires designs
The explicit overall attitude measures were based on Campbell’s (1971) 
measure, using an 11 point scale, sensitive enough to measure small attitude changes 
over the course o f the research, between “extremely negative” and “extremely positive”. 
This measure benefits from findings o f strong validity in previous research 
(e.g. Haddock, Zanna and Esses, 1993, and Stangor, Sullivan and Ford, 1991). The 
attitudes measured were those towards cows, pigs, sheep and chickens (representing 
farm animals throughout the study), eating meat, and animals’ slaughter.
These three explicit overall attitude measures were used twice, towards the 
beginning and towards the end o f the research (see section 4.5 for more detail about the 
procedure), to measure potential changes in attitudes resulting from any experienced 
dissonance. In this sense, the attitude measures became experimental dependent 
variables, responding to experienced dissonance (the independent variable, for the 
purposes o f this measure).
The two detailed questionnaires were about eating meat and evaluating animals. 
The questionnaire about eating meat was based on Fessler et. al.’s (2003) research. It was 
amended because Fessler et. al. (2003), like most researchers in this field, were only
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interested in why people do not eat meat, rather than why people do eat meat. So 
questions derived from the focus group data were included to fill this void. Fessler et. 
al.’s (2003) question about why participants may not have eaten meat was also expanded 
to include a more complete range o f possible reasons, again drawn from the focus group 
data. For example, Fessler et. al. (2003) concentrated on ethical, health and disliking 
reasons for avoiding meat, but focus group participants raised issues about availability 
and being unable/unwilling to cook meat (especially among a young population), as well 
as cost. Ignoring these possible reasons for meat-avoidance could have distorted the 
data, so the focus groups’ range o f ideas were included and the questionnaires piloted.
In the questionnaire about evaluating animals, the questions were drawn from 
focus group responses and theories about how animals can be evaluated (e.g. see section 
1.1) to provide a comprehensive range o f options. Instrumental evaluations were 
measured first because the focus groups again demonstrated that these were the most 
readily volunteered, if not exhaustive, reasons for positively evaluating animals.
To minimise the interference o f any dissonance early on, the explicit attitude 
questionnaires were presented as disconnected from each other. The instructions advised 
respondents that there were two unrelated questionnaires in the research. They explained 
that a number o f research projects were being run together to ease the burden of 
recruiting many participants and that respondents should not allow their answers to one 
questionnaire to influence their answers to the other because this would invalidate the 
research. The debriefing, however, advised participants that this was in fact not the case 
and that they had been misled to try to avoid people misrepresenting their views.
It was hypothesised that: (1) Vegetarians would have more positive attitudes 
towards farm animals than would meat-eaters; (2) Meat-eaters would tend to positively 
evaluate animals for instrumental reasons, while vegetarians would tend to positively 
evaluate animals for intrinsic reasons; (3) Vegetarians would have more negative attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter than would meat-eaters. Each o f these hypotheses assess 
research questions (a) and (c) on p.65 about people’s attitudes and the differences and 
similarities between meat-eaters and vegetarians. While attitude changes were predicted 
over the course o f the research, these are specifically hypothesised as part o f the 
dissonance experiment which is the expected stimulation causing attitude change, see the 
end o f this section.
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Im plicit A ssociation  T est (“IAT”) design
The IAT (Nosek, et. al., 2003) measures implicit attitudes that operate 
automatically, often without their owner’s awareness, see section 3.1 for the theoretical 
foundations o f this method. In this research, the IAT measured people’s reactions to 
pictures o f meat, farm animals, and farm animals being slaughtered.
The IAT is a computer program that combines target images with 
“good-meaning” and “bad-meaning” words. Participants categorise the image or word 
using one o f two response keys: one assigned to the left hand, the other assigned to the 
right hand. Greenwald et. al. (1998) found that when highly associated categories shared 
a key (e.g. flowers and pleasant-meaning words), participants responded faster than when 
less associated categories shared a key (e.g. weapons and pleasant-meaning words). The 
IAT works because it is difficult to ignore labels that share the same required response. 
By pairing the responses, each implicit attitude interferes with the other.
Greenwald et. al. (1998) found the IAT to be unaffected by intertrial intervals, 
the set size o f categories, or by the assignment o f response key (left or right) to the 
good-meaning words. They found the IAT to be robust, useful for diagnosing a wide 
range o f attitudes, and twice as sensitive to evaluative differences as semantic priming 
techniques, hitherto used to measure implicit attitudes. It is also sensitive to consciously 
disavowed evaluative differences (e.g. showing ‘racial’ preferences for self-described 
unprejudiced participants, Greenwald et. al., 1998). Thus the IAT can avoid pressures to 
falsely enhance the appearance o f consistency.
Since its creation, the IAT has been used by hundreds o f independent 
researchers and the original designers now run a programme, Project Implicit, which 
averages over 15,000 tests a week and has earned accolades including a Webby Award 
(Anon, 2008).
Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate two examples o f a computer screen 
displaying IAT tests for different sets in this research. I f  participants saw a target picture, 
as in Figure 4, then they categorised it according to the labels at the top— “Animal” or 
“Meat”— using the associated left- or right-hand keyboard keys, ignoring the “Good” 
and “Bad” labels on the screen. If  participants saw a target word, as in Figure 5, then 
they categorised it according to the labels “Good” or “Bad”, ignoring the picture labels. 
In Figure 4 the correct response used the left-hand key to identify the target as an 
animal. The following screen then presented a word that was categorised as good or bad,
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followed by a further screen showing a target picture o f  either meat or an animal, and so 
on. Although the types o f  images and words were randomised by the IAT program 
within each set, participants received instructions and practice trials to ‘learn’ the correct 
combinations o f  images with words for each set, followed by an equal number o f  tests 
within each set. Once a set o f  tests was complete, the next set changed the targets and 
repeated the procedure, ensuring that all target images were paired with good and bad 
words. See section 4.5 for further details about the procedure.
Figure 4: Example IAT test screen pairing Animal with Good and Meat with Bad
This stimulus screen requires the left key to be 
pressed to correctly categorise the cow as an 
“Animal”, ignoring the “G ood” and “Bad” labels 
that apply to target words not used in this screen.
Figure 5: Example IAT test screen pairing Meat with Good and Animal with Bad
This stimulus screen requires the left key to be 
pressed to correctly categorise “Peace” as a 
“G ood” word, ignoring the “Meat” and 
“Animal” labels that apply to target images not 
used in this screen.
Comparing all o f  the results from the two sets represented by the example 
screens in the Figures above evaluates whether people prefer animals to meat or vice 
versa. I f  som eone’s implicit preference is for meat over animals, then their responses will 
be faster in the set o f  tests represented by Figure 5 than Figure 4. If, however, they 
prefer animals to meat, then their responses will be faster in the set o f  tests represented 
by Figure 4. Consequently the results are always relative to each other. A result showing 
that som eone’s responses were faster in the M eat/G ood and Anim al/Bad condition than 
in the A nim al/G ood and M eat/Bad condition shows only that meat is preferred to
Meat Animal
G ood Bad
P eace
Animal Meat
G ood Bad
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animals, not that meat is necessarily considered good, or that animals are necessarily 
considered bad.
It was hypothesised that: (4) Participants would prefer meat pictures to animal 
pictures; (5) Participants would prefer animal pictures to slaughter pictures;
(6) Vegetarians would demonstrate disparity between their explicit and implicit attitudes.
Hypotheses (4) and (5) assess research question (a) on p.65: What are people’s 
attitudes towards farmed animals and eating meat—independently, as well as in the 
context o f each other? They also assess question (b): D o people’s explicit attitudes match 
their more automatic (non-conscious, or implicit) attitudes, and do any attitudes match 
people’s reported behaviour? by measuring the implicit attitudes for comparison with 
explicit attitudes and reported behaviour. Hypothesis (6) assesses question (c): In what 
relevant ways do vegetarians’ and meat-eaters’ attitudes differ, and in what ways are 
they similar?
IAT pre-tests
Because this IAT used photographs to stimulate participants’ responses, the 
photographs had to represent the target well and be easily recognisable. Three pre-tests 
ensured that the IAT produced the most reliable and valid data. The first pre-test 
identified which pictures best represented the target categories. The second pre-test 
ascertained whether colour was likely to skew the IAT results. The third pre-test 
measured how long it took to recognise images to control for complex images taking 
longer to recognise than simpler images.
Pre-test 1: representative photographs
26 male students, 41 female students, and one student who did not declare 
their sex rated photographs based on how well they typified a category. Each participant 
rated either photographs o f animals, meat, or slaughter. (Participants were asked if they 
would rather not review pictures which were potentially distressing, but none did.) The 
categories were:
Animal categories Meat categories Slaughter categories
(rated by 22 participants) (rated by 22 participants) (rated by 24 participants)
"A lam b" "M eat from a lam b" "A lamb being slaughtered"
"A cow " "M eat from a cow " "A cow being slaughtered"
"A pig" "M eat from a pig" "A pig being slaughtered"
"A chicken" "M eat from a chicken" "A chicken being slaughtered"
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This was a paper and pencil test with an instruction sheet, a practice page, and 
seven pictures between which to choose for each o f the four categories. Participants 
were instructed to choose the pictures which best exemplified the category, not those 
that they most liked. The participants viewed the photographs and ticked boxes 
alongside them to indicate their first and second choice on each page.
Each first choice was given a score o f 2, each second choice was given a score 
o f 1. A related t-test compared participants’ choices and found a significant preference 
for the chosen images (/= 10.60,/)<0.001). The top three choices for each category are 
reproduced in Appendix E.
Pre-test 2: colours
The IAT was set up with blocks o f red and green colours picked from target 
photographs using a bitmap colour matcher. Red and green were chosen because they 
featured in the photographs (blood and grass) and because they have associated cultural 
messages, for example, green = go/environmentally-friendly; red = stop/danger. 
Therefore, if no preference was found between these colours, then the IAT could 
proceed with colour images.
7 male students, 17 female students and one student who did not declare their 
sex participated in the tests which were run on three Dell optiplex 9x260 PCs (1.8GH, 
512mb RAM with Pentium 4 processors). Participants viewed the display from a distance 
of about 65 cm and gave left responses with their left hand (using the D key) and right 
responses with their right hand (using the K key). The keyboard was placed with the 
space bar centered in front o f participants so that no bias was given to the response keys. 
The IAT ran a series o f instruction and informed consent screens which ensured that 
participants were seated and using the keyboard correctly. It also checked that 
participants could see the screen properly and, for this IAT only, that they were not 
colour-blind.
All tasks were administered in trial blocks o f 40 trials. Each trial block started 
with instructions that described the category discriminations for the block and the 
assignment o f response keys (left or right) to categories. Reminder labels positioned to 
the left or right, remained on screen during each block. Each new category 
discrimination consisted o f a practice block followed by a block for which data were 
analysed. The IAT randomises the order in which targets are presented within trials and
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alternates the initial pairing o f targets with good- and bad-meaning words 
between participants.
Stimuli were presented against a light grey screen background, centred in the 
display and remaining on screen until the participant responded. After any incorrect 
response a large black X appeared below the stimulus until the participant hit the 
correct key.
This method is outlined in more detail following. A copy o f the program is 
available in Appendix J.
A related t-test found a preference for green colour blocks over red (/= 3.35, 
y><0.01). The pictures chosen by the typicality ratings were then converted to black and 
white (see Appendix F) for the recognition task.
Pre-test 3: recognition times
To measure recognition times, a computer-based task was run in the same way 
as the IAT where participants categorised the target images using left and right keys 
without any pairing with good- and bad-meaning words. The test was run on two 
computers with the same specification as the second pre-test. 11 female and 13 male 
students participated in the test. The test was run over two days and participants were 
recruited throughout the days. The instructions were the same as for the second pre-test 
except that participants were not excluded if they were colour-blind.
There were six versions o f the test, which controlled for the effects o f task 
presentation order. These versions mirrored the main IAT (following). Recognition 
times o f all three variables (animal, meat and slaughter pictures) were measured in every 
possible variation o f presentation order, producing around 120 latency measures for each 
o f the 36 images. A copy of the program is presented in Appendix J.
The resulting mean recognition times for each image are presented in 
Appendix F. Some images were much more recognisable than others. The farm animal 
mean recognition latencies ranged from 537.1 to 575.0; the meat mean recognition 
latencies ranged from 601.7 to 691.5; the farm animal slaughter mean recognition 
latencies ranged from 624.3 to 815.8. The appropriate figures were later subtracted from 
the main IAT results for each image before the data were analysed.
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M ain IAT design
Figure 6 shows the combination o f variables and Figure 16 in Appendix G  
shows how each o f the six IAT programs used these combinations. Each participant 
completed one o f the six programs.
Figure 6: IAT test alternatives
Set 1 Set 2
anim al v. m e a t  
m e a t v. anim al
m e a t v. s la u g h te r  
s la u g h te r  v. M eat
Set 4 Set 5
m e a t  v. an im al 
an im al v. m ea t
Set 3
s la u g h te r  v. an im al 
anim al v. s la u g h te r
Set 6
s la u g h te r  v. M eat an im al v. s la u g h te r
m e a t v. s la u g h ter sla u g h te r  v. an im al
Each participant was measured in every possible target combination shown in 
Figure 6, but in a different order. For example, participants assigned to program 1 would 
have first experienced the animal/good, m eat/bad pairing, followed by the m eat/good 
and anim al/bad pairing (set 1 in Figure 6). Then they would have experienced the 
slaughter/good, m eat/bad pairing followed by the m eat/good, slaughter/bad pairing (set 
5 in Figure 6). Finally they would have experienced the slaughter/good, anim al/bad 
pairing followed by the animal/good, slaughter/bad pairing (set 3 in Figure 6). Across all 
programs, all the set combinations were used evenly, counterbalancing any order effects.
Participants first learnt to categorise good words with the left key and bad 
words with the right key. One target category (e.g. animal) was then assigned to the left 
key and the other target category (e.g. meat) to the right key. The targets and words were 
then combined, appearing alternately. The targets were reversed before the target and 
words were again combined. O ne o f the target categories was then replaced while the 
remaining target was once again reversed. The targets and words were then combined, 
before the order was again reversed, and so on. The words occupied the same position 
(i.e. good-meaning: left; bad-meaning: right) throughout all trials. A copy o f the program 
is in Appendix J.
The experiment used 32 stimulus words: 16 good-meaning words, and 
16 bad-meaning words. These words were used by Greenwald et. al. (1998) which, in 
turn, were selected from norms reported by Bellezza, et. al. (1986). This experiment did 
not use all o f  the same words, however: ‘kill’, ‘murder’ and ‘death’ were excluded from
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this test because they could be too readily associated with images o f animals being 
slaughtered, distorting the data. The 36 photographs were those used in the third pre­
test. The stimulus words and pictures are in Appendix F.
D issonance experim ent design
This research drew together the two cognitive dissonance streams identified in 
section 3.2 o f laboratory research, which may not represent real life due to an 
over-reliance on the induced compliance paradigm, and the real life observations that 
lack testability. It did so by quantitatively measuring any cognitive dissonance in 
participants’ own attitudes simply by making their attitudes more salient in the context of 
each other, particularly through the IAT which, for example, as well as measuring 
participants’ implicit attitudes, also focused participants’ attention on their attitudes. The 
resulting focus on genuinely-held attitudes (rather than induced-compliance) better 
resembles conditions that may have happened naturally during the foot and mouth 
epidemic. Any dissonance found arose naturally from this process. The method is, 
therefore, both more ecologically valid than much previous laboratory work, and more 
empirically supported than most previous discussion about dissonance.
Because the dissonance measure relied on the questionnaire and the IAT, 
rather than explicidy manipulating independent variables, the only uniquely identifiable 
part o f the dissonance experiment is the measure o f dissonance itself. Dissonance was 
therefore the dependent variable in this experiment, expected to increase during the 
research due to the concentration on attitude stimuli (independent variables) and reduce 
following the opportunity to express attitude change. However, any attitude change was 
due to the increase in dissonance, so, in this sense, dissonance was also the independent 
variable, manipulated by the research, which was expected to stimulate attitude change 
(dependent variables).
This study used Elliot and Devine’s (1994) self-report measure o f dissonance 
(see section 3.2 for the theoretical background) at three stages to follow participants’ 
dissonance levels as they progressed through the research. Elliot and Devine’s (1994) 
method divide dissonance into ‘uncomfortable, ‘uneasy’ and ‘bothered’. Participants 
considered their feelings about the relationship between their attitudes towards farm 
animals, animals’ slaughter and eating meat. However, in contrast to many other 
experimental measures o f dissonance (including Elliot and Devine’s, 1994), where the
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manipulated variables were counter-attitudinal essays in the induced-compliance 
tradition, this research focused participants’ attention on their own, genuinely held, 
attitudes. Consequently the design is most akin to the free-choice paradigm (see p.50).
It was hypothesised that: (7) Dissonance would increase between the first and 
second measures; (8) Dissonance would reduce following attitude change;
(9) Meat-eaters would report greater dissonance than vegetarians through the course of 
the research; (10) Attitudes would change in the direction o f pre-existing behaviours at 
the end o f the research. Thus meat-eaters’ attitudes would become more positive 
towards meat and more negative towards animals; vegetarians’ attitudes would become 
more positive towards animals and more negative towards meat.
Hypothesis (7) assesses research question (d) on p.65: Does simply focusing on 
genuinely held, relevant attitudes cause dissonance? Hypotheses (8) and (9) assess 
research question (e): Is consonance restored through attitude change and, if so, do 
attitudes move in the expected direction? Hypotheses (9) and (10) again assess research 
question (c), looking for patterned differences between meat-eaters and vegetarians.
4.5 Quantitative procedure
Order o f  research
Figure 7 draws together all o f the quantitative methods, demonstrating how 
they complement each other.
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Figure 7: Order of research and predicted dissonance in the quantitative research stage
Dissonance Dissonance Repeat all Dissonance
experiment experim ent overall experiment
Research Detailed M eat or Detailed Animal (meat IAT; (meat, animal attitudes: (meat, animal
item questionnaire! animal questionnaire2 or m eat and animal meat, and slaughter m eat, and slaughter
(m eat or overall (animals overall a ttitude Slaughter animal and attitude animal and attitude
animals) a ttitude or meat) attitude relationship) attitude slaughter relationship) slaughter relationship)
What it
T
D eta iled Explicit D eta iled Explicit Dissonance Explicit
1
Implicit Dissonance
1
Explicit Dissonance
measures re a s o n s / attitude re a so n s / attitude l attitude attitudes i attitudes i
v a lu a tio n s <X1) v a lu a tio n s (xl) ii
i
(xl) (x3) i
i
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Progression through research
Figure 7 shows that participants first answered a detailed questionnaire (about 
either meat or animals, counterbalanced between participants) followed by their overall 
explicit attitude evaluation, then answered the other detailed questionnaire and overall 
explicit attitude evaluation. Until this point, instructions told respondents that there was 
no relationship between the questionnaires to minimise participants’ desire to appear 
consistent. This disconnection between the questionnaires was destroyed by the first 
dissonance measure, which deliberately connected the topics.
The same dissonance measure was used three times, the same overall attitude 
evaluations were measured twice. If  dissonance was going to be experienced, then it 
should have increased between the first and second measure, reflecting the effects o f 
focusing on the relevant attitudes, but consonance should have been restored by the 
third measure because the final explicit overall attitude evaluations allowed participants 
to modify their attitudes, which Elliot and Devine (1994) found (in tune with Festinger’s, 
1957, theory) quickly achieved psychological comfort.
The IAT was expected to increase any potential dissonance for meat-eaters 
precisely because all existing theory7 and research says that people avoid connecting meat 
to animals through animals’ slaughter (see section 2.3). The deliberate strategies, cultural 
aids (such as dissociation variables), or psychological abilities, like denial, are said to aid
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this avoidance. The IAT, in presenting images o f meat, animals and slaughter together, 
and demanding a categorisation o f these images, prevented people from easily employing 
the avoidance strategies upon which previous theories insist they rely.
I f  dissonance occurred, then attitudes in the final explicit attitude measure were 
expected to polarise in the direction o f existing behaviour patterns: i.e. dietary choice. 
This effect, in tune with previous free-choice experiments, is called the ‘spreading o f 
alternatives’ (see page 50). Meat-eaters were expected to enhance their evaluation o f meat 
and decrease their evaluation of animals; vegetarians’ attitudes were expected to move in 
the opposite direction.
Thus, the quantitative stage assessed all o f the research questions (p.65), 
sometimes discretely and sometimes simultaneously. Questions (a) and (b) about 
people’s explicit and implicit attitudes towards meat and animals, independently as well 
as in the context o f each other and in comparison to their reported behaviour are 
measured by the attitude questionnaires and the IAT. These measures also assessed 
question (c) concerning differences between meat-eaters and vegetarians. But, as just 
discussed, the IAT had the secondary advantage o f stimulating any potential dissonance, 
enabling the dissonance measures and assessing research questions (d) and (e) about the 
causation o f dissonance and consonance restoration. Again, the expected polarisation o f 
attitudes in the direction o f existing behaviours also directly assesses question (c) about 
the differences between meat-eaters and vegetarians.
Procedure
78 participants, 64 meat-eaters and 14 vegetarians, were recruited from the LSE 
campus over two days, and a month later from a corporate vegetarian society. The 
vegetarian sample was small because vegetarians were used only to contrast with 
meat-eaters who were the focus o f this study. Participants were offered entry into a prize 
draw as an incentive. Each participant was given a number to preserve their anonymity 
while allowing cross-referencing between the methods. Following standard consent 
guides, all participants first completed the explicit attitude questionnaires, 
counterbalanced between participants, then the discomfort measure, the IAT, another 
discomfort measure, explicit overall attitude evaluations and the final discomfort 
measure (see Figure 7, page 78). A debriefing followed and all participants were given a 
leaflet allowing them access to further information if necessary.
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The IAT used pictures showing animals being slaughtered. Participants were 
warned that some of the pictures might be distressing before proceeding and offered the 
opportunity to withdraw from the research at any stage. An ethics committee approved 
this research.
Materials
Questionnaires, pencils, 6 computers (Dell optiplex 9x260 PCs 1.8GH, 512mb 
RAM with Pentium 4 processors) and 1 laptop loaded with the IAT program.
Preparation o f questionnaire data
The questionnaires were coded from 1, “Strongly disagree”, to 11, “Strongly 
agree”, with 6 being “Neither”.
Preparation o f I A T  data
The response latencies in milliseconds for each trial formed the IAT data.
As Greenwald et. al. (1998) also found, these tests resulted in a small 
proportion o f extremely fast and slow responses. These typically indicate anticipatory 
responses prior to perceiving the stimulus or momentary inattention (Greenwald et. al., 
1998). These values lack theoretical interest, distort means and inflate variances. In line 
with Greenwald et. al. (1998), therefore, values below 300 ms and those above 3,000 ms 
were recoded to purify the data. Recognition times recorded by the third pre-test, were 
then subtracted from each target test response time. The difference in response times, 
minus the recognition times from the third pre-test, provided the measure o f implicit 
attitudinal difference between the target categories.
Chapter 5 now presents the qualitative results, and Chapter 6 the 
quantitative results.
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All focus group participants ate meat and all but one considered themselves to 
be an ‘animal-lover’.
5.1 Method of analysis
Focus group tape recordings were transcribed and the transcripts uploaded into 
Atlas.ti V5.0. Atlas has become one o f the m ost prominent tools for qualitative data 
analysis (Muhr and Friese, 2004) by allowing the user to code quotations, which classifies 
sets o f  related information units for comparison, and then observe the relationships 
between these codes.
Atlas does not automatically analyse data, but supports human interpretation. 
Codes may overlap each other, and quotations often receive more than one code, as 
participants discuss different concepts in relation to each other. Figure 8 shows a 
screenshot demonstrating this.
Figure 8: Atlas.ti hermeneutic unit editor
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W hen the transcripts were coded, co-occurring codes were imported into 
networks to analyse their relationships with each other at a level abstracted from the 
transcripts themselves. Networks convert the codes assigned to quotations into nodes 
that can be visually manipulated with reference to each other (see an example in Figure
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9, p.85). Nodes are then manually linked to each other with relationship labels. The most 
frequent relationship between nodes in these networks was “is associated with”, shown 
by the symbol This represents relationships between nodes that share some
commonality but are not synonymous or derivative. Another frequent relationship in 
these networks was “contradictory”, shown by the symbol “< > ” .
Atlas can then identify the ‘groundedness’ and ‘density’ of each code. 
‘Groundedness’ is defined by the number o f quotations associated with the code; large 
numbers indicate strong evidence for the code. ‘Density’ is defined by the number o f 
links to other nodes; large numbers indicate a high degree of theoretical density for the 
concept (Muhr and Friese, 2004). Usually, the more times a code is applied, the more 
opportunity it has to relate to other codes thus, to some extent, groundedness and 
density are likely to increase together.
Table 2 lists the codes identified in these transcripts in descending orders o f 
goundedness and density. The networks associated with each o f these codes are 
presented alphabetically in Appendix C.
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Table 2: Codes in descending orders of groundedness and density
Codes in descending order of groundedness
Code Grounded Density
Intrinsic evaluations 57 4 4
Animal treatm ent 5 6 4 6
Instrumental evaluations 41 4 3
Animals' exp erien ces 4 0 3 9
In/consistency 3 4 4 4
R ight/w rong 3 0 3 5
Personal distress 2 8 3 5
Kill ow n  fo o d 27 3 0
Valuing lives 2 6 3 8
Pets v farm  anim als 2 4 2 9
M eat refusal 23 27
Animal suffering definition 22 37
H uman superiority/hierarchy/control 19 2 7
Phil-moral relativism 18 21
H um ans v anim als 18 21
Anim al lover 17 32
M eat-eatin g morality 15 4 0
D issociation 15 2 9
K n ow led ge/ig  norance 14 2 8
C onsum er difficulty 14 2 8
Upbringing 13 15
Health 13 6
Taste 11 21
Industry d em an ds 11 16
Eat d ogs/ca ts 10 19
Animals' values 10 5
A ttractiveness 9 19
N am ed anim als 9 13
V egg ie  difficulties 9 6
A nim al n ot m eat 8 27
Personal co n ten tm en t 8 2 5
Unjustified 8 23
A nthropom orphism 8 16
By-products 8 15
Individuals vs u nknow n 7 22
A ffection 7 18
C onsum er ch o ice 7 15
O ver-em otional 7 14
Life w orth  living 7 10
Hunting 7 3
Animals' souls 6 18
N atural/eco balance 6 13
Cultural fo o d  d ifferen ces 6 10
Logic o f  larder 6 10
R educing m eat 5 18
C om passion ate m eat-eatin g 4 2 0
Intensive farm ing 4 14
Squ eam ish n ess 4 14
U nconcerned 4 14
G et som eth in g  back 4 11
Fairness 4 9
Fluffy brigade 4 8
C hanging m eats 4 4
Intellect vs. Em otion 3 19
Tradition 3 13
Econom y 3 10
A nim als k n ow  n o different 3 8
Endangered sp ecies 3 5
V egg ies unhealthy 3 4
V egg ie  tem p tation 3 3
W orthless life 3 3
Repulsive 2 5
V egg ie  recategorisation 2 3
Dislike m eat 2 2
Slaughter 1 19
Pay m ore/quality 1 4
V egg ie  propaganda 1 3
Backward justification 1 2
V egetab le  life 1 2
Support farm ers 1 1
Codes in descending order of density
Code Grounded Density
A nim al treatm ent 5 6 4 6
Intrinsic evaluations 57 4 4
In/consistency 3 4 4 4
Instrumental evaluations 41 4 3
M eat-eatin g  morality 15 4 0
Anim als' experiences 4 0 3 9
Valuing lives 2 6 3 8
Anim al suffering definition 22 3 7
R ight/w rong 3 0 35
Personal distress 2 8 3 5
A nim al lover 17 32
Kill o w n  food 27 3 0
Pets v farm anim als 2 4 2 9
Dissociation 15 2 9
K n ow led ge/ign oran ce 14 2 8
C onsum er difficulty 14 2 8
M eat refusal 23 27
Hum an superiority/hierarchy/control 19 2 7
A nim al not m eat 8 27
Personal co n ten tm en t 8 2 5
Unjustified 8 2 3
Individuals vs unknow n 7 2 2
Phil-moral relativism 18 21
Hum ans v anim als 18 21
Taste 11 21
C om passion ate m eat-eating 4 2 0
Eat d ogs/ca ts 10 19
A ttractiveness 9 19
Intellect vs. Em otion 3 19
Slaughter 1 19
A ffection 7 18
Anim als' souls 6 18
R educing m eat 5 18
Industry d em an ds 11 16
A nthropom orphism 8 16
Upbringing 13 15
By-products 8 15
C onsum er choice 7 15
O ver-em otional 7 14
Intensive farm ing 4 14
Squ eam ish n ess 4 14
U nconcerned 4 14
N am ed anim als 9 13
N atural/eco balance 6 13
Tradition 3 13
G et som eth in g  back 4 11
Life w orth  living 7 10
Cultural food  d ifferences 6 10
Logic o f  larder 6 10
Econom y 3 10
Fairness 4 9
Fluffy brigade 4 8
A nim als k n ow  n o different 3 8
Health 13 6
V eg g ie  difficulties 9 6
Anim als' values 10 5
Endangered sp ecies 3 5
R epulsive 2 5
C hanging m eats 4 4
V eg g ie s  unhealthy 3 4
Pay m ore/quality 1 4
Hunting 7 3
V eg g ie  tem p tation 3 3
W orthless life 3 3
V eg g ie  recategorisation 2 3
V eg g ie  p ropaganda 1 3
Dislike m eat 2 2
Backward justification 1 2
V egetab le  life 1 2
Support farm ers 1 1
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Auto-colour tool
Atlas’s auto-colour tool demonstrates each node’s groundedness and density. 
T o the green default colour, the auto-colour tool adds red or blue pigment. 
Groundedness is shown by the increase o f  red, density by the increase o f blue. An 
example is demonstrated by the network in Figure 9. Hunting was associated with few 
quotations (seven), and linked to only three other nodes, thus retaining much o f its 
original green colouration, but the nodes representing the codes ‘in/consistency’ and 
‘animal lover’ show that many quotations were coded as about in/consistency, and that 
quotations about loving animals were associated with many other codes. Thus 
‘in/consistency’ was a heavily grounded code, while ‘animal lover’ was a particularly 
dense code. The same information is evident numerically within brackets in the nodes. 
The relatively large numbers associated with the ‘in/consistency’ node can be misleading, 
however. Clearly the node contains a lot o f  blue colour, as well as red, but against the 
‘animal lover’ node it appears predominantly red. The colours here show that relative to 
other nodes, ‘in/consistency’ is particularly well grounded. The auto-colour tool thus 
makes relatively high and low levels o f  groundedness and density stand out, meaning that 
codes that are heavily or seldom used for coding or network-building are easily 
identifiable.
Figure 9: ‘Hunting’ network
in /consisten cy  {3 4 -4 4 }
m H nsn
instrum ental va lue {4 1 -4 3 } animal lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
Semantic layout algorithm
Atlas’s semantic layout algorithm placed the nodes within each network into 
optimal positions, with the nodes having the highest connectivity within each network 
(not necessarily the same as overall density) into central positions. Minimal manual 
refinement o f  the nodes’ placement was necessary to avoid overlapping nodes, but 
retained the shape o f relationships.
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5.2 Analysing the most grounded and dense codes
Some o f the m ost grounded and dense codes are analysed in this section more 
closely (analysis o f  the other codes becoming repetitive). Unfortunately, the complex 
nature o f many networks makes them impractical to include here. Consequently, all o f 
the networks used in this analysis are available in Appendix C in alphabetical order, while 
Figure 10 has simplified the presentation o f  codes to be discussed while retaining the 
colour-coding and grounded and dense data. The codes have been grouped into related 
categories. These categories are not discrete. For example, concerns about animals’ 
treatment are connected to ideas about morality, but were more often discussed in terms 
o f the effect o f  treatment on animals. For this reason, concerns about animals’ treatment 
have been categorised as predominantly about animals’ perceived intrinsic evaluations. 
Nevertheless, such meta-categorisations were not the aim o f this research and are made 
primarily for ease o f presentation; they are therefore tentative and would require further 
research to validate them (if necessary).
Figure 10: Codes categorised by related meaning
Instrumental evaluations (41-43) 
Affection (7-18)
Attractiveness (9-19)
By-products (8-15)
Economy (3-10)
Endangered species (3-5)
Get som ething back (4-11) 
Natural/eco balance (6-13)
Tradition (3-13)
Others' false views
Anthropomorphism (8-16) 
Fluffy brigade (4-8) 
Over-emotional (7-14) 
Squeamishness (4-14)
Veggie propaganda (1-3) 
Veggie recategorisation (2-3) 
V eggies unhealthy (3-4)
Morality (15-40)
Animal lover (17-32)
Animals know no different (3-8) 
Backward justification (1-2) 
Compassionate m eat-eater (4-20) 
Consumer difficulty (14-28) 
Cultural differences (6-10) 
Fairness (4-9)
Kill ow n food (27-30)
Meat refusal (23-27)
Moral relativism (18-21)
Pay m ore/quality (1-4)
Personal contentm ent (8-25) 
P e rso n a l d is tr e s s  (28-35)
Reducing m eat (5-18) 
Right/wrong (30-35) 
Unconcerned (4-14)
Unjustified (8-23)
Upbringing (13-15)
Recategorisation
Animal not m eat (8-27)
Eat dogs/cats (10-19) 
Individuals vs unknown (7-22)
Named animals (9-13)
Pets vs farm animals (24-29)
Pro-meat
Consumer choice (7-15) 
Health (13-6)
Human superiority (19-27) 
Humans vs animals (18-21) 
Hunting (7-3)
Logic o f larder (6-10) 
Support farmers (1-1) 
Taste (11-21)
Intrinsic evaluations (57-44) 
Animal suffering def'n (22-37) 
Animal treatm ent (56-46) 
Animals’ experiences (40-39) 
Animals' souls (6-18)
Animals' values (10-5)
Intensive farming (4-14)
Life worth living (7-10) 
Slaughter (1-19)
Valuing lives (26-38)
In/consistency (34-44) 
Dissociation (15-29)
Intellect vs em otion (3-19) 
Knowledge/ignorance (14-28)
Positively evaluating anim als
Participants wrote down their own reasons for positively evaluating animals 
and then numbered them in order o f each reason’s importance or persuasiveness, 
starting at 1 for the most im portant or persuasive reason:
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Figure 11: Reasons for and against positively evaluating animals
Reasons for positively evaluating animals  Reasons against positively evaluating animals
1. Unconditional love 1. Pass on disease
2. Com panionship 2. Natural fear of a ll animals
3. Healthy exercise 3. Kill o ther animals
4. Security 4. Mess up th e  house
5. Ecological balance 5. Mess up footpaths and gardens
6. Enrichment to  our world 6. Keep you aw ake a t night
7. Teaches children love and responsibility
All o f the reasons for positively evaluating animals that participants explicitly 
offered, shown in Figure 11, are based on what good they do to people. In other words, 
animals are only evaluated instrumentally according to these reasons. This lack o f explicit 
recording o f intrinsic evaluations, although animals were talked about as if they did 
possess intrinsic qualities which were taken for granted, is crucial, and returns 
throughout the analysis. The intrinsic reasons for positively evaluating animals, which all 
groups demonstrated implicitly despite not explicidy stating any such reasons, together 
with discussions about animals’ treatment, form three o f the top four most grounded 
and dense in the analysis (see Table 2, p.84).
Instrumental reasons for positively evaluating animals, show that animals’ uses 
were positively evaluated. However, these quotations also show the tension between 
participants as 4C disagrees that instrumental reasons for evaluating animals are valid. 
This participant described herself as a ‘theoretical vegetarian’ and evaluated animals 
highly for intrinsic reasons:
Transcript Speaker
line code
47. 4C I can 't see any justification I see no justification w hatsoever I really d o n 't I
think w e use animals
48. 4B Yes
49. Int th a t sounds as if th a t's  a negative thing is th a t your view?
50. 4C it's my view th a t animals should never be m ade pets in th e  first place
going back to  th e  old caveman
51. Int in term s of o ther dom esticated animals then
52. 4C I think w e use them  for our ow n solace our own gratification
55. 4D well they 're a product a ren 't they
56. 4C I would find th a t more difficult there  again w e use them  by good rights
w e should be gatherers really not hunter gatherers
550. 4C yes w e 're  with you there  using it as a product
551. 4A I d o n 't think there 's anything disgraceful abou t th a t if you trea t them
responsibly
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579. 4C you d o n 't care abou t them  because you d o n 't like them  facially
580. 4B well I can 't think of a good use for a giraffe
581. 4A oh a giraffe is beautiful
582. U Yes
583. 4A they 're useful just to  look a t really isn't it
584. I m ean yes
585. 4A camels look very ugly but they 're useful to  a lot of people so a camel can 
carry on as far as I'm concerned
586. U th a t's  ano ther product
587. 4C they 're a nasty vicious animal
588. 4A well they are nevertheless they are very useful
589. 4C well there  you are you only care abou t them  if they 're useful to  you then
590. 4A useful or attractive or appealing yes
591. 4B if you d idn 't have a car you 'd  probably find a donkey very useful
592. 4A useful or attractive any of those categories are ge t my vote
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Instrumental reasons for positively evaluating animals stemmed from receiving 
something in return from animals, for example affection or appreciating their beauty, by­
products from their bodies, benefits to the economy and nature, as well as traditional 
ways o f life, see Figure 10 (p.86). Participants were quick to offer instrumental reasons 
for positively evaluating animals and only hinted at positively evaluating animals for 
intrinsic reasons through their views about the rightness or wrongness o f treatment. For 
example, disapproval o f causing animal suffering indicates that an animal’s perceived 
intrinsic ability to experience suffering was a cognition held by all participants. The 
propensity o f an animal to experience was deemed too obvious to remark upon. So while 
participants did evaluate animals for intrinsic reasons, they did not voluntarily explicitly 
say so.
When asked, participants in group 3 answered immediately that other species 
could experience pleasure and pain, fear and happiness. There wasn’t any discussion 
about this, the answer was so obvious to them. However, there was disagreement about 
whether animals suffered through farming, as represented by the following quotations:
Transcript Speaker
line code
7. 3D ... well I'm not an expert bu t having worked in the  food industry to  an 
extent I'm aw are of well not necessarily in all cases but if it's most 
animals th a t th e  majority of them  d o n 't suffer I haven 't actually 
witnessed slaughter as well
8. 3A yes I have I agree with th a t
9. Int do you work in farming or
10. 3A no I work in transport bu t I've been to  a slaughter house
11. Int Right
12. 3A w hen I w as a child there w as one next to  my school
13. Int oh really
14. 3A and I used to  look ou t of th e  gate and w atch th e  animals and I've been 
to  one in Holland and I've been to  a cattle m arket and I would say 
in th e  main they 're ok
15. 3D Yes
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16. 3A there  are som e but if the  slaughterm an knows w hat he's doing
17. Int does it depend then  on the  quality of the  equipm ent and the men
18. 3A yes I would say th a t
25. 3C I used to  keep sheep and pigs and they always know  som ething is going
on
26. 3B yes they do
27. 3C and they g e t distressed and they seem  to  know they 're abou t to  be
slaughtered w hen they 're  being rounded up and herded in to  the
thing and the  bu tcherm an 's there they seem  to  sense th a t th a t's  it 
and I'm a m eat eater b u t I still think th a t well w hat's  suffering you 
know being rounded up th e  distress of all th a t and then  they're 
stunned they 're out cold in goes the  bolt and at th a t point I d on 't 
know if they feel anything or not, probably not, but I still think it's 
go t to  hurt even if it's only for an instant
28. 3B but it's suffering if they are disturbed before they are actually slaughtered
then th a t is suffering w hether it's being upset because they are
moved or w hether it's because they 're kept in I mean if they 're
moved if they 're on a long journey and they 're in difficulty tha t's  
w here I think suffering m ight be as well
29. U Right
30. 3B and thing is I d o n 't know because I have never visited a slaughterhouse
and this is probably looking a t this it's probably me being emotive 
abou t it rather than er so erm I d o n 't know I d o n 't know but I 
think if my [X] has driven pigs to  be slaughtered and he says tha t 
pigs th a t all pigs are always very distressed w hen they go and
31. U Right
32. 3B and w hen they 're driven they g e t very distressed th a t is suffering and
w hether or no t they are  hurt or no t they are suffering I think
33. U I think from the  point of being stunned and then killed there 's probably
not a lot of suffering there
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Participants felt that some people took their evaluations of animals too far, 
having warped notions o f their natures by anthropomorphising them, or by becoming 
over-emotional towards them. This was considered negative for animals as well as for 
people because suffering animals’ lives could be wrongfully prolonged by people too 
weak to mercifully euthanase animals in distress. These concerns for animals’ experiences 
demonstrate how participants evaluate animals for intrinsic reasons, although these 
concerns were often expressed through the perceived rightness, or more often 
wrongness, o f animals’ treatment by humans. Thus it was the animals’ experience that
was important, but the morality o f treatment that warranted judgement and articulation:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
263. 1A across I think it's scandalous and there 's  no need for it because w e've
had New Zealand m eat for years and years and years which is 
frozen and it's been fine th e  only reason th a t these animals go 
through this torture is in order to  keep the  Italian and French 
abattoirs open and I think th a t is I find th a t very distressing
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from die recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
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Another intrinsic reason to positively evaluate animals was life itself: explicit in
this view:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
466. 4C well it's th e  sam e question if you go back to  th a t sam e point th a t
everything is created however it's created it has a right to  life then
you have no right because you are so called superior have a 
superior intellect you have no right to  dom inate any o ther right 
why should you have any right to  dom inate any o ther life
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
Two participants in different groups were concerned about the cost to animals 
in creating meat which, although others understood and agreed with their concerns, they 
did not feel to the same extent. The two that did, clearly experienced dissonance. The 
difference between them and their fellow group members seemed to be in their emphasis 
on animals’ experiences: their emphasis on intrinsic, versus instrumental, reasons for 
positively evaluating animals. The following quotation demonstrates lF ’s concern for 
animals’ lives and experiences, something with which his fellow group members
identified:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
243. 1F bu t I mean 11 grew  up to  ea t m eat and also brought up with pets ... th e
only m eat I ea t now  is chicken bu t even th a t I've th ough t to  myself 
really do I w an t to  e a t th a t you know  could I survive on fruit 
vegetables
244. 1B is th a t from th e  animals' point of view or is th a t just-
245. 1F well I think as I go t older I cam e to  appreciate life more is th a t just plainly
due to  the  fact th a t I'm getting to  th e  end of my life so it becom es 
more precious to  me erm because I know  I can you know I can you 
know avoid the smallest animal in the  road or som ething like th a t 
you know or w hat have you or I hate to  kill an an t you know or 
som ething like th a t th a t's  how  I feel and er and I'm becoming more 
emotional with regards to  animals so er and I do w onder you know  
why th a t is w hether it's just a case th a t you you know as you 
becom e more educated  w hen I look back as a child and as a 
teenager you never knew  how  food w as produced
246. 1C no th a t 's  right I w as going to  say th a t
247. 1F and w hen you start to  learn these things and you see w hat happens to
these animals and everything else and you think to  yourself you 
know  "well is th a t fair?"
248. 1U Mmm
249. 1F you know they have as much right to  life as I have you know  do I w anna
be would I w anna be treated  like th a t and I think "no" but you 
know  there is th a t part of me th a t er well I e a t chicken so th a t's  I 
d o n 't know and I think "well could I live w ithout as well really"
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Participant IF  positively evaluated all animals and saw even human ‘positive’ 
interference with them (e.g. turning them into pets) as wrong. Many participants did 
draw a distinction between pet and farmed species, and this distinction brought with it
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different ideas about treatment and the level o f human emotion that could be afforded 
them.
Transcript Speaker 
line code
278. 1F well I think for me ... it's som eone w ho cares abou t w hat happens to
animals you know any animals no m atter how  small or big it is 
really th a t they have a right to  live am ong wild and everything 
else and not to  be interfered with really I think th a t's  th a t's  how I 
see it really because I think to  have a pet and to  you know  and to  
be obsessed and hum anise it because th a t's  w hat w e as hum an 
beings do w e hum anise animals and they 're not hum ans w e do it 
with dogs cats pigs
291. 1U no I've g o t this distinction betw een domestic and farm ed which is
product you know I love to  see cows in the  field but I love to  see 
it on my plate as well so
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Figure 10 (p.86) demonstrates distinctions between animals based on their 
categorisations as ‘pets v farm animals’, ‘animal not meat’, ‘individuals vs unknown’, and 
‘named animals’. Further codes especially represented the perceived erroneous views of 
animals by others, e.g.: ‘anthropomorphism’, ‘fluffy brigade’, ‘over emotional’,
Veggie recategorisation’.
Individuals, named or pet animals could be evaluated and treated differently to 
unknown, unnamed or farmed animals, even if they were from the same species. This 
group demonstrates views from people who had first hand experience of animals that
could cross the boundary between pet and food distinctions:
Transcript Speaker 
code
3A did you say it doesn 't m atter w hether an anim al's bred for well I used to
keep rabbits and chickens and 
3B It shouldn 't do
3A and w e used to  nam e them  every one of them  and my sisters and I would
trea t them  as pets bu t they would still kill them  so it doesn 't really 
m atter
3U there w ere rabbits th a t w e used to  and the  ones th a t had names w ere for
breeding th a t w e d idn 't ea t and the  others w ere not named 
3A oh my sisters nam ed all of them  and they all took their turn on th e  table
Int how  did your sisters feel about that?
3A there w as only one tim e w hen w e had a chicken th a t w as and my dad
told me I w as to  kill it because he w as going away for a few  days 
and it had a dodgy leg and it ended up I had to  kill it, clean it and 
cook it and ea t it because my tw o sisters w ou ldn 't ea t it because 
they said "no th a t w as daisy"
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Quotations about ‘us versus them’ and discussions o f human superiority, 
hierarchical positions and rightful control over other species, were related to ideas about
line
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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nature and environmental balance, which could also be associated positively with loving 
animals and their place in nature. One participant was emphatic that humans were
superior to other animals:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
421. 4A intellectually morally and also physically because w e have all sorts of
things like coordination of hand eye and o ther things which 
animals d o n 't and therefore although a horse is faster than  w e 
are on the w hole and also physically w e are superior too  and so I 
rest my case
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
This participant represented the opposite end of the scale from the two 
participants who struggled with their meat-eating. While those participants identified 
with animals and did not find acceptable reasons for animals’ uses by people, participant 
4A considered that people were superior to other animals and that this superiority 
justified animals’ subjugation.
A nim als, experiences and treatment
As already demonstrated, many codes were about animals’ experiences and 
treatment: ‘animal suffering definition’, ‘animal treatment’, ‘animals’ experiences’, ‘life 
worth living’ and ‘worthless life’ all being closely related as shown in Figure 10 (p.86). All 
o f these codes implicitly represent animals’ perceived intrinsic qualities.
Although there was a distinction between animals’ experiences and how they 
were treated, these ideas are related. Sometimes participants talked about how an animal 
must suffer, or be content, under certain conditions, but more often they talked about 
the rightness or wrongness o f conditions and treatment without specifically mentioning 
the animals’ experience. These codes therefore also relate to views about morality, 
valuing lives, fairness, what makes a life worth living, and the perceived rightness or 
wrongness o f animals’ treatment and experiences. There is a continuum o f arguments 
here, ranging from whether some concern over animals’ treatment is an over-emotional 
reaction by ‘others’, or whether some animals’ treatment simply cannot be 
morally justified.
Some participants were concerned about the failures o f the stunning and 
inspection systems in slaughterhouses:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
690. 4U having w atched a lamb being slaughtered in Crete while all the  o ther
animals stood around bleating piteously it w as really really
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horrible and it does m ake you think then
691. 4A but you w ouldn 't see th a t here
692. 4C it doesn 't make any difference
693. 4B only dow n an abattoir
694. 4C it doesn 't make any difference it's still done
695. 4D but it's th e  method
696. AC they 're not always stunned properly
697. 4A well no bu t you saw  this in som e xxx so th a t w as their way of life and
their way of doing things
698. 4U I m ean w e would like to  think th a t it w as all terribly hum ane and terribly
w onderful but in betw een the  inspectors visiting I expect there 's
lots of things going on th a t w e w ou ldn 't like to  know abou t
699. 4U Yes
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Industry demands and intensive farming shared much of the responsibility for 
what participants deemed to be unjustified and poor treatment and experiences.
Participants felt that animals should not be treated cruelly and that if their lives 
were to be taken, then these lives should be comfortable and positive and their deaths as 
painless as possible (although, as just discussed, there was disagreement about whether 
this was the case in modem farming conditions). O n the whole, farmed animal welfare 
was deemed important and participants argued that they did not want animals to suffer, 
but for many participants their access to meat took priority over animals’ concerns.
While there was consensus across groups that eating meat causes some harm to 
animals, one group was undecided about whether it was cmel or not. The issue turned 
on the definition o f cmel, but also, again, on whether animals could be positively 
evaluated for intrinsic reasons or not:
Transcript Speaker
line code
182. 4B Cruel
183. AC I'm finding th a t a bit difficult to  answ er
184. 4U Yes
185. 4B it's cruel to  kill it
186. 4F it can 't be cruel can it
187. Int w hat do you take cruel to  m ean?
188. 4U Well
189. 4U Unkind
190. 4U Unkind
191. 4B very unkind
192. 4F yes unkind
193. AC savage 1 would say more than unkind savage
194. 4F to  kill an animal
195. 4B to  kill yes
196. 4U I'm quite happy to  ea t it from th e  superm arket w ithout even thinking
abou t it because I like m eat
202. 4F how  do you kill it you d o n 't to rtu re  it to  death  you d o n 't w ant it to  have
a lingering death
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203. AC no th a t would be cruel
204. 4U if you killed it quickly and outright
205. 4B yes th a t w ouldn 't be cruel
206. Int th a t would be hum ane would it
207. 4B yes th a t would be hum ane
412. 4E yes well it's got to  be harm ed to  kill it
413. 4F well it's go t to  be harm ed to  create m eat
414. 4U Yes
415. Int yes?
416. 4B Yes
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
There was often much agreement about the perceived rightness or wrongness 
o f animals’ treatment, but hunting proved highly contentious (so contentious that the 
issue was dropped to avoid a potential argument):
Transcript
line
296.
297.
298.
299.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
Speaker
code
1E
Int 
1E
well I consider myself an animal lover and I've hunted  ever 
since I w as a boy and a t one  time I used to  love th e  
thrill of the chase and everything th a t w ent it's it's 
no t so im portant to  me now  but I would I would 
no more go and kick my pet dog or beat it or you 
know pick the  cat up and sling it ou t by the  scruff 
of the  neck than than anybody
Mmm
I think I think th a t er you know  th e  last thing I w ant to  do 
is ge t into a discussion on the  ethics of fox hunting 
or w hatever it might be bu t I think th a t my like of 
country sports or bloodsports w hatever way you 
choose to  look a t it is for w hat it does to  the  
country and w hat it's done for the country
Mmm
and w hat would happen if it doesn 't continue rather than 
the  actual scene and th e  sight of hounds hunting a 
wild animal and w hat th a t does
Mmm
and I consider myself an animal lover and I will I will catch 
a butterfly in our conservatory and put it out 
through th e  w indow  you know
Mmm
or a bee you know w e meticulously catch bees with 
glasses and a spatula you know 
all the  tim e [laughter]
although I think it's the  er it's th e  tw o  you know  you can 't 
really equate  the tw o very well at all
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Int 
1 E
Int 
1E
Int 
1E
1A 
1E
[throughout
this
discussion,
1F vigorously 
shook his 
head]
IE ’s position is similar to Hills’s (1993) finding that people do not consider 
issues o f equality and dominance to be related. In contrast, for Participant IF, who said 
nothing but glowered at IE  and shook his head throughout, these issues are very related.
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T aste and m eat refusal
Participants wrote down their own reasons for and against eating meat and 
then numbered them in order of each reason’s importance or persuasiveness, starting at 
1 for the most important or persuasive reason:
Figure 12: Reasons for and against eating meat
Reasons for eating meat____________________  Reasons against eating meat
1. It taste[s] good 1. Animal welfare (intensive farming)
2. Nutritional factor 2. Live exports
3. By-product from dead animals 
(skin, milk, wool etc.)
3. Health factors (antibiotics, additives, 
preservatives)
4. Economy of the  country 4. Emotive reasons (fluffy bunny brigade)
4a. It keeps farm ers in jobs and able to  bring 
up their families
5. Continuation of species
5a. They look nice in th e  country. Traditional 
English scenes
The top two reasons for avoiding meat again demonstrate the tendency to 
positively evaluate animals for intrinsic reasons only through the rightness or wrongness 
o f their treatment. Concerns about live exports and intensive farming both relate to 
animals’ welfare, which only makes sense if participants positively evaluated animals’ 
experiences, which in turn has been argued previously (see section 1.1) is an implicit 
claim that animals are positively evaluated for intrinsic reasons. However, these 
evaluations were not expressed as reasons for positively evaluating animals (see Figure 11 
on p.87), but as reasons for avoiding meat. This pattern o f not expressing perceived 
intrinsic qualities explicitly, but implicitly through concerns for their treatment, is now 
established.
These welfare reasons for avoiding meat better match vegetarians’ reasons for 
avoiding meat than other meat-eaters’ reasons identified in previous research (see section 
2.1). This could be because these participants were more familiar with vegetarianism than 
meat-eaters were in previous research (having vegetarian family members, or 
representing a change in attitudes over the intervening time between research studies). 
Alternatively, their prioritisation o f animal welfare could be a function o f the research 
discussion itself that had spent time considering farmed animals’ experiences. Further 
research would be necessary to resolve this issue.
5 and 5a, appearing under reasons for eating meat, could also have appeared 
previously under reasons for positively evaluating animals. Scruton’s (2000) view that he
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eats farmed animals because he likes them is therefore represented here. Another 
participant explains this view:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
308. 4A ... w ha t I feel about animals being eaten is th a t in many cases if they
w eren 't eaten they w ouldn 't exist for instance nobody would
have erm lambs say er if people w eren 't going to  ea t them  
therefore if no-one w as going to  ea t them  there w ouldn 't be any 
sheep therefore there  w ouldn 't have any existence a t all
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int” ; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Meat-eating was an easy definition: all participants ate meat, therefore they 
were meat-eaters. When questions explored ideas about eating non-conventionally 
farmed species, it was clear that this had not occurred to participants. ‘Meat’, to them, 
meant only the readily-available meat with which they were familiar, such as that defined 
in section 1.1. Participants agreed that people need protein and that it is natural for 
people to eat meat, but also agreed that they could get protein from sources other 
than meat.
The top reason participants gave for eating meat was because they liked its
taste. Taste was considered the greatest barrier to vegetarianism:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
229. 1G my daugh ter w as a vegetarian for abou t 4  years w hen she w as a t school
and the  whole group of them  decided they w ere all going to  
becom e vegetarian and she stuck it longer than  all th e  rest of the  
group and she w as quite proud th a t she w as th e  last one to  
succum b to  a bacon sandwich
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
The codes ‘taste’ and ‘meat refusal’ could be placed at opposite ends o f a 
continuum, perhaps with ‘eat dogs/cats’, ‘personal distress’ and ‘kill own food’ situated 
towards the ‘meat refusal’ end o f the continuum, and ‘economy’, ‘by products’ and ‘get 
something back’ towards the ‘taste’ end o f the continuum. Morality and its perceived 
relativism were also key concepts here: ‘meat-eating morality’, ‘fairness’, ‘cultural food 
differences’, and ‘upbringing’.
Morality and personal experiences
People talked o f being contented with, or distressed by, an animal’s perceived 
experience. Contentment was considered a key indicator o f virtuous actions, and so, for 
a participant to be content with an animal’s treatment and perceived experience, he or
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she had to feel that the animals’ treatment and experience was justified, appropriate, valid
or positive:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
1375. 2E it w as dearer it w as it had a happy life because it w as free range
1376. 2C so are you saying
1377. 2E so I w as happier
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
However, often comments veered more towards personal distress at animals’ 
perceived experiences:
Transcript Speaker
line code
267. 1A and they talk of animals being 'a unit' and I think well you know there 's
no right you look a t these sheep som etim es in the  field w hen 
you're going by and you think "you poor devils you d o n 't know 
w hat's  in store for you" and th a t's  er you know th a t's  som ething 
a t th e  back of your mind you know
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
One group defined an immoral act as something that causes physical
discomfort because it is wrong:
Transcript Speaker
code
2C my simple sta tem ent in life is th a t each person has their ow n moral views 
which can be different and my sort of description of w hat I feel is 
moral is som ething I feel com fortable doing or not if I feel 
uncom fortable then  I would feel th a t to  me would be immoral to  
me it might not be immoral to  anybody else in the room th a t's  
w hat I would feel is a moral is w hat I would feel com fortable in 
myself in doing
Int so is th a t quite a physical feeling then  tha t if you're doing som ething th a t
you think is w rong you start to  feel a bit uncom fortable?
2C yes yes as I would feel uncom fortable with it yeah
2D yes I would
2C you know  you know this is quite a simple thing I feel uncom fortable lying
you know so therefore to  me a very im portant moral thing is to  
try to  be truthful you know  it's no t always possible bu t I always 
feel uncom but to  me th a t's  w here I feel uncom fortable
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
This discomfort could be a symptom of dissonance; 2C’s description matches 
Festinger’s (1957) theory. An immoral act, in these participants’ terms, is something 
inconsistent with one’s own moral standards:
Transcript 
line
1031.
1032.
1033.
97
Speaker
code
Int would there be a right answ er do you think objectively w here you can say
w e've go t different views b u t th e  right answ er is this 
2A yeah I m ean my view is there 's  a set of values w hether w e 're  talking
fiction w hether w e 're  talking truth or and those views should be 
consistent
Int Right
line
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.
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1034. 2A th a t's  w here the  morality comes in you have a consistency and you set 
your values there  or there  or there
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by "Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
D issociation  and know ledge
Participants endorsed the idea o f the absent referent and the dissociation 
variables emphasised by theorists in section 2.3. Here was unanimous agreement, within 
and between groups, with many examples o f how people keep animal ideas separate to
meat ideas:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
232. 1U my daughter w as a vegetarian for abou t 12 years she gave it up w hen
she w en t on travelling and her first meal I asked her w hat did she
w an t and she said "fish fingers because it's no t recognisable as 
anything"
233.
234.
1U
1U
No no
and th a t w as her first non-vegetarian meal and then I had to  cut
everything up so th a t it d idn 't actually look like an animal or
1065. 2A I reckon 90%  of people th a t go  into the  butcher's shop
1066. 2D d o n 't think abou t animals
1067. 2A and order a piece of lamb d o n 't think of th a t as a sheep
1068. 2B you d o n 't you d on 't it's m eat you d o n 't see it as a sheep you d o n 't see it 
as a cow
1069. 2A if they actually knew how  they w ere killed how  th a t w as dealt with
1070. 2B it'd pu t you off for life
1071. 2A there 'd  be a lot more vegetarians
1072. 2B oh yeah true
345. 3C but I'm sure a lot of people perhaps children think th a t m eat is no t a 
sheep in the field or a cow
346. 3A Yeah
347. 3C it's som ething you go to  Tesco's and buy
480. 3A thev d o n 't w an t animals to  suffer
481. 3D mmm yes
482. 3A while they 're alive
483. 3D Yes
484. 3A but they 're quite happy to  see them  killed
485. 3U Yes
486. 3B not see them  killed if they are killed
487. 3D well yes
488. 3A well they have to  be killed
489. 3B they d o n 't have to  w atch
490 3A yes as long as som ebody else will do it behind the  scenes then  they 're 
quite happy and they will accept it
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515. 3B so everything is removed and I think th a t actually makes a difference you
know if you d o n 't see liver in the  shops and anything I'm quite 
sure I m ean the  children a t school ea t liver and bacon bu t I think 
th a t's  probably because they d o n 't even think w hat liver is and 
they probably d o n 't know w hat it is actually
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
In /co n sisten cy , d issonance and denial
The focus groups showed how people can simultaneously, and 
unproblematically live with inconsistencies, if they are not consciously known, and also 
that participants do not like to think o f themselves as inconsistent. Throughout the 
discussions, and in relation to quotations about positively evaluating animals, were 
concerns about inconsistencies. Sometimes participants expressed their own perceived 
inconsistencies, sometimes each others’, the farming industry’s, government’s, 
consumers’, and other wider groups’, including different generations’ and cultures’.
One group endorsed the difference between species depending on their 
categorisation as pests. The following statements come from participants who said that 
they could not personally kill an animal for food, one o f whom was participant 4C who 
had, until now, maintained that killing animals was wrong, even describing herself as a 
‘theoretical vegetarian’, and being highly ambivalent about eating meat:
Transcript Speaker
line code
510. 4A w hat abou t slugs?
511. 4C yeah I kill slugs
512. 4A well th a t's  mass murder
513. 4C I pu t a jar of salt over them  I know isn't it awful
514. 4A now  do th a t on a bigger scale
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Participant 4A is accusing participant 4C of being inconsistent, an accusation 
against which 4C finds herself unable to defend. In the following quotation, consistency 
drives the desire to de-categorise animals as pets:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
302. 3D how ever if it w as a nam ed pet you know  w hatever th e  species if it w ere a
sheep I'd probably sort of I would you know I'm contradicting
myself b u t if it w as som ebody with w hom  I'd had a relationship 
with over a period of time and got to  know  them  then  I would 
struggle to  e a t th a t particular piece of m eat bu t you know I ea t 
lambs and pigs and anything outside of tha t
303. 3U I would ea t cats and dogs I'm with you I think if it w ere th e  local delicacy
then  I would like to  try it intellectually I think there 's  nothing 
different it's just a piece of m eat really I would think well it used 
to  be a dog or cat but
304. 3D Yeah
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305. 3U I suppose th a t's  just so ingrained isn 't it really th a t cats and dogs are pets 
and tha t's  a big psychological step I w ouldn 't deliberately ea t a 
cat or a dog bu t I w ou ldn 't have a particular problem with it
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
This group was particularly keen to strive for consistency in contrast to 
participants in other groups who categorically ruled out ever eating dog or cat meat.
When asked whether, in liking and eating animals, people simply liked animals, 
but only up to a certain point, or whether they were inconsistent, two participants in this 
same group maintained their consistency before a third tentatively suggested that 
inconsistency also plays a role. Note the “to be quite honest” in statement 496, indicating
that it is something to which he is reluctantly admitting:
Transcript Speaker 
code
3C I think there 's a limit to  their caring
Int Right
3B mmm I think so I think so
3U Yeah
3D I think there 's  probably a contradiction as well to  be quite honest I m ean 
it's come down to  th e  er th e  wire and an anim al's going to  be 
harm ed I think th a t m ost people would have a problem  with it 
3B you d o n 't think it's
3C I m ean they probably have a problem with it while you 're telling them
3D yes th a t 's  right if it's done in front of them  then  it's very im mediate
3C Yeah
3D you know going back to  th e  question earlier w here w e w ere saying
abou t identifying th a t th a t lamb chop looks like a lamb in the  field 
then  you know you start addressing th a t contradiction I think
3D I think it's contradictory I think if people say "oh I d o n 't w ant animals to
be harm ed" or if w e 're  saying it's both of these things then w e're 
actually
3A if you ask the  majority of people "would you like to  see an animal
harm ed?" then they would say "no" because they d o n 't w ant it 
harm ed they d o n 't w an t to  see a cow  harm ed but they do w ant 
to  ea t beef it's th e  sam e thing you know I w ou ldn 't w an t to  see 
som ebody suffer you know  even though  a t the  sam e tim e I'm 
quite happy
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “In t”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
While some participants said they had no concerns at all about eating meat, 
others showed strong signs o f active denial strategies:
line
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499. 
500 
501.
511.
512.
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Transcript
line
234.
Speaker
code
4D well w e tend not to  think abou t it yes w e tend not to  think about it
235. 4C well 1 only ea t m eat because 1 d o n 't think about it if 1 th ough t abou t it 1
236. 4D
couldn 't possibly 
1 d o n 't think tha t would bother me actually
237. 4U you d o n 't think about it you probably d on 't but
238. 4B it w ouldn 't m ean anything to  me
239. 4C 1 do think abou t it but 1 push it away [at this point 4C motioned
240. Int Right with both hands as if pushing
241. 4C 1 deliberately d o n 't think abou t it something away to her right]
242. Int so th a t's  quite a conscious thing then would you say th a t's  every time
243. 4C
you cook a piece of m eat or w hen you do your weekly shop or is 
it just som ething th a t occurs to  you every now  and again 
1 suppose it occurs to  me every now  and then w e shouldn 't be eating
244. Int
them
but th a t 's  not the case for th e  rest of you
245. 4B No
246. 4U well it m ight be now
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Participants were asked if they had thought about these questions before. Most 
o f them answered that they were aware o f them, but did not think about them much. 
Participant 4C, however, who in statement 243 above said that it occurred to her “every
now and then”, later on had increased her perceived frequency o f discomfort:
Transcript Speaker 
line code
706. 4C I do think abou t it quite a lot I think I'm conscious every tim e I e a t m eat
th a t it is a bit repulsive it is a bit questionable but I like m eat
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
It seems that during the course o f the focus group her dissonance had not only 
heightened, but her memory o f how often she thought about these issues had changed 
too. This demonstrates Bern and McConnel’s (1970) point about how, following a 
change in attitude, people will maintain that their old attitude was more like their new 
attitude than it actually was. It shows that this participant’s dissonance affected how she 
processed information. No other participant in this group said that they thought about 
these issues a great deal, and certainly none o f them showed a shift in attitude (or at least 
thinking about the attitude) like this participant.
Other participants supported Hills’s (1993) findings that they were too 
preoccupied by immediate concerns in their personal lives to consider other issues. The 
emphasis on emotional concerns, and the physically draining aspect o f it, was referred to 
by two participants as tiring:
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Transcript Speaker 
line code
19. 1B yes absolutely I find really its family th a t take up a lot of my thoughts
mainly because I've got an ageing father w ho lives round the
corner he takes up a fair bit my tim e I've also go t a son w ho 's  go t
a mental illness so he 's in and ou t of hospital like a yo-yo a t th e  
m om ent and I I'm lucky because I've go t five daughters and my 
daughters are close a t hand but I do find th a t most of my tim e is 
taken up with family and th a t's  w hat occupies my thoughts
37. Int So do you think it's th e  am ount of em otion th a t's  tied in to
38. 1B yes and I think I think it's th e  em otion tha t's  the  tiring thing as well
39. 1C it is tiring yes
84. 1D I've go t tw o small children and because w e're  moving house everything's
slanted tow ards th a t and I can 't really think of anything else a t 
the  m om ent
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “In t”; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U” (unidentifiable).
Kill ow n food
A lot o f the codes discussed so far were epitomised in the relatively polarised 
condition o f killing for one’s own food. Some participants felt that they could not 
consider killing an animal and that they would rather become vegetarian; others 
answered that they could kill because they had done it before, but that they would not 
want to. This reticence was not just due to a lack o f skill or squeamishness (a feeling 
which Ryder (2000) claims is closely related to compassion), but also because participants
genuinely would not want to harm an animal.
Transcript Speaker 
line code
35. 3U but you know th e  w hole thing I think if people had to  do it [slaughter] 
for them selves to  e a t m eat m ost people w ouldn 't e a t m eat
308. 3A m ost people w ouldn 't
309. Int w ouldn 't
310. 3A w ouldn 't
311. 3C would not
312. 3A but if som ebody else did it
313. 3C Yeah
314. Int why do you think th a t is, because of the  tim e or lack of skill or?
315. 3A well I think it's th e  way you look on life and the  majority of people 
w ou ldn 't w an t to  do it
316. 3D yeah I think it m ight be som ething to  do with skill
317. 3A Yeah
318. 3C kill it cleanly
319. 3D m ost people w ou ldn 't know  how  to  kill it cleanly and gu t it and I think 
squeam ishness would com e into it as well
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129. 4C you d o n 't have to  bring yourself to  do th e  horrible act do you
130. 4D well over there it's not here
131. 4U if you 're not doing it for a living if you 're not doing it for th e  w hole of
your life you will find it very difficult to  do it I w ou ldn 't be able to 
do it a t all so only I think I couldn 't ea t a dog or cat unless I was 
absolutely starving and there  w as nothing else to  e a t
132. 4B Yes
133. 4C self-preservation
134. 4U Xxx
135. 4D yes each generation 's completely different
136. Int ... would you kill animals for m eat yourself if there w as a strike
137. 4B oh I d o n 't know if it was just a strike
138. 4C no I'd becom e vegetarian I'd becom e vegetarian
Note: Speaker codes identify group by number and participant by letter; the interviewer is identified by “Int” ; speakers whose 
voice could not be identified from the recording are classified as “U ” (unidentifiable).
Section 7.1 builds on the results presented here to consider broad patterns o f 
meat-eaters’ attitudes and arguments that can be tentatively drawn from 
these discussions.
5.3 Answers to research questions
Focus groups explored the topic and identified key questions to follow up in 
further research. They were ideal designs for this topic because competing arguments 
were offered more naturally by members o f a group than by a researcher. The groups 
were particularly used to assess research questions outlined on p.65.
(a) What are people’s attitudes towards farmed animals and eating meat—  
independently, as well as in the context o f each other?
Taste was people’s main reason for eating meat, and most participants deemed 
that this sufficiently outweighed their ordinary concerns about animals. The use of 
animals for meat was one o f many instrumental reasons for positively evaluating animals.
While participants felt that animals had intrinsic qualities, these were rarely 
made explicit, rather they were obvious qualities that animals automatically possessed 
and which should not be affected by people without very good reason (like eating meat), 
but even then, not with impunity. An uncontentious view, deemed so obvious that it did 
not warrant explication, was that animals can experience pleasure and pain, both physical 
and emotional.
(b) D o people’s explicit attitudes match their more automatic (non-conscious, 
or implicit) attitudes, and do any attitudes match people’s reported behaviour?
All participants were meat-eaters, and their positive attitudes towards eating 
meat and liking its taste were therefore consistent with their behaviour. While most 
participants felt that these reasons outweighed their concerns for farmed animals’
103
Chapter 5 r: Qualitative research results
experiences, two in particular did not: IF  and 4C. IF  had gready reduced his meat 
consumption and questioned whether he “really” wanted to eat meat when considering 
the life it cost, and 4C described herself as a “theoretical vegetarian”. While the other 
participants shared many of the same concerns about animals’ experiences prior to 
becoming their meat, suggesting some inconsistency between their attitudes towards 
farm animals and meat-eating behaviour, these two participants expressed attitudes that 
suggested greater inconsistency and possibly even that when these attitudes and 
behaviour were relevant in the context of one another (as in the focus group conditions), 
consistency may not have been maximised overall. Although implicit attitudes were 
beyond the reach o f this method, participant 4C did demonstrate a physical response to 
some thoughts, automatically demonstrating how she pushed them away. This physical 
reaction may indicate an implicit response that would normally operate before such 
thoughts became conscious. I f  so, it suggests that her implicit attitudes towards animals’ 
suffering matched her explicit attitudes and were perhaps even stronger. The quantitative 
methods include an implicit attitude measure designed to test these attitudes 
more robustly.
(c) In what relevant ways do vegetarians’ and meat-eaters’ attitudes differ, and 
in what ways are they similar?
Although these participants were all meat-eaters, some o f them had vegetarian 
family members and confirmed the connection between animals and meat in vegetarian 
attitudes that previous research had found. This connection was noted by participants as 
an explanation o f how vegetarians differed to themselves. Hence, either the absence of 
this connection, or concern about this connection, for meat-eaters may be inferred. 
However, they too were concerned about animals’ welfare and experiences.
A key difference between these participants’ own attitudes and those reported 
by previous research, was in these meat-eaters’ perceived greatest advantages of a 
vegetarian diet: animals’ welfare being deemed more important than human health 
benefits. This suggests that these meat-eaters’ perceived advantages o f a vegetarian diet 
better match vegetarians’ perceived advantages o f their own diets as recorded by 
previous research (see section 2.1). However, it has been noted that further research is 
required before this conclusion can be confidently accepted.
Participants’ attitudes towards their own diet was that, on the whole, although 
they did not want animals to suffer, their access to meat took priority over animals’
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experiences. This, they felt, was the greatest difference between themselves 
and vegetarians.
(d) Does simply focusing on genuinely held, relevant attitudes 
cause dissonance?
There was plenty o f evidence for dissociation variables, offered independently 
by all four groups, and conversations often turned naturally to the issue o f consistency 
and o f wanting to avoid uncomfortable knowledge o f the life and death behind meat. 
These concerns did not ordinarily come between participants’ liking for the taste o f meat 
and their meat-eating behaviour, however, which, without these concerns, were 
consistent with each other. Even in this exploratory research design there was evidence 
o f increased dissonance caused by simply considering and discussing the topic as denial 
was physically demonstrated by one woman ‘pushing’ her thoughts away. A reluctance to 
‘admit’ to feelings o f inconsistency was also noted.
(e) Is consonance restored through attitude change and, if so, do attitudes 
move in expected directions?
Although consonance restoration, like attitudes and dissonance, was not 
explicitly measured by this method, many participants felt that they maximised 
consistency overall and showed no obvious consonance-restoration strategy. However, 
dissociation variables were accepted by all participants to aid the disconnection between 
meat and animals, and one participant experienced a change in her perceived frequency 
o f feelings o f discomfort and concern for animals and how troubled she felt by eating 
meat, suggesting her attitude towards eating meat became more negative over the course 
o f the discussion. This direction o f attitude change is contrary to the direction predicted 
as attitude changes were expected to reinforce behaviour. Hence, a reduction in 
positivity towards animals, and an increase in positivity towards meat for this meat-eater 
would have been expected. However, as the next Chapter shows, this result is not as 
aberrant as it first appears.
The next Chapter presents the quantitative research results that explicitly test 
many o f the ideas explored here.
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Figure 7, repeated from p.78, again lays out the order o f the quantitative 
research methods. Because the design was explained in Chapter 4, a brief summary is 
presented below. See Appendix D  for the research guide and Appendix H for the tables 
o f  statistical analyses used in this chapter.
Figure 7: Order of research and expected levels of dissonance
Research
item
What it 
measures
Dissonance Dissonance Repeat all Dissonance
experiment experiment overall experim ent
Detailed M eat or Detailed Animal (meat IAT: (meat, animal attitudes: (m eat, animal
questionnaire 1 animal quest ionnaire2 or m eat and animal meat, and slaughter m eat, and slaughter
(meat or overall (animals overall attitude Slaughter animal and attitude animal and attitude
animals) a ttitude or meat) attitude relationship) attitude slaughter relationship) slaughter relationship)
D eta iled Explicit D e ta ile d Explicit Dissonance Explicit
1
Implicit Dissonance
1
Explicit Dissonance
r e a so n s / attitude r e a so n s / attitude i attitude attitudes i attitudes i
v a lu a tio n s (x1) v a lu a tio n s (xl) ii (xl) (x3) ii (x3)
i
i
hi fo  o  u u
Progression through research
Participants answered detailed questionnaires about their attitudes towards 
eating meat and towards farm animals. They also completed overall attitude 
measurements about eating meat, farm animals and animals’ slaughter. These overall 
attitude measurements were repeated towards the end o f  the procedure. Results o f  the 
detailed questionnaires and change in attitudes, along with dissonance reports, are 
presented later. The next section introduces the initial overall attitude results, which were 
largely made while the participants were unaware about potential connections between 
the attitudes. The attitudes towards eating meat and towards farm animals can therefore 
be considered “pre-dissonance”, while the attitude measurements towards animals’ 
slaughter were taken after the first dissonance measure. Measuring attitudes towards 
animals’ slaughter automatically related eating meat to animals, so the first dissonance 
measure o f the relationship between eating meat and farm animals alone was taken 
beforehand. Nevertheless, the first dissonance measure and the slaughter attitude 
measurement were both taken before the IAT. Although participants were therefore no
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longer naive when evaluating their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, they had not 
undergone the specific dissonance-stimulation o f the IAT.
6.1 Explicit attitudes towards farm animals, eating meat and 
animals’ slaughter
Chart 2: Mean explicit attitudes
A n im a l overall M e a t overa ll S la u g h te r  overall
■  M e a t-e a te r s  V e g e ta r ia n s
As Chart 2 shows, meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals were 
significantly more positive than their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /(63)=6.44, 
^< .001. Their attitudes towards eating meat were also significantly more positive than 
their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /(63)=6.72,p< .001. The differences between 
meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat were not statistically 
significant.
In contrast, vegetarians’ attitudes towards farm animals were significantly more 
positive than their attitudes towards both eating meat, /(13)=6.71,_p<.001, and animals’ 
slaughter /(13)=6.29,/><.001, but the differences between their attitudes towards eating 
meat and animals’ slaughter were not statistically significant (however, the small 
vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power o f these tests).
While meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ overall attitudes towards farm animals were 
no t significantly different, vegetarians’ attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ 
slaughter were significantly more negative than meat-eaters’, /(76)=5.67,^><.001 and 
/(76)=3.55,/><.001, respectively.
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6.2 H ow people evaluate farm animals
Chart 3: How farm animals are evaluated
Instrumental reasons
I 3
o
2
1
0
-1
|  -2 
ai
-  -3
, 1.30
I
-0.16 n 20
StatusB odies Biodiversity M oney A p p e ara n ce  Rarity Affection
■  M ea t-ea te rs V egetarians
Intrinsic reasons
I T
S entience Abilities In telligence Souls
Chart 3 demonstrates that meat-eaters recorded that they positively evaluated 
farm animals for the products that could be made from their bodies significandy more 
highly than did vegetarians, /(19)=2.39,^<.05. But although this was meat-eaters’ highest 
mean value, this, along with evaluating animals as status symbols, did not correlate with 
meat-eaters’ overall attitudes towards farm animals. The highest rated detailed reason, in 
contrast with almost all other evaluations, is therefore not what meat-eaters think o f 
when they generally evaluate their attitudes towards farm animals.
However, all o f the other reasons (with the exception o f biodiversity) that did 
positively correlate with overall attitudes toward animals (the highest rated o f  the three 
overall attitudes) actually achieved negative mean rankings from meat-eaters 
(biodiversity: r(63)=.26,/><.05, money: r(63)=.34,/><.01, appearance: r(63)=.44,/><.001, 
rarity: r(63)=.30,/><.05, affection: r(63)=.37,/><.01, sentience: r(63)=.31,/><.05, abilities: 
r(63)=.37,^><.01, intelligence: r(63)=.29,/><.05, souls: r(63)=.26,/><.05).
Chart 3 also shows that meat-eaters and vegetarians explicidy evaluated farm 
animals for different reasons. Meat-eaters’ only mean positive evaluations shown in 
Chart 3 are the use o f animals’ bodies (which, as already stated, did not significantly 
correlate with overall animal evaluations) and animals’ biodiversity. In contrast, while 
vegetarians also positively evaluated biodiversity, their evaluations o f animals for more 
intrinsic reasons were significantly higher than meat-eaters’, F ( l ,  76)=9.37,^><.01.
Meat-eaters’ evaluations o f animals for the products that can be made from 
their bodies correlated with positively evaluating animals for their monetary cost, 
r(63)=.40,/><.001, and rarity, r(63)=.30,/><.05. It did not correlate significantly with 
overall attitudes towards farm animals, eating meat or animals’ slaughter, but did
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correlate with a wide range o f meat consumption, r(63)=.40,^<.005. On the other hand, 
vegetarians’ evaluations o f animals for the products that could be made from their 
bodies did correlate with their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, r(13)=.66, p<.05.
This suggests that vegetarians connected the use o f animals’ bodies to animals’ slaughter, 
while meat-eaters did not.
Meat-eaters’ negative correlations between the perceived intrinsic reasons for 
positively evaluating animals (farm animals’ perceived sentience, abilities, intelligence and 
souls) and overall attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter also stand out. 
(Meat correlations: sentience: r(63)=-.52,^><.001, abilities: r(63)=-.41,^><.01, intelligence: 
r(63)=-.54,^<.001, souls: r(63)=-.37,^><.01. Animals’ slaughter correlations: sentience: 
r(63)=-.40,^><.005, abilities: r(63)=-.26,jfr<.05, intelligence: r(63)=-.44,jfr<.001, souls: 
r(63)=-.31,y><.05.) For meat-eaters, all four intrinsic reasons correlated not just with 
each other, but with biodiversity, appearance, rarity and affection reasons, as well as all 
three overall attitudes. (Sentience correlations: abilities: r(63)=.71,^><.001, intelligence: 
r(63)=.86,^><.001, souls: r(63)=.74,^><.001, biodiversity: r(63)=.47,^><.001, appearance: 
r(63)=.50,/><.001, rarity: r(63)=.49,^><.001, affection: r(63)=.56,^><.001, overall 
attitudes towards animals: r(63)=.31,_/><.05. Abilities correlations: intelligence: r(63)=.79, 
7><.001, souls: r(63)=.57,^><.001, biodiversity: r(63)=.45,^><.001, appearance: r(63)=.43, 
^><.001, rarity: r(63)=.28,^><.05, affection: r(63)=.50,^<.001, overall attitudes towards 
animals: r(63)=.36,p<.005. Intelligence correlations: souls: r(63)=.71,^<.001, 
biodiversity: r(63)=.41,jfr<.01, appearance: r(63)=.47,p<.001, rarity: r(63)=.42,p<.01, 
affection: r(63)=.59,A< -001, overall attitudes towards animals: r{63)—.29,p<.03. Souls 
correlations: biodiversity: r(63)=.39,p<.005, appearance: r(63)= .4 9 ,< .0 0 1 , rarity: 
r(63)=.36,p<.005, affection: r(63)=.61,p<.001, overall attitudes towards animals: 
r(63)=.27,/><.05.)
Factor and regression analyses: m eat-eaters
Regression analyses revealed no significant prediction between meat-eaters’ 
detailed evaluations of animals and overall attitudes towards farm animals or eating meat; 
however, biodiversity did negatively predict attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /?=-.37; 
^(63)—~2.34,p<.05, as did beliefs about farm animals’ intelligence, /?=-.59; /(63)=-2.16, 
p<. 05.
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Meat-eaters’ evaluations o f animals for the products that can be made from 
their bodies predicted a wide range o f meat consumption, /?—.15; /(63)=2.32,^><.05.
Factor analysis o f meat-eaters’ evaluations o f animals revealed three 
components, labelled in Table 3 as Intrinsic, Consumption & Global and Personal.
Table 3: Meat-eaters* evaluations of farm animals: factor analysis
Component
Intrinsic
Consumption 
& Global Personal
Bodies .040 .811 .103
Biodiversity .398 .481 -.118
Money -.138 .771 -.308
A ppearance .301 .052 -.604
Rarity .060 .247 -.716
Affection .401 -.111 -.675
Status -.142 .016 -.881
Sentience .908 .004 -.032
Abilities .891 .142 .140
Intelligence .928 -.031 -.028
Souls .741 -.124 -.234
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations
Reducing the data into these components revealed that no component 
significantly predicted overall attitudes towards animals or the range o f meat 
consumption, but the Intrinsic component (a = .92) did negatively predict attitudes 
towards eating meat, /?=-.61, /(63)=-4.40}J£<.001, and animals’ slaughter, 
^=-.51,/(63)=-3.18,jp<.005.
Factor and regression analyses: vegetarians
Positively evaluating animals for the products that could be made from their 
bodies predicted vegetarians’ attitudes towards eating meat, /?=1.69, /(13)=8.50,/><.05. 
Rarity, perceptions o f animals’ souls and their abilities negatively predicted vegetarians’ 
attitudes towards eating meat, /?=-.67, /(13)=-4.60,^<.05; /?=-1.41, /(13)=-6.30,J><.05; 
/?=-4.71, /(13)=6.09, ^ ><.05, respectively.
Biodiversity, status and animals’ intelligence negatively predicted vegetarians’ 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /?=-.61, /(13)=-7.39,/><.05; /i=-.49, /(13)=-4.79, 
^><.05; /?=-4.66, /(13)=-9.87,/><.05, respectively.
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Factor analysis o f vegetarians’ evaluations o f animals revealed a similar pattern 
to meat-eaters’, and three components are labelled in Table 4 as Intrinsic, Consumption 
& Global, and Personal.
Table 4: Vegetarians’ evaluations of farm animals: factor analysis
______________________ Component______________________
Consumption 
Intrinsic & Global Personal
Bodies -.251 .749 -.205
Biodiversity .534 .552 .112
Money -.302 .887 -.019
A ppearance .353 -.155 .465
Rarity .426 .743 .217
Affection .348 -.474 .665
Status -.430 .225 .921
Sentience .910 -.057 -.054
Abilities .930 -.034 .078
Intelligence .924 -.073 .081
Souls .986 .018 -.209
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 11 iterations
Unlike meat-eaters, vegetarians’ overall attitudes towards farm animals were 
predicted by the Intrinsic component (a = .96), ^=.55, /(13)=2.64,/><.05. N o 
component predicted vegetarians’ overall attitudes towards eating meat or 
animals’ slaughter (however, the small vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power 
o f these tests).
Vegetarians’ Intrinsic component results were significantly higher than 
meat-eaters’, F(1, 76)=9.37,^<.01. The other components differed slightly between 
meat-eaters and vegetarians, preventing their direct comparison.
6.3 Reasons for eating meat
The range o f meat consumption correlated positively with meat-eaters’ 
attitudes towards eating meat, both initially, r (77)=.44, ^ ><.001, and after the IAT, 
r(77)=.41,jfr<.001. This relationship also held for attitudes towards animals’ slaughter 
r(77)=.36,_/><.001 before the IAT and r(77)=.28,/><.01 afterwards. Similarly, the range 
o f meat consumption correlated positively with higher evaluations o f animals for the 
products that can be made from their bodies, r(7T)=A2,p<.001, and correlated 
negatively with positively evaluating animals for intrinsic reasons, r(77)=-.22,p<.05.
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Chart 4: Meat-eaters’ reasons for eating meat
Notes:
* First measure o f the overall attitude towards meat
As Chart 4 demonstrates, meat-eaters’ strongest reason for eating meat was 
because they liked its taste. This was followed by the view that meat was natural or good 
to eat, that it looked or smelled nice, that they ate meat out o f habit, that it was good 
value for money and the fact that it did not occur to meat-eaters not to eat meat. 
However, habit alone significantly predicted overall attitudes towards eating meat, /?=.40, 
/(63)=2.55,^<.05.
Table 5 demonstrates the result o f  factor analysis which identified four 
com ponents, Principled, Senses & Natural, Normalised, and External Pressure.
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Table 5: Why meat-eaters eat meat: factor analysis
Component
Principled Senses & Natural Normalised External Pressure
Taste .064 .827 .153 -.060
Natural .081 .811 -.133 .034
Look/smell -.167 .692 -.272 .210
Habit .142 -.096 -.710 -.355
Value -.018 .050 -.619 .209
Didn't occur .000 .117 -.658 -.105
Organic .890 .102 -.003 -.231
Celebration -.027 .084 .120 .860
No alternative .040 -.449 -.203 .521
Butcher/farmer .662 -.059 -.259 .228
Religious .718 -.032 .018 .175
Others .188 .041 .029 .670
Mistake .520 -.118 .301 .459
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 14 iterations
The Normalised com ponent predicted overall attitudes towards eating meat, 
/?=.35, /(63)=2.24,/><.05. However a low reliability score for this com ponent (a = .46) 
demonstrated that the Habit variable alone explained 49% o f the variance and so 
remained the only significant variable in attitudes towards eating meat.
N one o f  the individual factors or com ponents predicted the other overall 
attitudes or the range o f meat consumption.
6.4 Reasons for avoiding meat
Chart 5: Vegetarians’ reasons for avoiding meat
Notes:
* First measure o f the overall attitude towards meat
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As Chart 5 shows, the strongest reason for avoiding meat was ethics, followed 
by environmental concerns, a dislike of meat’s appearance, health concerns, and a dislike 
of meat’s smell and taste.
Regression analysis found that none of these reasons significandy predicted 
attitudes towards farm animals or eating meat, but religion and health negatively 
predicted attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /?=-.30, /(13)=-3.63,/><.05; /?=-.29,
/(13)=-3.40,/><.05, however, ethics, environmental and health concerns correlated 
negatively with attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, r(13)=-.92,/)<.001, r(13)=-.63, 
/><.05, r(13)=-.60,/><.05, respectively.
Table 6 demonstrates the result of factor analysis which identified three 
components, Religious & Dislike, Meatless Meat-eater (reasons suggesting that people 
would eat meat out of choice, but are prevented from doing so by external variables), 
and Principled & Health.
Table 6: Why vegetarians avoid meat: factor analysis
______________________Component______________________
Religious Meatless Principled
& Dislike Meat-eater & Health
Ethical .092 -.041 .938
Environmental -.262 -.515 .699
Dislike appearance .951 -.070 -.007
Health .027 .189 .821
Dislike smell .963 -.135 -.093
Dislike taste .742 -.123 .016
Religious .676 .443 .162
Expense -.236 .926 .108
Unavailable -.009 .962 -.077
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations
The Principled & Health component (a = .78, the strongest contributor being 
the Ethical variable, explaining alone 70% of the variance) predicted overall attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter, ^=-.77, /(13)=-5.75,/><.001. Overall attitudes towards eating 
meat and farm animals were not explained by any o f these variables, suggesting that 
avoiding meat is not about farm animals or meat itself, but about animals’ slaughter 
(however, the small vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power of these tests).
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6.5 Implicit attitudes towards farm animals, eating meat and 
animals’ slaughter
Chart 6: Meat-eaters’ mean implicit attitude (response speed ms)
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Meat-eaters’ responses were faster in the trials pairing farm animal images with 
good words and animal slaughter images with bad words, than the trials pairing animal 
slaughter images with good words and farm animal images with bad words, /(63)=6.51, 
/><.001. Their responses were also faster when pairing meat images with good words and 
animal slaughter images with bad words, than when pairing animal slaughter images with 
good words and meat images with bad words, /(63)=4.69,/><.001. Pairing farm animal 
images with good words and meat images with bad words was also faster than pairing 
meat images with good words and farm animal images with bad words, /(63)=3.47, 
^ < . 001.
Like their explicit attitudes, meat-eaters’ implicit attitudes therefore 
demonstrated a preference for farm animal images over meat images and meat images 
over animal slaughter images.
Chart 7: Vegetarians’ mean implicit attitude (response speed ms)
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Vegetarians’ responses were similar to meat-eaters’. The coloured columns in 
Chart 6 and Chart 7 highlight differences in the order o f preferences between
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meat-eaters and vegetarians. Pairing farm animal images with good words and animal 
slaughter images with bad words produced faster responses than pairing animal slaughter 
images with good words and farm animal images with bad words, /(13)=5.63,^><.001. 
Although, as Chart 7 shows, overall vegetarians’ responses were slighdy faster when 
pairing meat images with good words and animal slaughter images with bad words than 
when pairing animal slaughter images with good words and meat images with bad words, 
this result was not statistically significant (however, the small vegetarian sample si2e 
creates low statistical power o f these tests). Pairing farm animal images with good words 
and meat images with bad words was however significantly faster than pairing meat 
images with good words and farm animal images with bad words,
/(13)=8.93,/><.001.
Like their explicit attitudes, vegetarians’ implicit attitudes therefore 
demonstrated a preference for farm animal images over both meat and animal 
slaughter images.
Vegetarians were significantly faster than meat-eaters when pairing farm animal 
images with good words and meat images with bad words, /(41)=2.89,^><.01. As the 
combination o f farm animals with good words and animals’ slaughter with bad words 
did not produce a significant difference between the groups, meat responses may be the 
key difference. The differences demonstrated between the ascending order o f pairings in 
Chart 6 compared with Chart 7 also show that vegetarians were quicker than meat-eaters 
when meat images were associated with bad words and slower than meat-eaters when 
meat images were associated with good words in other combinations (although not 
significantly, however, the small vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power o f 
these tests). While vegetarians’ responses were generally quicker than meat-eaters’, 
responses to meat images stand out: meat-eaters’ responses being much more positive 
than vegetarians’.
6.6 Experience o f cognitive dissonance through the research
Factor analysis revealed that the three dissonance measures (uncomfortable, 
uneasy and bothered) were closely correlated at all three phases o f the research (see 
Table 7). They have therefore been collapsed into a single dissonance variable.
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Table 7: Experience of dissonance: factor analysis
Dissonance com ponent
First measure Second measure Third measure
Uncomfortable .944 .948 .983
Uneasy .931 .967 .985
Bothered .897 .966 .974
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
1 component extracted at each stage
Chart 8: Mean dissonance experiences
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2.0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First measure Secon d  m easure Third m easure
 M eat-eaters  V egetarians
Chart 8 shows that, as predicted, participants experienced increased dissonance 
between the first and second measures (i.e. before and after the IAT), 7(77)=4.76, 
/><.001. However, dissonance did not significantly reduce following the re-expression of 
attitudes, and by the third dissonance measure there remained a significant increase in 
dissonance between the first and third measures, /(77)=4.05,/)<.001. Separating 
meat-eaters and vegetarians revealed that this pattern remained significant for 
meat-eaters, /(63)=4.34,/)<.001; /(63)=3.80,/><.001, but not for vegetarians— although 
the pattern direction was similar (however, the small vegetarian sample size creates low 
statistical power of these tests).
Vegetarians’ mean scores were higher than meat-eaters’, which was not 
predicted, although this difference was not statistically significant (however, the small 
vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power o f these tests). Some vegetarians 
reported after the study that they felt so strongly about the attitude targets that they were 
unable to respond as instructed and instead reported their discomfort with the 
relationship between animals, meat and slaughter (rather than about their attitudes 
concerning this relationship). Thus, while some vegetarians reported nil dissonance
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throughout the study, others reported high levels of dissonance. This strength o f feeling 
is itself notable.
Most participants’ dissonance was increased by considering their own attitudes 
and the relationship between them, as might happen naturally under certain social 
conditions (e.g. foot and mouth epidemics). While simply re-evaluating and expressing 
one’s attitude seemed to slightly reduce the dissonance, the effect was not statistically 
significant. The fact that this effect was not larger is intriguing.
Figure 13 superimposes the dissonance results from Chart 8 onto the previous 
Figure 7 to demonstrate the disparity between the predicted and actual results between 
the second and third measures.
Figure 13: Disparity between predicted and actual consonance restoration
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Comparing meat-eaters’ range of meat consumption and first overall attitudes 
(towards eating meat, farm animals and animals’ slaughter) to the dissonance data, 
reveals that attitudes towards animals’ slaughter alone significantly negatively predicted 
dissonance, /?=-.49, /(63)=-3.30,/><.005. That is, the more negative participants’ 
attitudes were towards animals’ slaughter, the more dissonance they experienced.
Although a similar result held for the group as a whole, when vegetarians’ and 
meat-eaters’ data were analysed separately, the vegetarians’ data produced no significant
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results, so meat-eaters are analysed here alone (however, the small vegetarian sample size 
creates low statistical power of these tests).
Subtracting the first dissonance scores from the second dissonance scores to 
reveal the increase in dissonance following the IAT, produced a similar result,
/?=-.32, /(63)=-2.41,/><.05.
This suggests that if vegetarianism is caused by cognitive dissonance, then the 
research which has previously cited a love for animals as the reason behind vegetarianism 
is incorrect. A love for animals does not cause dissonance: a concern over animals’ 
slaughter does. This fits with the vegetarian data, which, as already analysed, identified 
that attitudes towards animals’ slaughter (unlike the other overall attitudes) were 
predicted by reasons for avoiding meat. Here meat-eaters’ dissonance scores and 
vegetarians’ meat-avoidance attitudes converge to independently enforce the view that 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter are key.
6.7 H ow  attitudes changed through the research
Chart 9: Meat-eaters’ mean attitude Chart 10: Vegetarians’ mean attitude
changes changes
First m e a su r e  S e c o n d  m e a su r e  First m e a su r e  S e c o n d  m e a su r e
 A n im al overall  M e a t overall -----------A n im al overall   M e a t overall
 S la u g h ter  overall  S la u g h ter  overall
There were three measures of attitudes towards eating meat, farm animals and 
their slaughter— two explicit measures and the IAT. The results all placed the attitude 
targets in the same relative order to each other, providing convergent validity and 
demonstrating that, in this case, implicit and explicit attitudes are similar.
While meat-eaters’ reductions in positive attitudes towards farm animals were 
not statistically significant, their attitudes towards eating meat reduced significantly, 
/(63)=3.00,^<.005, as did their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, /(63)=2.56,/><.05.
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Consequently meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat were significantly less positive 
than their attitudes towards farm animals in the second measures, /(63)=2.14, p<.05. The 
changes in vegetarians’ attitudes between the first and second measures were not 
statistically significant (however, the small vegetarian sample size creates low statistical 
power o f these tests).
As Chart 9 and Chart 10 demonstrate, many attitude changes were contrary to 
hypotheses and the majority o f dissonance literature. Dissonance was expected to cause 
polarisation in the direction o f existing behaviour patterns. Thus, meat-eaters were 
expected to enhance their attitudes towards meat, and to reduce their attitudes towards 
farm animals. In fact, almost all attitude targets were judged more negatively at the end 
o f the research than at the beginning (with the exception o f vegetarians’ attitudes 
towards farm animals). This means that while negative attitudes did indeed become more 
extreme (slaughter for both groups and meat for vegetarians), positive attitudes became 
more uncertain (meat and animals for meat-eaters). Meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm 
animals were expected to become less positive, while attitudes towards eating meat were 
expected to become more positive, not less positive. These results being contrary to 
expectations suggests that the content of these attitudes and, as Stone and Cooper (2000) 
suggested, the level of interpretation o f these attitudes and behaviour, affected the 
experience o f dissonance and lack o f consonance restoration, as well as the unpredicted 
attitude changes.
However, Chart 9 and Chart 10 do demonstrate that the attitudes moved 
further away from each other (with the exception o f vegetarians’ meat and 
slaughter evaluations), showing a relative, if not absolute, polarisation effect. The Charts 
also demonstrate that the movement (reduction in positivity) o f attitudes towards meat 
and animals’ slaughter was similar between meat-eaters and vegetarians. This suggests 
that dissonance through the research had the same effects on meat-eaters and 
vegetarians, and that any differences between them may be quantitative, not qualitative.
There are theoretical problems with meat-eaters’ attitudes towards animals. 
First, farm animals provoked the most positive attitude when the most positive attitude 
was expected to be expressed towards eating meat. Second, based on behaviour, the 
positivity towards farm animals should have swapped places with attitudes towards 
eating meat after experiencing dissonance. The stability o f attitudes towards farm animals
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is in these ways difficult to explain: unlike the other attitudes, it seems highly resistant 
to change.
The greatest single attitude change was experienced by vegetarians with regard 
to eating meat. It was not a statistically significant change, perhaps due to the small 
sample size, but nevertheless, vegetarians were expected to experience the least 
dissonance and attitude change because their explicit attitudes and behaviours were more 
consistent at the outset than meat-eaters’. It was also likely that the vegetarian 
participants had already experienced dissonance in the course o f their decision to 
become vegetarian (assuming they were not vegetarian from birth). The greater attitude 
change for vegetarians than meat-eaters are in these ways surprising. However, ignoring 
the stable attitude towards farm animals, vegetarians’ attitudes towards meat and animals’ 
slaughter faced little resistance to increased negativity, becoming even more consistent 
with behaviour, as predicted by cognitive dissonance theory. These were therefore easy 
changes to make; in fact, perhaps easier than maintaining attitudes unchanged and 
certainly easier than moving attitudes contrary to behaviour, as meat-eaters did.
6.8 Key attitudes and causal relationships
Causal attitudes or experiences cannot be easily identified because each 
correlated factor can ‘predict’ the other in the language o f regression analysis. Some 
intuitive assumptions can be made, however, based on the order o f relationships found 
(and not found) and their fit with the theories and the focus group data. A path analysis 
model, Figure 14, tests these assumptions (the statistical tables are in Appendix H, see 
Table 41).
Path analysis is an extension of regression modelling, depicting a figure in 
which single-headed arrows indicate theoretical causation (Bryman and Cramer, 1990). 
While path analysis treats the single-directional relationships as causal, this is a theoretical 
relationship as each individual regression could have been drawn in reverse (although it 
may not make theoretical sense and the model as a whole may fail). Ultimately a different 
research design would be necessary to confirm some of the individual causal directions 
assumed in this model. The following analysis identifies which directional relationships 
can be confidently asserted, and which cannot. (While the %2=96.0 value indicates that 
the model is a poor fit, this would be expected from the small sample size and does not 
undermine the model, e.g. see Derkzen, 2007.)
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Figure 14: Path analysis o f key meat-eaters’ relationships in the quantitative study
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The model shown in Figure 14 was built in Amos V5 from the meat-eaters’ 
data to explore how attitudes affected each other through the research. Variations 
modelled the previously correlated variables and refined the model to achieve the most 
parsimonious analysis containing only statistically significant relationships. (The 
exception is the relationship between the two exogenous variables, Intrinsic component 
and Habit, where a bidirectional arrow was included per statistical requirements, which 
only confirmed the lack of relationship).
The final path analysis confirms some previous relationships identified in this 
Chapter. A regression is shown along the single-headed arrow for each assumed causal 
relationship between variables. All /? relationships (positive and negative values) are 
significant at/><.001. (The circular error controls and their regression weightings o f 1 are 
included in Figure 14 to show that the model is statistically compliant, but are not 
otherwise informative). By controlling for the effects of prior variables, the model 
estimates the variance explained by preceding variables, shown alongside each box. Thus, 
38% of the variance in the first measure o f meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat 
can be explained by their evaluations of farm animals for Intrinsic reasons and Habit of 
eating meat. Together all of the preceding variables in the relationships represented by 
the model account for 44% of the variance in attitudes towards eating meat by the end 
of the study.
Figure 14 demonstrates that the Intrinsic component (identified from the 
factor analysis of detailed reasons for evaluating animals) and the Habit variable 
(identified from reasons for eating meat) both contributed to the first measure of 
attitudes towards eating meat (#=-.47, and /?=.34, respectively). The model rejected the
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relationship between the Intrinsic component and attitudes towards animals’ slaughter. 
Habit, as a reason for eating meat, is tautological: meat-eaters positively evaluated eating 
meat because they ate meat. It is possible to reverse the causal relationship between 
attitudes towards eating meat, the Intrinsic component for positively evaluating animals, 
and Habit. However, the model would have failed at this point because neither the 
Intrinsic component nor Habit correlated significantly with attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter. Nevertheless, the causal direction o f these relationships can only be tentatively 
proposed and should be tested by other methods in the future to increase confidence in 
the causal direction as shown.
As plentiful evidence has now shown that attitudes towards eating meat do not 
conventionally include behavioural beliefs about animals’ slaughter, the model records 
the relationship from attitudes towards eating meat to attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter (#=.61). Attitudes towards animals’ slaughter can only work in the causal 
position shown in the model because the regressions only connect attitudes towards 
eating meat with attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, and attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter with the increase in cognitive dissonance. Hence, to remove the variable, or 
place it in a different causal relationship, results in failure o f the model. Also, the 
relationship between the measure o f dissonance and the attitudes can be confidently 
asserted as causal because dissonance (the dependent variable) was increased by 
manipulating the attitudes (as independent variables), and attitudes were then measured 
again (as dependent variables), following the experience o f dissonance (which then 
became the independent variable). Consequently, the experimental design had already 
identified that cognitively connecting the attitudes towards farm animals, their slaughter 
and eating meat increased dissonance between the first and second measure. The model 
confirmed that attitudes towards animals’ slaughter were key in this causal relationship 
(#=-.50). The previously discussed regression analyses failed to identify a direct 
relationship between cognitive dissonance and the reduced attitudes towards eating meat, 
but they did identify a relationship between experienced dissonance and attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter. Figure 14 confirms this relationship (#=-.67). Thus, despite 
relying on regression analyses, the model only works with dissonance causing an increase 
in negative attitudes towards animals’ slaughter which, in turn, causes a reduction in 
positive attitudes towards eating meat.
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Looking back in the model, because meat-eaters who initially had particularly 
negative attitudes towards animals’ slaughter tended to experience particularly high 
dissonance levels, this means that meat-eaters with more negative post-dissonance 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter may now be more susceptible to dissonance in the 
future. Thus there may be an interactive relationship; attitudes towards slaughter caused 
dissonance, which caused (changed) attitudes towards slaughter, which could cause 
further dissonance ... and so on, as shown by the dashed arrow in Figure 14. This 
proposed interactive relationship cannot be directly tested by this model, hence its 
dashed differentiation.
Finally, with the attitudes specifically connected, as in this research, meat-eaters 
whose attitudes towards animals’ slaughter became more negative also experienced less 
positive attitudes towards eating meat (#=.66). Again the relationship is therefore 
interactive, but this time the effects o f dissonance were mediated through the attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter. Hence attitudes towards animals’ slaughter can be said to 
cause attitudes towards meat in the unusual conditions o f a cognitive connection 
between these attitudes, ensuing dissonance, and consonance restoration through 
attitude change (rather than denial strategies).
6.9 Evaluating hypotheses and answers to research questions
1) Vegetarians would evaluate animals more positively than would 
meat-eaters.
McDonald’s (2000) and Knight et. al.’s (2003) research discussed in 
Chapter 1 emphasised that vegetarians liked animals. This distinction was 
problematic due to the lack o f control measures. This concern has been 
upheld by demonstrating that vegetarians did not evaluate farm animals 
significantly more positively than did meat-eaters (however, the small 
vegetarian sample size creates low statistical power o f these tests).
However, the detailed reasons for positively evaluating animals did seem to 
differ between meat-eaters and vegetarians, suggesting that vegetarians may 
evaluate animals for more intrinsic reasons than meat-eaters. In contrast 
meat-eaters reasons for positively evaluating animals did not fit with the 
rest o f the data. The potential reasons for this result have started to be
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analysed and the discussion in the next Chapter develops these ideas 
further.
2) Meat-eaters would tend to positively evaluate animals for instrumental 
reasons, while vegetarians would tend to evaluate animals for perceived 
intrinsic qualities.
Following the concerns about other research lacking definitions about what 
“loving animals” means, here distinctions were made between instrumental 
and intrinsic ways o f evaluating animals. This distinction was worthwhile as 
it demonstrated vegetarians’ high evaluations o f animals for their perceived 
intrinsic qualities. However, as noted above, meat-eaters’ detailed 
evaluations o f animals did not match their overall attitudes, suggesting that 
this explicit measure o f detailed evaluations, perhaps in the same way as the 
focus groups measured attitudes on a different level to those in the 
quantitative research, measured meat-eaters’ rationalisations for positively 
evaluating animals. In this sense the results remain worthwhile. Meat-eaters 
did tend to explicidy evaluate farm animals instrumentally in comparison to 
vegetarians, who emphasised more intrinsic qualities.
3) Vegetarians would show a stronger negative response to animals’ slaughter 
than would meat-eaters.
Again, based on the previous research stating that vegetarians are 
vegetarian because they like animals— assuming that this meant that they 
positively evaluated animals for intrinsic reasons more than meat-eaters 
did— they should have objected to animals’ slaughter. Vegetarians did show 
stronger negative responses to animals’ slaughter than did meat-eaters and 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter seemed to be a key reason for avoiding 
meat. However, the results identified that meat-eaters’ attitudes towards 
animals’ slaughter were also negative.
4) Participants would prefer meat pictures to animal pictures.
Implicit attitudes were expected to be based on the mere exposure effect 
and subliminal attitude conditioning. Hence, greater exposure to meat than 
farm animals was expected to be reflected in these results. However, 
participants did not prefer meat pictures to farm animal pictures, in fact the 
opposite.
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5) Participants would prefer animal pictures to slaughter pictures.
On the same bases o f the mere exposure effect and subliminal attitude 
conditioning alone, participants were expected to prefer pictures o f animals 
to pictures o f animals’ slaughter. This was the case. All participants 
preferred farm animal images to animal slaughter images.
6) Vegetarians would demonstrate disparity between explicit and 
implicit attitudes.
Because implicit attitudes are based on automatic effects, in contrast to 
explicit attitudes which can be consciously considered, disparity between 
explicit and implicit attitudes, such as Greenwald and Banaji (1995) found, 
is not uncommon. Vegetarians in this study were expected to have received 
the same exposure and conditioning effects as meat-eaters and to have 
consciously chosen a vegetarian lifestyle. Hence their explicit attitudes 
towards meat were expected to reflect their eating behaviour, while their 
implicit attitudes were expected to better match meat-eaters’ and the 
proposed conditioning effects. In fact, neither meat-eaters nor vegetarians 
demonstrated disparity between explicit and implicit attitudes, and both 
groups’ attitudes towards farm animals were more positive than their 
attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter in the explicit and 
implicit measures.
7) Dissonance would increase between the first and second measures. 
Following cognitive dissonance theory, it was proposed that focusing 
participants’ attention on their own attitudes would create dissonance if 
they believed their attitudes were inconsistent with each other in any way. 
Dissonance did increase between the first and second measures.
8) Dissonance would reduce following attitude change.
Again, following previous cognitive dissonance research showing 
consonance-restoration as a result o f attitude change, the same result was 
predicted here. In fact, as discussed, dissonance did not significantly reduce 
following attitude changes.
9) Meat-eaters would report greater dissonance than vegetarians through the 
course o f the research.
Based on the expectation that focusing on perceived inconsistent attitudes
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causes dissonance, meat-eaters’ explicit attitudes, which were expected to 
be more inconsistent with each other than vegetarians’, were predicted to 
cause greater dissonance than vegetarians experienced. In fact, as discussed, 
meat-eaters did not report greater dissonance than did vegetarians.
10) Attitudes would change in the direction o f pre-existing behaviours at the 
end o f the research.
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, many previous cognitive dissonance studies 
have found that to restore consonance, participants tend to change their 
attitudes to better match their behaviour. This effect is theorised to happen 
because attitudes are generally easier to alter than behaviours. Thus 
meat-eaters’ attitudes were expected to become more positive towards 
meat and more negative towards animals; vegetarians’ attitudes were 
expected to become more positive towards animals and more negative 
towards meat. However, meat-eaters’ attitudes did not change in the 
direction o f existing behaviours, although vegetarians’ attitudes did. 
Meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter moved 
contrary to their pre-existing eating behaviour.
Answers to research questions
(a) What are people’s attitudes towards farmed animals and eating meat—  
independently, as well as in the context o f each other?
Despite different tasks and increases in dissonance, meat-eaters and vegetarians 
alike consistently evaluated farm animals over eating meat and eating meat over animals’ 
slaughter in both the implicit and explicit attitude measures. Meat-eaters reported 
evaluating farm animals most positively for the products that could be made from their 
bodies. Yet this did not correlate with their overall attitudes towards farm animals, 
suggesting that when they generally evaluate farm animals, meat-eaters do not think o f 
what could be made from animals’ bodies, but positively evaluated animals for other 
reasons.
Meat-eaters’ main explicit reason for eating meat was their liking for the taste, 
but habit emerged as the significant predictive reason for eating meat.
Attitudes towards animals’ slaughter are crucial in the relationship between 
attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat— once this relationship is made explicit.
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The changes in dissonance and attitudes reinforce the view that it is often an 
unacknowledged, invisible lack o f  relationship’ for meat-eaters. The meat-eaters who 
experienced greatest discomfort over the course o f the research were those who at the 
start rated their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter most negatively. This data 
triangulated with vegetarians’ reasons for avoiding meat, which in turn predicted 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter.
(b) D o people’s explicit attitudes match their more automatic (non-conscious, 
or implicit) attitudes, and do any attitudes match people’s reported behaviour?
Explicit and implicit attitudes matched in this research, the implicit attitudes 
showing the relative order o f preferences by directly comparing attitudes, and the explicit 
attitudes demonstrating whether they were positive or negative.
Meat-eaters’ eating behaviour was consistent with their positive attitudes 
towards eating meat. Vegetarians’ eating behaviour was also consistent with their 
negative attitudes towards eating meat. Meat-eaters’ more positive attitudes towards farm 
animals than eating meat are at odds with their behaviour if the attitudes are brought into 
context with each other (which they usually are not) and if, as has been argued here, 
meat-eaters positively evaluated animals for reasons other than the products that can be 
made from their bodies. This is explored further in the next Chapter.
(c) In what relevant ways do vegetarians’ and meat-eaters’ attitudes differ, and 
in what ways are they similar?
Meat-eaters tended to explicitly positively evaluate farm animals for more 
instrumental reasons, in contrast to vegetarians who emphasised more intrinsic reasons, 
suggesting that the groups evaluated farm animals in fundamentally different ways. 
Nevertheless, the same intrinsic reasons were identified by factor analysis for both 
groups, suggesting that relationships between such concepts are similar for both 
meat-eaters and vegetarians, but that their contribution to overall attitudes towards 
animals may differ in quantity. However, the qualitative and quantitative results have 
raised concerns about these detailed evaluations o f animals which are explored more 
fully in the next Chapter.
Vegetarians avoided meat mainly for ethical reasons. The regression analysis 
results confirmed that vegetarians avoided meat because they disliked animals’ slaughter, 
not because they especially positively evaluated farm animals or disliked meat itself. 
However, vegetarians’ automatic reactions (i.e. not under conscious control) to meat
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were more negative than meat-eaters’. Together with results demonstrating that 
vegetarians, unlike meat-eaters, connect the use o f animals’ bodies to animals’ slaughter, 
vegetarianism is explained as driven by negative attitudes towards slaughter and 
maintained by a genuine, consequential qualitative and automatic change in attitudes 
towards meat.
Meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ 
slaughter all became less positive (or, more negative), suggesting that both groups 
responded in qualitatively the same way to dissonance. (Vegetarians’ attitudes are only 
used here as a point o f contrast against meat-eaters who are the focus o f this study.)
(d) Does simply focusing on genuinely held, relevant attitudes 
cause dissonance?
Yes, dissonance increased over the course o f the study.
(e) Is consonance restored through attitude change and, if so, do attitudes 
move in expected directions?
Rather than their attitudes towards eating meat becoming more positive, as 
predicted, meat-eaters reduced their positivity towards eating meat and increased their 
negativity towards animals’ slaughter. Meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals also 
slightly reduced in positivity, but, unlike their attitudes towards meat and animals’ 
slaughter, the reduction was not statistically significant. In fact, overall attitudes towards 
farm animals were remarkably stable given the significant changes in other attitudes and 
discomfort experienced during the research.
Vegetarians’ increased negativity towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter is 
in the predicted direction.
U nexp ected  results
Four anomalies stand out between the anticipated and actual results. First, 
meat-eaters preferred farm animals to meat; second, meat-eaters’ attitudes (with the 
exception o f attitudes towards animals’ slaughter) became more uncertain rather than 
more extreme; third, meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter 
became more negative, and fourth the dissonance reduction following attitude changes 
was insufficient to demonstrate statistical significance.
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The thesis introduced on page 11 drew on some commentators’ insistence that 
eating meat is inconsistent with positively evaluating farm animals. It argued that if  these 
views were right, then there should be psychological evidence o f people’s perceived 
inconsistency that would demonstrate how the inconsistency was handled to allow the 
same people to eat meat and positively evaluate animals. The results provided some 
evidence for psychological inconsistency, but there were also some surprises. This 
Chapter discusses the theories introduced earlier in light o f these results.
7.1 Patterns of meat-eaters
The cultural commentators introduced in Chapter 1 demonstrated different 
perspectives on eating meat and positively evaluating animals. There it was questioned 
whether any o f these commentators actually represented more ordinary meat-eaters who 
had not so explicitly and publicly analysed their opinions. The focus groups enabled 
meat-eaters to express their views from which some patterns resonate with those 
commentators whose ideas now tentatively provide frameworks to categorise the groups’ 
discussions. These frameworks are included here, rather than with the previous results 
section, because they are impressionistic, intended for interpretive purposes rather than 
as solid answers to research questions. The qualitative research sample was too small to 
allow greater certainty. Nevertheless, future research may evaluate these tentatively 
observed patterns.
For now, the participants have been categorised according to their 
predominant stances, but the categories are not discrete as participants and arguments 
often blurred into each other. Hence it is the structure and patterns o f attitudes that are 
o f interest, rather than any quantitative analysis. However, while there were insufficient 
numbers o f focus group participants to analyse these patterns quantitatively, the 
observed patterns are later, again tentatively, compared to the quantitative data.
K now ingly-in-denial m eat-eaters
Two focus group participants experienced awareness o f inconsistency and 
unhappiness at causing suffering. Although they enjoyed the taste o f meat, they believed 
that this enjoyment was, all things considered, insufficient reason to kill farm animals.
These participants were unwilling to personally kill unless it was essential for 
their own survival, which they felt was not the case in modern Britain. They experienced
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guilt and discomfort, fitting Cohen’s (2000) description o f denial, but were aware both o f 
their own denial and that they could not function as meat-eaters without i t  They claimed 
to often feel unhappy about the animals behind their meat, but deliberately pushed such 
thoughts away.
In fact, these participants’ responses to meat-eating were more like Johnson’s 
(2004) than Cohen’s (2000) own. The slaughter that so affected Johnson (2004) is 
something that these participants would rather not know about and so they pretend that 
it is not true, or at least not known. Knowing and not knowing— the denial paradox—  
was prevalent in the data. These participants can be identified as “meat-eaters knowingly- 
in-denial”.
T aboo-bound balance-sheet m eat-eaters
Fifteen participants agreed with those who knew they were in denial. They too 
had often experienced pangs o f guilt and preferred not to think about the life and death 
o f meat. But they said that overall they liked the taste o f meat sufficiendy to justify the 
cost to animals. Like those knowingly-in-denial, these participants were also unwilling to 
personally kill for meat under normal circumstances, and were unwilling to eat species or 
body parts that were taboo in Britain. When challenged by others, they agreed that they 
were inconsistent but remained steadfast in their views o f edibility. These meat-eaters 
aimed to maximise their consistency and felt that they did so as far as they could. These 
participants can be identified as “taboo-bound balance-sheet meat-eaters”.
Taboo-free balance-sheet m eat-eaters
Four participants also assumed a cost-benefit approach to their meat-eating. 
Where they differed was in arguing that they would eat outside the bounds o f British 
taboos and personally kill for meat. Although they had not done so, they felt that when 
abroad they would be willing to eat national dishes irrespective o f which animal, or body 
part, the meat came from. Their views most matched Fearnley-WhittingstalTs (2004), and 
they aimed to maximise consistency overall (in principle if not in practice). These 
participants can be identified as “taboo-free balance-sheet meat-eaters” .
Logic-of-the-larder m eat-eater
This final distinction actually comprised only one participant. She 
demonstrated the most explicit moral reasoning o f all arguing, like Scruton (2000), that if
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it were not for people eating certain animals then these animals would not be created and 
hence it was her duty, as an animal-lover, to eat meat. This view was powerfully argued, 
laid out as statements o f irrefutable fact. Other participants, to whom the argument was 
addressed, either lacked the ideas, or the will, to contradict the forceful proponent. 
Although the reasoning was the same as Scruton’s (2000), no reference was made to him 
or to other public sources o f this argument. This meat-eater claimed to be entirely 
consistent and can be identified as the “logic-of-the-larder meat-eater”.
Cultural com m entators, quantitative data, and focus group patterns
Underlying some of the public representations in Chapter 1 do seem to be 
patterned private phenomena. The quantitative data add an extra dimension to these 
tentative patterns, assessing how these consciously considered views compare to the 
results gleaned from the experimental methods which measured more automatic 
responses. However, although focus group participants did have an underlying stance, 
they also often agreed with other viewpoints (balance-sheet meat-eaters acknowledging 
their often experienced discomfort, and those knowingly-in-denial agreeing that they 
must like the taste o f meat a lot, for example). The exception was the logic-of-the-larder 
meat-eater, whose arguments were more uniform and discrete.
Johnson’s (2004) distress and inability to consume the meat o f the cow whose 
slaughter he had witnessed, and Cohen’s (2000) view of his own denial as inexplicable, 
were strongly represented in the focus groups. The prevalence o f denial, acknowledged 
at some stage by all but one participant, not just those knowingly-in-denial, suggests that, 
in this context at least (and in tune with Cohen’s, 2000, theory), denial is far from 
aberrant, but normal. The focus groups also provided evidence for Fearnley- 
Whittingstall’s (2004) cost-benefit approach and Scruton’s (2000) logic-of-the-larder 
philosophy.
The unexpected presentation o f animals’ perceived intrinsic qualities through 
concern for animals’ treatment also mirrors Feamley-Whittingstall’s (2004) approach. He 
too argues against ‘cruel’ treatment, favouring less intensive and more natural farming 
methods, but does not articulate the reasons for this. Perhaps the reasons are too 
obvious to him, like when these focus group participants agreed, without discussion, that 
animals experienced pleasure and pain. Alternatively, perhaps focusing on animals’ 
subjective experience would raise other concerns, about their slaughter, say, that form a
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wider challenge to meat-eating. Hence it might be possible that an explicit concern for 
animals’ perceived mistreatment, is in itself a form of coping (distraction or denial) 
strategy to avoid a wider concern for animals’ experiences. This warrants 
further research.
Those knowingly-in-denial meat-eaters were, like Johnson (2004), painfully 
honest, seeing themselves as guilty and inconsistent. Although these participants found 
their lack o f consistency and state o f denial perplexing and intellectually interesting, the 
strongest impetus for their condition and its maintenance seemed to be their concern for 
animals’ suffering, rather than dissonance itself. Whatever they did or said, they found no 
way to satisfactorily justify animals’ treatment, yet remained meat-eaters. The social 
intuitionist model o f moral judgements introduced in Chapter 3 explains the experience 
o f those knowingly-in-denial: Haidt (2001) found that people’s inability to understand 
their own intuitive judgements under scrutiny is common, despite immediate and strong 
commitment to them.
Both groups o f balance-sheet meat-eaters calculated a rough implicit formula 
o f suffering measured against the pleasure they felt when eating meat. The logic-of-the- 
larder meat-eater also focused on cognitive arguments and intellectual reasoning.
Thus, generally speaking, the knowingly-in-denial meat-eaters used more 
explicidy emotion-based arguments than the other groups. They described their 
emotions and views as personal experiences, without trying to persuade others o f their 
correctness. They sometimes admired the other participants who seemed to use intellect 
and formulae, rather than emotion, to argue their case. Those knowingly-in-denial spoke 
as if confessing a personal truth. For others, an intellectual argument or debate had less 
deeply personal relevance.
Therefore, it was not just the content o f the groups’ discussion that differed, 
but the styles o f presentation. These styles are similar to Greene’s (2007) distinction 
between ‘up close and personal’ dilemmas versus impersonal dilemmas, building on 
Latane and Darley’s (1970) and Unger’s (1996) research on bystander and moral 
problems introduced in Chapter 3. They also tie in to Stone and Cooper’s (2000) 
emphasis on the level o f interpretation o f the meaning o f behaviour which affects the 
experience and motivation o f dissonance. Hence, these participants interpreted their 
behaviour o f eating meat differendy, leading to greater experience o f dissonance for 
those knowingly-in-denial, for whom the problem was personally more relevant than for
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other participants. It is possible that these participants’ self-beliefs (as Pious, 1993, 
suggests) were threatened, unlike other participants. Greene’s (2007) neuroimaging 
methods could be used in future research as they may identify whether knowingly-in- 
denial meat-eaters use areas o f the brain associated with emotion and social cognition, 
while other meat-eaters use areas associated with working memory. I f  so, this would not 
only support Stone and Cooper’s (2000) theory further, but also contribute to the 
research o f moral dilemmas, as the interpretation o f the content o f the dilemma is 
important and hence variable responses can be expected to complex 
real-world dilemmas.
The evidence can also resolve the contradiction between those introduced in 
Chapter 2 who argued that people are troubled by their uses o f other species and those 
who argued that consumers just don’t care. Everyone seemed to care; albeit to differing 
degrees, and with different reasoning about what is right and wrong and why. Everyone 
also agreed that factory farming and slaughter methods could be cruel and would prefer 
a more humane method o f making meat.
So the fashion industry experts who claimed that fur buyers simply do not care 
about the animals who comprise their garments, are unlikely to be correct. The anguish 
o f the knowingly-in-denial group would make them unlikely fur consumers. Fur 
consumers are therefore more likely to pursue a balance-sheet philosophy to the lives 
behind their purchases.
However, while the point of the focus groups was not to derive quantitative 
data but to explore the range o f views and observe patterns, the distribution o f 
participants’ views is, on the face o f it, at odds with the quantitative data. The most 
prolific balance-sheet arguments cannot explain why animals were evaluated more 
positively than eating meat in the attitude questionnaires and IAT; in fact their 
arguments oppose the quantitative results. The explicit and implicit attitude measures 
found that participants showed consistently positive attitudes towards farm animals, 
both more positive than their attitudes towards meat and, in the IAT which directly 
compared attitudes, a significant preference for images o f farm animals over images o f 
meat. The ensuing dissonance confirmed that these preferences were psychologically 
inconsistent with each other and participants’ behaviours. Johnson’s (2004) experience 
matches the quantitative results where meat-eaters evaluated animals more positively 
than eating meat. The analysis o f Johnson’s (2004) experience and Cohen’s (2000)
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arguments can explain why the quantitative data revealed higher evaluations of farm 
animals than eating meat. However, this means that the quantitative data best fits the 
knowingly-in-denial pattern. Minority logic-of-the-larder meat-eaters would be expected 
to be lost in the quantitative data, but balance-sheet meat-eaters should have produced 
more positive attitudes towards eating meat than animals overall.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, the quantitative methods 
may have comprised more participants who were knowingly-in-denial than appeared in 
the focus groups. Second, the qualitative and quantitative methods may not have just 
measured the same target in different ways; they may have measured different targets. 
The focus groups asked people to consciously consider and explain their views to others. 
Rationalisations are often seen as a problem for methods relying on introspection. Under 
focus group conditions, participants explained and justified their views and behaviour to 
others; and they had plenty o f thinking time in which to do so. In the quantitative 
attitude measures, participants sat alone in a cubicle, feeling more anonymous, and they 
were instructed to respond as quickly as they felt comfortable. The IAT also reveals 
automatic responses, not filtered through the reasoning processes o f the focus group 
discussion. It is therefore possible that focus group participants believed their 
balance-sheet arguments genuinely expressed their views as they ‘worked them out’ in 
the groups, but that these arguments did not reflect their less considered attitudes 
towards eating meat and evaluating farm animals.
Based on the prolific balance-sheet arguments in the focus groups, it is unlikely 
that a shift in sampling could have produced quantitative research participants who 
differed so fundamentally. It is more likely that balance-sheet arguments represent 
post-hoc rationalisations, demonstrating one way in which meat-eaters handled being a 
meat-eater and positively evaluating animals.
The knowingly-in-denial pattern stands out, therefore, as the best tentative 
explanation o f the quantitative results. These participants found their preference for 
farm animals over meat, coupled with meat-eating behaviour, which they themselves saw 
as facilitated by their own denial and cultural dissociation variables, to be inexplicable. 
This pattern alone matches the attitude and dissonance data.
The best tentative evidence for how well-matched the knowingly-in-denial 
pattern is to the quantitative data comes from the increased dissonance and attitude 
change experienced by the focus group participant 4C. Throughout the discussion, her
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level o f discomfort increased and her evaluation o f eating meat decreased; the end of 
Chapter 5 observed that this was contrary to cognitive dissonance theory’s expectations. 
However, this pattern went on to be quantitatively endorsed, suggesting that the 
knowingly-in-denial pattern represents the qualitative mirror image o f the quantitative 
results. Naturally, more research is required to confirm this view.
7.2 Consistent and inconsistent relationships between attitudes 
and behaviour
This study supports much of Plous’s (1993) and the Braithwaites’ (1982) earlier 
work. Despite the passage o f time, and three continents, meat-eaters in this research 
remained concerned about farmed animals’ well being and supported the use o f these 
same animals. They also condemned many production practices, and consumed the 
results o f those practices.
This research has further supported previous findings outlined in Chapter 2 
that meat-eaters’ understanding o f the modem meat industry is limited even among 
those with a childhood farming background. No focus group participant claimed that 
they did not care, or that the issue never occurred to them. Although facts about factory 
farming and slaughter techniques were questioned, and general widespread ignorance 
about the industry was acknowledged, no-one argued that modern methods o f mass 
meat production were humane. Opinion was more divided over whether less intensive 
farming was cruel. Focus group participants agreed that they do not like to dwell on 
meat production and animal slaughtering, which supports Cohen’s (2000) theory of 
denial and lends weight to the theory that perhaps focusing on mistreatment o f animals 
is itself a defensive strategy to avoid considering farm animals’ wider experience.
Although farm animals’ slaughter was expected to be the least preferred 
attitude target, meat-eaters (and vegetarians in the implicit measure) were expected to 
prefer meat over animals (a) to match meat-eaters’ eating behaviour, (b) because of the 
effects o f familiarity, and (c) due to evolutionary and social associations between meat 
and the satiation o f hunger. In fact, both groups, in both the explicit and the implicit 
attitude measures, had more positive attitudes towards farm animals than eating meat. 
Given that meat-eating may be a thrice-daily behaviour for meat-eaters, in contrast to the 
more esoteric evaluations of farmed animals, and that attitudes normally mould to
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pre-existing behaviour patterns (as evidenced by the wealth o f existing cognitive 
dissonance work), these results are surprising.
The unexpectedly positive attitudes towards farm animals proved highly 
resistant to change. This stability, especially in contrast to attitudes towards eating meat, 
points either to evolved predispositions (as Serpell, 1996, and Ryder, 2000, argued), or 
very profound and widespread social forces, immovable by cognitive dissonance. Why 
attitudes towards eating meat were not as positive or stable as attitudes towards farm 
animals is intriguing given many evolutionary theorists’ emphasis on the past importance 
o f eating meat.
There was no evidence for Ryder’s (2000) view that people possess a deep- 
seated drive to dominate animals. Participants’ reasons for eating meat seemed more 
mundanely motivated: quantitative results agreeing with focus group emphases on ‘taste’, 
while regression analysis revealed that ‘habit’ was strongly related to attitudes towards 
eating meat. I f  Ryder (2000) was correct, then different reasons for positively evaluating 
animals should have been found, perhaps emphasising status; instead, status was the least 
likely reason for meat-eaters and vegetarians alike to positively evaluate farm animals.
Hills’s (1993) use o f the dominance concept, where animals are subjugated 
simply for use, rather than to fulfil a drive to dominate for its own sake, could therefore 
perhaps be re-labelled “willingness-to-use”, even if, for those knowingly-in-denial, it was 
an “unwilling willingness-to-use”. In  this sense, there was support for the notions o f 
compassion and willingness-to-use other species.
The theory proposed here is that in issues as embedded in our culture as eating 
meat and positively evaluating animals, Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) view of automatic 
attitudes makes better sense than traditional attitude theories’ conceptions of meat-eating 
and evaluating animals as consciously-considered, intentional attitudes. The evidence 
from this study also supports this view because, although the explicit and implicit 
attitude measures matched each other, they did not match the majority o f focus group 
evidence where attitudes were consciously considered. That is not to say, however, that 
these theories are mutually exclusive; further research would be required to make any 
claims about whether the conscious/non-conscious relationship can be deemed discrete 
or continuum-based.
However, a problem with comparing attitudes towards farm animals and 
attitudes towards their slaughter with attitudes towards eating meat is that they cannot be
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compared like-for-like. Farm animals are not a behaviour; eating meat is. Ajzen’s (2002) 
theory about behavioural beliefs combined with this research’s focus groups and 
cognitive dissonance experiment shows that meat-eaters do not ordinarily hold beliefs 
about farm animals and their slaughter readily accessible in their set o f beliefs about 
eating meat. Top o f the list o f beliefs about eating meat are those relating to taste. Thus 
it would be wrong to claim that meat-eaters’ behaviours do not match their attitudes. 
Their overall attitudes towards eating meat were positive; this is consistent with 
their behaviour.
This returns to the question o f whether meat-eaters are inconsistent or not. On 
the single dimension o f eating meat, they are consistent: they have positive attitudes 
towards meat overall and they eat meat. The animals whose bodies comprise that meat 
may rarely come into focus in the context o f eating meat. However, focus group 
participants reported previously experiencing the discomfort caused by knowledge o f 
this relationship. At this point the discomfort can be fairly acute, as would be expected 
by the more positive attitudes towards farm animals than eating meat found by the 
quantitative research. Here meat-eaters are inconsistent and do not maximise consistency 
overall. It is little wonder that denial prevents these thoughts from becoming uppermost 
in beliefs about eating meat.
With the exception o f the logic-of-the-larder meat-eater, focus group 
participants felt that there was inconsistency in the relationship between eating meat and 
positively evaluating animals. The taboo-free balance-sheet meat-eaters felt that they 
maximised consistency overall, while taboo-bound balance-sheet meat-eaters felt that 
they were inconsistent in many respects. Those knowingly-in-denial accepted their 
perceived inconsistency but were unhappy with it.
The taboos identified by Leach (1964) and Eder (1996) remained largely 
inviolable for most focus group participants. Those few who felt that they would be 
willing to break the taboos outside o f their home culture, drew shocked exclamations 
from fellow participants. However, while the narrow range o f animals conventionally 
eaten in Britain suggests that social taboos define species’ edibility, these taboos remain 
inadequate to altogether remove eaten animals from the frame o f moral concern.
The broad lack o f automatic connection between farm animals and eating meat 
itself supports the previous research identified in Chapter 2, especially concerning 
dissociation variables and the absent referent, and might also indicate the unconscious
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collective moral feeling, or moral norm, that Eder (1996) emphasised. But these theories 
can now be improved upon by saying that it is not animals, or animals in meat, so much 
as animals’ slaughter that features in vegetarians’ attitudes towards meat. This returns to 
the problems posed by previous research identified on p.22. Vegetarians’ greater negative 
attitudes towards animals’ slaughter can account for their concern for animals’ welfare 
that was previously identified.
No-one went as far as Eder (1996) in seeing conventional Western acts o f 
slaughter as moral or ritualistic processes, but there was agreement among focus group 
participants that professionals, rather than amateurs, should kill. This agreement 
stemmed from concern for animals’ experiences and focus group participants’ 
unwillingness or inability to slaughter. Therefore, there was no evidence that the 
dissociation variables were ritualistically meaningful in themselves, rather they appeared 
simply functional. Again the differences between attitudes in the quantitative research 
endorse this view.
7.3 H ow dissociation variables and denial remove animals 
from meat
Research data confirmed that the life and death behind meat is unpleasant to 
think about. Many focus group participants freely and explicitly commented that this had 
not just occurred to them within the focus group, but that it had often troubled them 
before, if only momentarily. Negative evaluations o f animals’ slaughter in both the 
implicit and explicit attitude measures further support this view, as does the discomfort 
found by the dissonance experiment.
Supporting Povey et. al.’s (2001) theory (see p.21), meat-eaters did not often 
consider the animals in their diets unless prompted. Some focus group participants even 
showed surprise when the relationship between eating meat and positively evaluating 
animals was first pointed out; but they did know about the relationship.
Focus group participants overwhelmingly agreed that the meat they ate was 
abstracted from the animal, confirming Adams’s (2000) concept o f the absent referent. 
There was also support for Plous’s (1993) concept o f dissociation variables among the 
focus groups: once one variable had been offered by a participant, unilateral agreement 
quickly followed with a cascade of other variables, all previously outlined by Pious 
(1993). Despite different research questions, at some stage all groups commented on the
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unrecognisability o f animals in meat cuts, packaging, presentation, and far away factory 
farming and slaughtering: remote even from the rural participants with 
farming experience.
In some ways many of these variables were felt to deliberately manipulate 
consumers. Some meat-eaters argued that consumers were calculatedly deceived about 
the origins o f their food— and the poor quality o f lives, deaths, and products, behind 
them— in order to maximise consumption and profit. Much as they disapproved, for 
many participants these feelings o f being deceived and cheated did not alter 
their consumption.
Dissociation variables are not entirely successful, however. The majority of 
focus group participants would rather not think about the issues or their consistency, but 
they can and sometimes do.
Participants agreed that dissociation variables meant that they did not have to 
kill animals themselves, which few thought they could do, and that they could consume 
meat, to a large extent, in ‘blissful ignorance’ o f the life and death behind it. Thus, the 
application o f Latane and Darley’s (1970) research on the diffusion o f responsibility and 
invisibility o f the victim to this new area is endorsed. Most meat-eaters do appear to use 
strategies o f denial to eat meat and positively evaluate animals without equating the two. 
That is, as Cohen (2000) suggests, knowledge is not refuted, but it is assigned to less 
troublesome categories where the ideas do not interact. When they are brought together, 
meat-eaters are aware o f having known about the ideas and their relationship all along, 
and sometimes even that they have been active in their separation and avoidance.
Two aspects o f meat-eaters’ detailed evaluations o f farm animals were 
problematic. First the high evaluations o f animals for the products that can be made 
from their bodies and second the negative intrinsic evaluations. These evaluations alone 
would suggest that meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals are consistent with their 
attitudes towards eating meat and eating behaviour. However, there is a weight of 
evidence against this interpretation. The detailed evaluations do not match either the 
explicit or implicit attitudes as, if animals were positively evaluated for the products that 
could be made from their bodies then, as the most prevalent product, meat should have 
been evaluated as highly as, if not more highly than, farm animals. Especially when 
considering implicit attitudes, it make no sense for components to be evaluated more 
positively than the desired end product. The negative attitudes towards farm animals’
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slaughter, a necessary part o f meat production, support this view. This is also endorsed 
by the correlation analysis, which demonstrated that the products that could be made 
from animals’ bodies were not what came to mind when participants rated their attitudes 
towards animals. Hence, the positive attitudes towards animals had nothing to do with 
how their bodies can be used for meat.
The strongest indication that participants believed that their attitudes were 
inconsistent stems from the increase in dissonance as attitudes’ relationships were made 
explicit. The reduction in positivity towards meat, and increase in negativity towards 
animals’ slaughter, following the increase in dissonance caused by considering the 
relationships between attitudes, also strongly supports the theory that farm animals were 
evaluated more positively than meat, that attitudes towards animals were stable, and that 
when farm animals and meat were brought into context with each other, dissonance 
ensued. This indicates that these attitudes were considered to be at odds with each other, 
and not that animals were positively evaluated as a part o f meat (which would be 
consistent and cause no dissonance). Further, the lack o f consonance restoration 
demonstrates that consistency was not maximised between attitudes and behaviour 
through the research. This was because the ‘spreading o f alternatives’ increased 
inconsistency overall between attitudes and meat-eating behaviour (attitudes towards 
farm animals remaining stable, while attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter 
became more negative).
However, while the quantitative results suggested that denial o f the lives and 
deaths behind meat is widespread, in contrast, it was the qualitative results that showed 
that animals are positively evaluated for their perceived intrinsic qualities, which was not 
the case in the quantitative results. But, these evaluations were not made explicidy even 
in the qualitative research. When asked, participants immediately agreed that farm 
animals experienced pleasure and pain, without any discussion, the answer being obvious 
to them, but otherwise the only indication that these experiences were positively 
evaluated came from arguments about the wrongness o f animals’ treatment. The 
causation o f pain and suffering being heavily criticised, often to the point o f there being 
‘no excuse’ for it, only makes sense if animals’ sentience is positively evaluated. Yet it 
was the treatment that drew attention, not the reasons for its objection. This is typical 
when implicit judgements are automatically made that do not necessarily match 
consciously reasoned ideas. As Haidt (2001) found (see Chapter 3), implicit attitudes
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often defy expression, but drive judgements nevertheless. It has already been proposed 
that there may be a defensive reason behind the separation o f this automatic judgement 
from the consciously reasoned focus on mistreatment.
Consequently the detailed quantitative questionnaires, asking participants 
whether they evaluated animals for these intrinsic reasons, may not have stimulated the 
same responses as those made consistendy and repeatedly in the focus groups. There the 
implications o f positively evaluating animals’ sentience when it is perceived to be violated 
(which is when sentience becomes relevant) were very clear. Indeed this fits with Ryder’s 
(2000) view that it is less the spectrum of animals’ experience that matters morally, but 
‘painience’ (Ryder 2001), seeing the capacity to experience pain as the crucial factor in 
evaluating the rightness or wrongness o f animals’ treatment. All focus group participants 
implicidy, but reliably, applied this same intuitive judgement throughout the discussions.
Further evidence that farm animals were positively evaluated for intrinsic 
reasons comes from the dissonance caused by the research. If  animals were positively 
evaluated for the products that could be made from their bodies, then there would be no 
perceived inconsistency, and no cause o f dissonance. Crucially, there would also be no 
reason to have a negative attitude towards animals’ slaughter. The final indication that 
meat-eaters experienced inconsistency is in the correlation between attitudes towards 
animals’ slaughter and dissonance levels: the more negative the attitudes were towards 
slaughter, the more dissonance was experienced.
Meat-eaters’ mean values only rated farm animals for the products that could 
be made from their bodies, and their contribution to biodiversity, positively. All other 
mean detailed evaluations were not reasons for positively evaluating farm animals, to 
different degrees. However, all o f the detailed evaluations positively correlated with 
overall attitudes towards animals, with the exception of positively evaluating animals for 
the products that could be made from their bodies and as status symbols. Focus group 
participants agreed, without discussion, that animals experienced pleasure and pain; they 
talked in terms o f respecting farm animals and some discussed animals’ souls. The 
intrinsic evaluations were evident in the discussions about how animals should be 
treated, but the evaluations themselves seemed intangible to participants who, unlike 
moral philosophers, were unused to talking in these terms. These results are understood 
here in the context o f dissonance and denial, but they indicate that further research
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would be beneficial to explore the reasons for negative, but positively correlated, 
detailed evaluations.
Given the lack o f correlation between attitudes and behaviour in some 
previous research (discussed in section 3.1), it is therefore accepted that there was a lack 
o f correlation between detailed evaluations and attitudes/behaviours in this study. This 
suggests that there was something coming between the detailed evaluations o f animals 
and the attitudes towards farm animals which prevented them from matching. However, 
meat-eaters’ recorded detailed evaluations o f farm animals (e.g. for the products that 
could be made from their bodies) did better match their meat-eating behaviour.
Chapter 3 laid out Potter’s (1996) criticism of attitude theory that when theorists tried to 
increase the correlation between attitudes and behaviours by making attitude measures 
more specific, research participants may simply restate their behavioural intentions via 
attitude measures. In other words, this is the same problem frequendy noted in different 
theories throughout this thesis, and observable in the focus group studies, of 
rationalising attitudes by working backwards from behaviour. It may have then seemed 
inconsistent to evaluate animals for intrinsic reasons. While the presentation order of 
attitude measures was balanced, the fact that the animals were specifically farmed (food) 
species may have stimulated meat-eating frameworks which affected participants’ 
interpretation o f these measures. However, this does not explain why their overall 
explicit attitudes towards farmed animals were, in comparison, so positive or stable, 
matching the implicit attitude measures. It is possible that the quantity o f measures being 
undertaken in the study prevented participants from rationalising between the detailed 
evaluations and the overall attitude measures.
Had it been just the explicit attitude measures that had thrown these detailed 
evaluations into question, then it would not have been clear which results were ‘flawed’. 
However, the IAT, because the results cannot be consciously controlled, lends weight to 
the overall explicit attitude measure. Hence the detailed evaluations o f farm animals may 
represent rationalisations, meaning that this area needs further research.
7.4 Cognitive dissonance
Meat-eaters experienced dissonance during the research because their attitudes 
towards eating meat were at odds with their attitudes towards farm animals and their 
slaughter, when beforehand, as far as their limited behavioural beliefs were concerned,
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these attitudes were unrelated. In response, meat-eaters reduced the positivity o f their 
attitudes towards eating meat, but not enough to make the attitudes negative overall. 
However, attitudes towards farm animals were already, and remained (becoming 
relatively even more) positive. Another surprise was that although the increase in 
dissonance during the research was entirely in tune with the last 50 years’ research into 
cognitive dissonance theory, consonance was not restored following attitude change.
Psychologically, denial can now be understood as a symptom, and 
consonance-restoration strategy, o f cognitive dissonance, which was confirmed by the 
qualitative study. Participants’ discomfort with the relationship between their attitudes 
towards farm animals and eating meat when they come into the context o f one another 
(which they usually do not) is dealt with by being pushed away, rejected, ‘forgotten’, 
denied (reported by focus group participants). This study, like others, may only have 
achieved attitude change because it left participants with little alternative for avoidance: 
possibly their preferred dissonance reduction strategy (e.g. McGregor et. al., 1999).
The focus groups endorsed Wicklund and Frey’s (1981) theory (and Hills’s, 
1993, observations), that people’s minds are often ‘too full’ to consider dissonant objects 
unless they block a goal. Sadly it seems from the focus groups that much o f the ordinary 
conscious content o f people’s minds is negative: problems and worries. Focus group 
participants agreed that they deliberately tried not to think about the issues o f eating 
meat and positively evaluating animals and so cognitive dissonance theory, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, explains that unless the issues blocked goal attainment, they may be 
‘forgotten’, until the owner is once again reminded.
One o f the possible responses to dissonance considered in Chapter 3 is 
changing the cognition least resistant to change (Hardyck and Kardush, 1968). In this 
case, contrary to hypotheses, attitudes towards meat and animals’ slaughter became more 
negative. These attitudes, therefore, can be said to have responded to participants’ 
perceived reality and lack o f consonance with other cognitions. However, the remaining 
positivity o f attitudes towards eating meat suggests that behaviour is unlikely to be 
affected for most participants because the satisfaction derived from the behaviour and 
the extent o f ensuing pain or loss from ceasing it (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999) stand 
in good stead.
So, this research brought farm animals and their slaughter into focus with each 
other. Once they shared the same consciousness, meat-eaters perceived themselves to be
146
Chapter 7 r Psychological consistency, inconsistency and dissonance between valuing animals and eating meat
inconsistent and experienced the predicted discomfort (dissonance). Rather than 
reversing their evaluations o f farm animals and eating meat, they reduced their 
evaluations o f eating meat, reducing consistency between their eating behaviour and 
attitude towards meat. While the spreading o f alternatives— reduction in evaluation o f 
weaker attitudes, and widening gap between the opposing stronger and weaker 
attitudes— would normally be expected under cognitive dissonance theory’s free-choice 
paradigm, this should be in the direction o f behaviour. The peculiar result here means 
that quantitative research participants became less consistent between their behaviours 
and attitudes as a result o f the research, than they were beforehand. This relates both to 
the relationships between their behaviours and all measured attitudes, as well as the main 
behaviourally-relevant attitude (attitude towards eating meat). This is an unusual result 
within traditional cognitive dissonance theory, but, as has already been noted, was also 
observed in one focus group participant.
Attitudes towards farm animals’ slaughter also became more negative over the 
course o f the quantitative research and greater negative attitudes towards farm animals’ 
slaughter created greater dissonance. This may mean that, as a result o f the research, 
people are more susceptible to dissonance in the future and even more negative attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter in an interactive process (see Figure 14, p.123).
The discomfort measures indicated that dissonance was created. This was 
expected both from the theory and focus group participants’ responses. The expected 
consonance restoration, found in other dissonant experiments after attitude changes had 
been expressed, was not found here. Similarly, there was litde sign that participants were 
“more confident than ... correct” (Blanton et. al. 2001, p.373). The overconfidence 
usually associated with cognitive dissonance was missing in this study. This is most likely 
because the strongest, most positive attitudes— those towards farm animals— did not 
match meat-eaters’ eating behaviours. This is not a recipe for dissonance reduction, as 
indeed the experiment demonstrated.
If  meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat had been in 
reverse positions (i.e. attitudes towards eating meat were more positive than their 
attitudes towards farm animals), or if attitudes towards meat had become negative, 
suggesting a change in behaviour (toward vegetarianism), then consonance should have 
been signiflcandy restored in line with other cognitive dissonance experiments. It is 
possible, therefore, that when attitudes do not match existing behaviours at the outset,
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overall uncertainty, but relative polarisation, ensues following a dissonant experience. 
This possibility warrants further research.
An advantage o f Stone and Cooper’s (2000) synthesis o f cognitive dissonance 
theories, which was enhanced in Chapter 3, is the flexibility o f dissonance motivation 
depending on how personally relevant the interpretation o f behaviour is perceived to be. 
Chapter 3 also showed that dissonance is culture-specific, as well as content-specific, 
again with the interpretation o f behaviour causing different responses. Research findings 
are therefore likely to be variable to some degree when real-world phenomena are 
involved. Consequently, while the results are surprising, they are not beyond the remit o f 
cognitive dissonance theory. Indeed, cognitive dissonance theory can now be improved 
upon to include an outcome where inconsistency between behaviours and attitudes is 
increased overall if strong and stable attitudes that are highly personally relevant and are 
psychologically inconsistent with behaviour are more positive than the attitudes towards 
that behaviour. This combination o f variables will also not necessarily successfully 
restore consonance through attitude change, as the strongest attitude may not budge in 
favour o f behaviour.
This study can update Plous’s (1993) idea that the core inconsistency lies in the 
collision o f people’s perceptions o f themselves as compassionate with the realisation that 
they, albeit indirectly, harm animals. Focus group participants did not raise concerns 
over their compassionate self-concepts, although they were concerned about teaching 
children to be compassionate through their treatment o f animals. Overall, the core 
tension seemed to be the meeting o f genuine concern for farm animals’ experiences with 
the taste o f meat (explicitly expressed) and/or habit o f eating meat (identified by 
regression analysis). However, the failure o f consonance restoration, along with attitude 
changes in unpredicted directions, does suggest that dissonance in the quantitative study 
was motivated at a reasonably high level o f personal relevance. If, as is proposed here, 
the quantitative results can be most likened to knowingly-in-denial patterns of 
meat-eating, then this also suggests that dissonance is motivated at quite a high level of 
personal relevance. This is because the theories introduced in Chapter 3 suggested that 
inconsistencies at lower levels o f personal relevance could be more easily resolved by 
attitude change to restore consonance, while those at higher levels o f personal relevance 
involve greater complexity and consonance is not so easily restored. The evidence 
demonstrates that the latter seems to be the case in this research. The implications are,
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therefore, that with this combination o f attitude targets, and a quantitative research 
environment which disallowed denial strategies, Plous’s (1993) view o f inconsistency 
causing discomfort at a high level o f personal relevance is a better explanation o f the 
results than Hills’s (1993) analysis o f her results that inconsistencies lacked personal 
relevance and were consequendy easily tolerated.
It remains to be identified which self-belief(s) may have been threatened by this 
research, however. Just because the level o f personal relevance seems similar to that 
proposed by Pious (1993), this does not automatically endorse the rest o f his theory. He 
argued that meat-eaters’ compassionate self-beliefs were at odds with the realisation that 
they harmed animals in some ways. This may be the case, but there is insufficient 
evidence in Plous’s (1993) work, and this study’s, to test this theory. A more 
parsimonious explanation might be that people find their evaluations o f animals for 
perceived intrinsic qualities to be at odds with contravening those qualities, or a more 
general psychological inconsistency o f positively evaluating and consuming animals may 
be relevant. Further research is required to ascertain the precise content o f disparity that 
causes dissonance.
O f course, Hills’s (1993) research materials were different to those employed 
here and she did not directly measure dissonance arousal, attitude change or consonance 
restoration. Because the participants in this research retained positive attitudes towards 
eating meat (albeit less positively than at the beginning o f the research), they are unlikely 
to have changed their eating behaviour significantly or permanently as a result o f the 
research alone. They are therefore likely to have employed denial strategies to restore 
consonance soon after leaving the research environment. It is possible that Hills’s (1993) 
survey measures allowed participants to respond from a position o f denial (which has 
been proposed as the default position), leading to the conclusion that the topic was o f 
little personal relevance to them. Indeed, the previous explanations that Hills’s (1993) 
participants’ cognitive capacity may have been ‘too full’ to consider such issues can now 
also be seen as allowing ‘spontaneous distractions’, explored in section 3.4, to enable 
denial o f any perceived inconsistencies. This research, however, attending to the 
motivation and operation o f cognitive dissonance, modifies and adds depth to that 
conclusion. While denial strategies are allowed to work normally (as in the focus groups 
in this research as well as potentially in Hills’s (1993) surveys), many people may 
genuinely believe that they maximise consistency overall and are not personally affected
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by any remaining inconsistency. But the quantitative measures in this study did not allow 
denial to operate so easily. For example, the IAT results can be correcdy interpreted by 
participants because o f their ease or difficulty with different test conditions. The 
dissonance measures also drew participants’ attention to the relationship between their 
attitudes, all in an anonymous setting where self-presentation forces were minimised.
Consequently both Hills’s (1993) and Plous’s (1993) interpretations o f their 
research results may be correct, as both are in evidence in this research, however, the 
interpretations need to account for the context and content o f dissonance, as well as 
their meaning to research participants, in order to be properly understood.
7.5 Key differences between meat-eaters and vegetarians
The former conclusions raise the question about how vegetarians may have 
turned their backs on eating meat. Two key attitudes have been identified in this 
research— positively evaluating farm animals for intrinsic reasons and attitudes towards 
animals’ slaughter.
McDonald (2000) found that the process o f becoming vegetarian starts with 
awareness o f information, which is unsuccessfully subjected to denial strategies, before 
further research leads to the decision to become vegetarian. Cognitive dissonance was 
almost certainly involved in trying to initially deny the information. It perhaps also 
increased people’s negative attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, and reduced their 
previously positive attitudes towards meat (as happened in this quantitative study) to 
such an extent as to transform their behaviour. Once this had happened, cognitive 
dissonance may have also worked to reinforce that behavioural change and, as a result, 
make the new vegetarians evaluate farm animals more highly for their perceived intrinsic 
qualities than they did beforehand. This matches Aronson and Mills’s (1959) findings, 
introduced on p.50, that people tend to enhance their attraction towards those for whom 
they have suffered. To the extent that rejecting meat in a meat-eating culture can be said 
to involve ‘suffering’ (or, at least, ‘effort’), there is motivation to enhance attraction 
towards animals. Hence causal relationships may not be in the direction that they have 
traditionally been assumed: vegetarianism may cause the perception o f high regard for 
animals, not the other way around. However, this perception in itself may be a 
rationalisation as there was no evidence from the attitude data in this study that 
vegetarians’ attitudes towards animals overall are significantly higher than meat-eaters’.
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(Although the detailed evaluations suggest that the groups may evaluate animals for 
different reasons, this requires further research). Nevertheless the difficulty that 
McDonald’s (2000) interviewees experienced in making their behavioural change 
(becoming vegetarian) is predictable by cognitive dissonance theory.
Perhaps the information which so affected McDonald’s (2000) vegetarians is 
rare and simply did not come into contact with meat-eaters. Alternatively or additionally, 
these participants may also have had sufficient cognitive capacity to allow these concerns 
time and space to ‘take root’, while other meat-eaters’ thinking ability may have been too 
full with everyday distractions. These vegetarians’ experiences and difficulties suggest 
that they suffered cognitive dissonance at a personally relevant level, where consonance 
was not easily restored with a tweak o f an insignificant cognition or denial strategies that 
sweep away concerns to the unknown.
McDonald’s (2000) vegetarians’ attempts at denial strategies also suggest that 
thought-suppression effects may have been operating. But more research would be 
necessary to confirm this, as not denying something is not necessarily the same cause or 
result as those found in thought-suppression experiments where personal relevance, 
inconsistency, and behavioural implications may demand qualitatively 
different processes.
The IAT results in this study demonstrated that vegetarians were more negative 
than meat-eaters towards meat. Hence these attitudes towards meat are, or have become, 
held at an automatic level, not just explicit rationalisations to justify vegetarianism. 
However, given that intrinsic evaluations o f animals and attitudes towards their slaughter 
are key, these attitudes are likely to have reduced the evaluations o f meat. Unfortunately, 
the IAT does not explain why this was the case. It cannot identify whether vegetarians 
were born with an aversion to eating meat, or whether their behavioural beliefs about 
eating meat include farm animals’ slaughter, rather than their own taste-buds. However, 
the explicit attitudes demonstrated that vegetarians’ reasons for avoiding meat were 
unrelated to their attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat, but centred around 
their attitudes towards animals’ slaughter. This suggests that vegetarians are not just 
quantitatively different to meat-eaters in respect o f their attitudes towards meat, but that 
the content o f their beliefs about eating meat are qualitatively different.
McDonald’s (2000) and Knight et. al.’s (2003) research, suggesting that 
vegetarians are vegetarian because they like animals, is clarified by this study. Vegetarians
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do not evaluate animals more positively than meat-eaters overall, but they may evaluate 
them for different reasons. The factor analysis components for animal evaluations show 
that attitude contents are qualitatively similar, but vegetarians evaluated farm animals 
significantly more positively for intrinsic reasons (although further research into meat- 
eaters’ evaluations is required). Therefore, expressing a “love for animals” is insufficient 
to distinguish vegetarians from meat-eaters. Rather it is essential to know in what ways 
animals are evaluated.
This does not clarify whether evaluating animals positively for intrinsic reasons 
causes vegetarianism, or whether something else (for example an aversion to animals’ 
slaughter, as has been proposed) causes both enhanced intrinsic evaluations and 
vegetarianism.
Insufficient data prevents a path analysis o f the vegetarian sample, however, 
vegetarians’ ethical reasons for being vegetarian predicted their attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter, not the other attitudes, suggesting that this is the key attitude in explaining 
vegetarianism. Figure 14 on p. 123 also confirmed the relevance o f positively evaluating 
farm animals for intrinsic reasons, and attitudes towards animals’ slaughter. Attitudes 
towards animals’ slaughter is further influenced by cognitive dissonance.
In the focus groups (unlike the previous research discussed in section 2.1 that 
showed meat-eaters’ top perceived advantages o f a vegetarian diet were health-related), 
participants listed welfare concerns as the top two advantages o f vegetarianism, with 
health third (see Figure 12 on p.95). However, prior to listing these reasons, participants 
had been discussing their attitudes towards animals and eating meat, so it is possible that 
these ideas had been primed. Further reseach would be required to ascertain whether the 
perceived importance o f these reasons can suggest a change in attitudes over time, or 
whether they represent a methodological function.
In light o f this research it seems that meat-eaters rarely think about eating meat 
because there is little need for them to do so. Their behaviour and attitudes towards 
meat match, while their automatically-accessed behavioural beliefs rarely include farm 
animals or their slaughter. Meat-eaters ostensibly evaluated animals more positively for 
the products that could be made from their bodies. Yet this reason for positively 
evaluating animals did not correlate with meat-eaters’ overall attitudes towards animals. 
This questions whether meat-eaters evaluated farm animals for the reasons that they 
think they do. The emerging picture is one where meat-eaters’ rationalisations about their
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attitudes are not the same as their overall attitudes, whether implicit or explicit (the latter 
perhaps still being intuitively drawn, rather than calculated from the rationalisations that 
follow— as Haidt, 2001, would argue). This picture is endorsed by the focus groups 
which produced one pattern that fitted the quantitative results, suggesting that 
meat-eaters’ behavioural beliefs about meat do not normally include farm animals or 
their slaughter, but that, when they do, meat-eaters use denial and rationalisations to 
restore consonance.
Meat-eaters believe that they eat meat because they like its taste. However, the 
regression analysis predictor o f overall attitudes towards eating meat turned out to be 
‘habit’ alone. Habit is more behavioural in nature, where sheer repetition over years 
propels the behaviour’s reproduction. Recall that Cohen (2000) maintained that 
behaviours were particularly difficult to change because this implies that past behaviours 
were sub-optimal, which is hard to accept.
Meat-eaters who experienced particularly negative attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter also experienced greater cognitive dissonance. If  the dissonance is allowed to 
further reduce attitudes towards animals’ slaughter, these meat-eaters may reduce their 
attitudes towards eating meat, if the behavioural beliefs come to include animals’ 
perceived intrinsic qualities and/or animals’ slaughter.
Meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ responses to cognitive dissonance were 
qualitatively the same: both groups maintained stable attitudes towards farm animals 
themselves and reduced their evaluations o f eating meat and slaughtering animals. This 
was not predicted and demonstrates that the groups have more in common than 
was expected.
By understanding how a meat-eater may become a vegetarian, it is possible to 
understand how a meat-eater remains a meat-eater. An absence o f change may tolerate 
greater variation than the specific pressures demanded to produce a vegetarian, because, 
as this research has demonstrated, all that is required to maintain meat-eating in a 
meat-eating culture is for behavioural beliefs to remain unfettered.
Thus meat-eaters may range from possessing reasonably high evaluations o f 
animals for intrinsic reasons, to very low; or from negative attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter, to very positive. The evidence suggests that attitudes towards animals’ 
slaughter are sufficiendy negative for most meat-eaters to routinely employ 
denial strategies.
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8.1 Summary of research findings
This research asked whether people experience psychological inconsistency in 
the relationship between their attitudes towards eating meat, farmed animals and animals’ 
slaughter. While the focus groups provided initial evidence that many meat-eaters 
maximised consistency overall by evaluating the taste o f meat above their concerns for 
farm animals, the groups also found their attitudes were inconsistent in many ways. This 
was explicidy said by many participants, and demonstrably experienced within the groups 
as participants talked about their difficulty answering questions, their perceived denial 
and how they “push away” uncomfortable thoughts. Participants independendy and 
universally offered dissociation variables to highlight their difficulty o f associating 
animals with meat.
The quantitative methods also found consistency between participants’ positive 
attitudes towards eating meat and meat-eating behaviour. The focus groups had 
demonstrated that animals did not ordinarily comprise meat-eaters’ behavioural beliefs 
about meat, so it was unsurprising to find this consistent relationship. What was 
surprising however was the relative order o f preferences in attitudes towards animals and 
meat. While the explicit attitude measures identified more positive attitudes towards farm 
animals than eating meat, they were not directly compared by this measure. The IAT 
measured implicit attitudes and confirmed the relative order o f attitude preferences, 
directly comparing attitude preferences to each other. Thus, the IAT demonstrated that 
images o f farm animals were relatively preferred to images o f meat. Consequently, 
although there was consistency between explicit and implicit attitudes (which was not 
expected in respect of vegetarians), meat-eaters’ relatively more positive attitudes 
towards farm animals than meat were inconsistent with their meat-eating behaviour 
when forcing animals into the frame of behavioural beliefs, as in this research. The 
dissonance that ensued would have been predictable by this relationship under these 
conditions and provides further evidence in itself o f psychological inconsistency.
Because the relative order o f attitude preferences (farm animals being more 
positive than eating meat) was unpredicted for meat-eaters, this meant that the lack o f 
consonance restoration was also not predicted prior to the research. This can now be 
understood as inevitable given the relative order o f attitudes and relationship to 
behaviour, resistance to change o f the attitude towards farm animals, and investment in
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meat-eating behaviour. Consonance restoration cannot be expected under these 
conditions; understanding this contributes to the existing wealth o f knowledge about 
how dissonance works in different contexts and with different attitude contents, 
especially those in the world beyond the laboratory.
People’s detailed evaluations o f farm animals also proved more complex than 
first envisaged. While vegetarians evaluated animals positively for perceived intrinsic 
qualities, these qualities were graded negatively by meat-eaters overall. The correlations 
demonstrate that evaluating animals for the products that can be made from their bodies 
is unlikely to result in positive attitudes towards animals, but meat-eaters’ attitudes 
towards farm animals did correlate with their detailed evaluations o f animals for their 
biodiversity, monetary value, appearance, rarity, affection, sentience, abilities, intelligence 
and souls.
Meat-eaters’ correlations o f the detailed evaluations o f animals with the three 
overall attitudes (towards meat-eating, animals and animals’ slaughter) highlighted the 
four intrinsic evaluations which correlated positively with farm animals and negatively 
with animals’ slaughter and eating meat. When factor analysed into one component, 
meat-eaters’ intrinsic evaluations negatively predicted their attitudes towards eating meat 
and animals’ slaughter. The preference order o f attitudes, and the evidence that people 
build evaluations backwards from their behaviour, led to the conclusion that the 
explicitly negative detailed evaluations o f animals, and positive evaluation of using 
animals for their bodies, were justifications for eating meat.
The contents o f meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ attitudes towards farm animals 
were similarly structured to each other— the factor analyses identifying similar 
components— but vegetarians explicitly evaluated animals much more positively for their 
perceived intrinsic qualities. In this sense, meat-eaters and vegetarians were 
quantitatively, not qualitatively, different. However, it might suggest, if the detailed 
evaluations were accepted at face value (which the cumulative evidence warns against), 
that meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ overall attitudes towards animals were qualitatively 
different. Hence, ‘liking’ or ‘loving’ animals are inadequate differentiations between 
meat-eaters and vegetarians. Meat-eaters’ and vegetarians’ overall attitudes towards farm 
animals were remarkably similar and stable, however. Unsurprisingly, vegetarians’ explicit 
attitudes towards eating meat and animals’ slaughter were much more negative than
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meat-eaters’, and while vegetarians saw animals’ slaughter in the use o f animals for their 
bodies, meat-eaters did not.
Indeed, attitudes towards animals’ slaughter also predicted meat-eaters’ 
tendency to experience dissonance. So while vegetarians’ behavioural beliefs about 
animals’ slaughter in their attitudes towards meat sets them apart qualitatively from 
meat-eaters, attitudes towards animals’ slaughter were paramount for meat-eaters too.
The main debates in this study have centered around whether people’s 
genuinely held attitudes cause cognitive dissonance when brought into context with each 
other, and what effect that dissonance has. To begin with, it was hypothetical that such 
long-standing and ingrained attitudes that were so culturally dominant could cause 
dissonance for individuals. This research confirmed that hypothesis and thereby 
validated cognitive dissonance’s place in this study. However, the relative order o f 
meat-eaters’ attitude preferences (farm animals being more positively evaluated than 
eating meat) and stability o f attitudes towards farm animals and less positive attitudes 
towards eating meat following dissonance was not only surprising but likely to explain 
why consonance was not significandy restored as in other studies.
The research found that inconsistency is not normally experienced because 
meat-eaters do not see animals in meat in the same way that vegetarians do. When the 
two attitudes are brought into context with one another, meat-eaters could potentially 
experience great inconsistency because, although their positive attitudes towards eating 
meat are in tune with their behaviour, their attitudes towards farm animals are even more 
positive. It therefore depends upon which attitudes are salient in the context o f each 
other to determine whether consistency is maximised overall. Cognitive dissonance may 
usually employ denial to restore consonance between these attitudes but when this is 
disallowed (as in the quantitative research), consonance eludes participants and attitudes 
move further away from each other in the directions o f increased inconsistency 
with behaviour.
Cohen (2000) had not formulated his theory o f denial specifically as a 
consonance restoration tool. Yet this research allowed focus group participants to 
express their sometimes deliberate use o f denial when faced with discomfort over the 
relationship between their attitudes towards farm animals and eating meat. However, 
when it came to explaining the quantitative research results, denial is the only pattern 
evident from the focus groups that fits the data. It alone can explain the higher
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evaluations o f farm animals than eating meat and may also explain the disparity between 
the detailed reasons for positively evaluating farm animals and the explicit and implicit 
attitudes. Thus Cohen’s (2000) theory o f denial can be assimilated into cognitive 
dissonance theory as proposed in Chapter 3.
The cultural commentators who helped frame the issue in Chapter 1 have been 
followed through the interpretation o f data, with Feamley-WhittingstalTs (2004), 
Johnson’s (2004) and Scruton’s (2000) views featuring strongly.
In recent years, Fearnley-Whittingstall (2004) has been one o f the most 
outspoken celebrity chefs about farming welfare standards while maintaining a strong 
commitment to eating meat. It is therefore possible that the majority cost-benefit 
approaches (suggested in Chapter 7), that were tentatively identified from the focus 
group data, were influenced by this viewpoint. Hence, the question is: were these 
participants’ own views, or have participants been influenced by Fearnley-Whittingstall’s 
(2004) arguments? Further research would be necessary to answer this question. 
However, the significant popular support for Feamley-Whittingstall’s (2004) public 
campaigns suggests that, whoever influences or represents whom, Fearnley- 
Whittingstall’s (2004) arguments have struck a chord with the British public.
To a lesser extent, Scruton’s (2000) views have also been publicised. The single 
focus group participant who explicated this position did not refer to Scruton (2000), but 
it was clear from her style o f presentation that these arguments were not spontaneous 
and that she had considered them previously. Thus, while these views may have been 
entirely her own, it is perhaps more likely that she had been influenced. She may 
nevertheless have genuinely believed these views.
Much less likely to be the product o f public influence was Johnson’s (2004) 
experience, mirrored by two focus group participants’ discussions. This is because this 
position involved so much discomfort, physical tears in Johnson’s (2004) case and 
expressions o f unhappiness by the two research participants, as well as the 
acknowledgement by all three people (including Johnson, 2004) o f their perceived 
inconsistency. This is not an aspirational condition: evidenced by the focus group 
participants who seemed to envy those arguing for alternative viewpoints, and Johnson 
(2004) himself who explicitly agrees with Fearnley-Whittingstall’s (2004) arguments.
The discomfort and apparently intellectually-confounding nature o f the 
knowingly-in-denial position, makes it unattractive. This may explain why it was a
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minority position in the focus groups, where participants had greater control over their 
self-presentation, but appeared to be the majority position in the quantitative research 
where participants’ control over the data was more relinquished.
The interpretation here is that the cost-benefit and knowlingly-in-denial 
approaches, espoused by Feamley-Whittingstall (2004) and demonstrated by Johnson 
(2004) respectively, represent the wider population in different ways. Fearnley- 
Whittingstall (2004) represents explicit attitudes to which people genuinely ascribe, while 
Johnson (2004) represents more implicit attitudes that people may wish to deny but may 
nevertheless influence behaviour and judgements.
Johnson’s (2004) experience has been treated here as a demonstration o f 
Cohen’s (2000) theory o f denial, while Cohen’s (2000) own position as a cultural 
commentator was not separately mirrored in this data. The two knowingly-in-denial 
focus group participants did match his argument that they should reduce meat 
consumption, but, unlike Cohen (2000), they experienced their own denial as an 
uncomfortable effect. Cohen (2000), it seems, is correct in his self-analysis that his own 
denial, unlike these focus group participants’, is successful in protecting him from such 
discomfort. Adams’s (2000) views were not explored through the focus group data 
because her comparison between vegetarians and meat-eaters was not possible in an 
entirely meat-eating sample. However, there was quantitative evidence that vegetarians, 
unlike meat-eaters, do see animals’ slaughter in meat. But the relative order o f overall 
attitude measurements, and the effect o f dissonance on those attitudes, was remarkably 
similar between vegetarians and meat-eaters, suggesting that they are not as alien to each 
other as Adams (2000) believes.
Ultimately, Chapter 1 concluded from the cultural commentators’ positions 
that consistency in real life was not an ‘all-or-nothing affair’. Perhaps more than any 
other, this observation has been upheld by this study. What is deemed psychologically 
consistent in one context can suddenly seem inconsistent with the shift o f an instant, 
leaving participants with a range o f possible responses depending on their level of 
interpretation o f the meaning o f their behaviour and the environmental options open 
to them.
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8.2 Research restrictions
Naturally the disparity between meat-eaters’ detailed evaluations o f farm 
animals and their attitudes is disappointing. However, the vegetarian evaluations, which 
were consistent with their attitudes and behaviour, do highlight how the different groups 
approached the evaluations and the meat-eaters’ evaluations do endorse the previous 
research, outlined in Chapter 2, that found rationalisations/backward justifications to be 
prevalent. So the results are still valuable in having confirmed previous research, but they 
have not enabled a full understanding o f how meat-eaters evaluated farmed animals. In 
fact, ironically, in this sense the focus groups provide a better indication o f how animals 
are evaluated through participants’ difficulty with the issues.
Future research, however, should perhaps use an implicit measure to ascertain 
participants’ automatic evaluations. In this case it would now be predicted, following the 
results in this study, that meat-eaters would evaluate animals positively for intrinsic 
reasons, and would not evaluate them positively for products that could be made from 
their bodies. Thus the expected results may be more similar to (if not as strong as) 
vegetarians’ evaluations.
The tentatively proposed patterns o f meat-eaters, based on the cultural 
commentators’ arguments, that were outlined in the previous Chapter, need to be more 
rigorously tested before they can be accepted. One focus group participant sharing a 
spontaneous change in attitude and reported increase in dissonance, similar to that 
measured by the quantitative data, is sufficiendy tantalising to draw comparisons, but 
insufficient to rely on further. More research is needed into these patterns and how they 
are manifested in different conditions.
Vegetarians struggled, and some failed, to follow the dissonance experiment 
instructions, saying that they just felt too strongly about the topic to record their views 
about the relationship between their own attitudes and instead recording their attitudes 
towards the target objects. This could have been an example o f self-affirmation (Steele, 
1988) and /or o f thought-suppression (Wegner, et. al., 1987) where, being asked 
specifically not to think about something had the opposite effect. Other methods should 
be employed in the future to test these theories.
Other restrictions also highlight how alternative methods could be used in 
future research to corroborate the results o f this study. For example, the IAT measured 
people’s responses to pictures. It could be argued that the whole attitude target may not
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be stimulated by pictures. Nevertheless, the IAT has previously been found to be an 
exceptionally reliable measure (see Chapter 3), and, in comparison with other written 
methods, the LAT’s image stimuli may better represent the attitude targets. So, while the 
measurements remain limited, they may still be superior to many traditional attitude 
measurements. Further, together with the explicit methods, which used written stimuli, 
three measures independently confirmed the order o f results.
Unfortunately the IAT results only demonstrate participants’ views relative to 
each other. There is nothing in the IAT results alone to say that participants disliked 
images o f animals being slaughtered. All that can be said is that participants preferred 
images o f farm animals to images o f meat, and images o f meat to images of animals 
being slaughtered. However, because the implicit and explicit attitude results appeared in 
the same relative order to each other, it can be inferred that the IAT results also 
demonstrate that meat-eaters’ attitudes towards farm animals and meat were positive, 
and attitudes towards animals’ slaughter were negative.
Nosek et. al. (2007) review (and respond to) criticisms o f the IAT. Traditional 
attitude research uses introspection to measure evaluations and Nosek et. al. (2007) claim 
that the absence o f introspection in implicit measures has led to scepticism and a loss in 
value o f the attitude concept to traditional attitude theorists. The lable o f ‘implicit’ has 
also loosely collected heterogenous concepts that avoid requiring introspection together, 
perhaps losing the subtlety o f variation between individual concepts such as ‘cognition’, 
‘attitudes’, and so on. Nosek et. al. (2007) further accept that the IAT can only be validly 
used as a comparative measure (as in this study), and not to assess single category 
evaluations, which is another disadvantage in comparison to traditional attitude measures 
(like Likert scales, for example, Trochim, 2006). Nosek et. al. (2007) also report a variety 
o f difficulties with the validity o f stimulus selection, which is why this study employed 
extensive pretesting. Participants’ cognitive fluency, age and familiarity with computers 
or speeded responding can adversely affect IAT response times, as can repetition. Nosek 
et. al. (2007) report that when combining the IAT with self-report measures, one may 
affect the other (this potential effect was used in this study to measure dissonance and 
attitude change, but may not be desirable in other research). Nosek et. al. (2007) note 
that the role o f faking in IAT performance requires further research (although they also 
note that research thus far suggests that the IAT is less deliberately controllable than 
other explicit and implicit methods). The precise relationship beween explicit and
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implicit attitude data also remains to be clarified. The IAT and explicit measures differ in 
their behavioural predictive power depending on the attitude content (it seems that the 
IAT may better predict socially undesirable behaviour, while explicit measures may better 
predict socially neutral or desirable behaviour). Nosek et. al. (2007) accept that the 
origins and development o f social category knowledge and preference formation are not 
well understood but are clear that the IAT must not be misunderstood, or misused, as a 
‘lie detector’. Their review o f IAT work finds that researchers using the IAT do not 
make this error, but that critics o f the method do (e.g. Arkes and Tetlock, 2004). As 
discussed here, the best view o f implicit and explicit data is that they are both real and 
true, but may measure different phenomena. Nosek et. al. (2007) are hopeful that a 
cognitive model o f performance at the task that generates the IAT measure may soon be 
established, but regret that it is currently missing from an understanding o f the IAT.
O f course dissonance and attitude changes may not have occurred (to this 
extent or in this direction) had the research used different stimuli or different variables. 
Omitting animals’ slaughter, for example, and researching any perceived inconsistency 
between attitudes towards farmed animals and attitudes towards meat-eating, may have 
produced different results (and indeed this would be a useful line o f further enquiry). But 
that is always the case: data are always a function o f the research stimuli. What this 
research tells us is that when drawing together stimuli o f animals and their slaughter with 
meat, dissonance ensues.
8.3 Research implications and opportunities for 
future developments
Section 3.5 identified some of the debates explored by the theoretical chapters 
and how this study could contribute to them. These debates are now finally reviewed.
Overall, the theories from Chapters 2 and 3 can be brought together in a 
complementary way. Evolutionary explanations form the core, surrounded by, 
influencing and influenced by, environmental and social realities and constructions.
These are permeated by the cultural and communicative importance o f a way o f life that 
stretches through history and across space to bind a nation. O f course, resulting from 
this evolutionary and social background, but also contributing to, directing and limiting 
this background, are people’s cognitive abilities.
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The thesis started by asking whether people experience psychological 
inconsistency in the relationship between their attitudes towards eating meat, animals 
and their slaughter and, if so, how they handled this inconsistency. The cultural 
commentators demonstrated the diversity and disagreement on the subject, leading to 
question whether these views represented patterned phenomena that resonated with 
ordinary people. These questions were the main focus o f the previous Chapter and have 
been summarised already in this Chapter. However, in short, meat-eaters are consistent 
in having positive attitudes towards eating meat and their meat-eating behaviour, but 
may be inconsistent when other attitudes, particularly those relating to animals’ slaughter, 
are brought into context with meat-eating. When this happens, cognitive dissonance 
usually employs denial strategies, sometimes automatically and sometimes even 
consciously and deliberately, to restore consonance. In the quantitative study, denial was 
prevented from restoring consonance and consequently attitude change was recorded, 
but not in the expected direction. The possible reasons for this, and the implications for 
cognitive dissonance theory have been discussed. Most importantly it has been argued 
that cognitive dissonance theory must be flexible to cope with variable outcomes 
depending on how the content and context o f dissonance affects the interpretation o f 
the meaning o f behaviour. The research has demonstrated that a flexible model of 
cognitive dissonance theory which accommodates variability can enhance our 
understanding o f the problem.
This research has highlighted the need for further research into the content- 
and context-dependent nature o f consonance restoration for real-world phenomena.
Such future research will face methodological problems o f its own about how much 
laboratory control can be exerted on genuinely-held attitudes before ecological validity is 
overwhelmingly compromised. This trade-off is not new (e.g. see Brewer, 2000), but may 
be particularly relevant when dealing with consonance restoration strategies in ordinary 
life (e.g. denial) that have traditionally been blocked by laboratory work. Nevertheless, 
the content- and context-specific nature o f dissonance motivation now demands a closer 
look at these real-world problems.
The stability o f attitudes towards farm animals, despite pressure from cognitive 
dissonance, suggests that these attitudes are psychologically deeply embedded and highly 
resistant to environmental pressure. The other attitudes were less resistant to change. 
While it could be argued that social conditioning could achieve similar effects, it does
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seem to support theories emphasising evolved predispositions towards positive attitudes 
towards animals. A universal dislike o f animals’ slaughter suggests that these attitudes are 
also evolved. Attitudes towards meat-eating were less clearly defined. Although 
intuitively it would make sense if a liking for meat was an evolved disposition, the 
attitude was vulnerable to laboratory stimulation in a direction contrary to behaviour. 
Regression analysis also highlighted ‘habit’ as predictive o f attitudes towards eating meat. 
This, combined with the fact that vegetarians’ automatic IAT results (as well as explicit 
attitude results) were more negative towards eating meat, suggests that attitudes towards 
eating meat are relatively socially-malleable in comparison to the other attitudes.
Although the main focus was on meat-eaters, the research has also clarified 
existing theories about vegetarians. Vegetarianism is not about loving animals; it is about 
hating animals’ slaughter. This research has redressed the failure o f much previous work 
to compare research groups to control groups. In doing so it has questioned the 
conclusions drawn previously about the differences between vegetarians and meat-eaters. 
It has been less successful in defining how meat-eaters evaluate animals, however. This 
difficulty has further enlightened cognitive dissonance, but not satisfactorily resolved the 
questions surrounding the evaluations.
Focus group participants supported previous work suggesting that knowledge 
about the ‘denial object’ (animals’ lives and particularly deaths) is indeed factually 
inadequate, by their own admission, somewhat hazy, and deliberately avoided. Hence 
Cohen’s (2000) theory about denial being a state of ‘knowing and not knowing’ is 
upheld, but at least some o f the ‘not-knowing’ can be considered a genuine, but active, 
absence of knowledge, whereby sufficient information is known to stimulate avoidance 
o f further information and denial of detail.
More research is also necessary into whether the failure o f denial strategies is 
the same as thought-suppression. For example, McDonald’s (2000) vegetarian 
interviewees reported trying to avoid knowledge before feeling compelled to investigate 
further. It has been proposed here that the failure o f denial involves qualitatively 
different processes to thought-suppression, but this was not specifically tested by this 
study and the field would benefit from further exploration.
Similarly, focus group participants’ perceived top advantages o f a vegetarian 
diet in this study were listed as animal welfare, followed by human health. The order o f 
these reasons are opposite to those found in previous studies. One possible conclusion
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may be that attitudes are starting to change and animal welfare is more highly prioritised 
now than at the time of previous studies. An alternative conclusion may be that the 
preceding discussion primed welfare concerns for the participants in this study. Further 
research should clarify these interpretations.
Section 8.2 has already identified that future research should measure detailed 
evaluations o f farmed animals using implicit techniques to prevent the interference of 
backward justifications/rationalisations and better understand how animals are 
evaluated. The tentatively proposed patterns o f meat-eaters, based on the cultural 
commentators, should also be more rigorously researched.
Attitude theory, cognitive dissonance theory and theories on social taboos have 
been evaluated by the research. Despite all the criticisms o f attitude theory, here three 
measures— explicit and implicit— converged to validate the order o f people’s 
preferences. The research also powerfully demonstrated the effects o f dissonance 
through attitude change in directions that could not have been predicted beforehand, but 
which make sense in relation to each other. Cognitive dissonance theory still has plenty 
to contribute, with this research showing that when a pattern o f attitude preferences 
does not maximise consistency overall, dissonance effects are unusual.
Could the direction o f change in attitudes in the quantitative research have 
been anticipated, this research would have benefited from contacting participants later to 
enquire whether any attitude changes survived outside the laboratory, or even led to 
behavioural changes in diet. This would now be a worthwhile future study.
Modifying independent variables to identify their effects on dissonance and 
attitude change would also be valuable. Focus group participants here felt strongly 
against intensive ‘factory’ farming methods and it would be interesting to identify 
whether this production method— responsible for the majority o f meat consumed in 
Britain— affected quantitative results as much as, or more than, the slaughter variable.
Calogero et. al.’s (in press) connection between individual differences in 
people’s need for cognitive closure and their underlying values, which affect their 
approaches to the world, (introduced on p.46) also opens up a wide area requiring 
further research. This could identify whether such idiographic factors can explain some 
differences between meat-eaters and vegetarians, or account for people’s consonance 
restoration methods. Investigating people’s cognitive styles, and their relationships to
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underlying values, may then make it possible to extrapolate research findings to other 
topics.
Greene and Haidt (2002) ask: “How do moral judgments of real events differ 
from those o f the hypothetical stories that have been used for convenience in 
neuroimaging studies?” (Greene and Haidt, 2002, p.522). This topic could help answer 
their question as the complex levels o f judgement between the quantitative and 
qualitative methods employed here demonstrate the difficulty participants experienced in 
some judgements. The potential advantages o f using neuroimaging techniques to identify 
which brain areas work on processing information about the relationship between 
relevant attitudes were introduced in the last Chapter. There may be considerable 
empirical and theoretical contributions from connecting moral dilemma research to 
Stone and Cooper’s (2000) theory o f dissonance motivation variability, made possible by 
the different patterns o f meat-eaters found in this research that draw the theoretical 
fields together. This could also confirm the theory that a balance-sheet approach to 
eating meat, such as Feamley-WhittingstalTs (2004), which was so prevalent in the focus 
groups, may be a defensive strategy— missing from the quantitative data— to protect 
meat-eaters from the threat to their self-beliefs. Indeed, Chapter 7 identified that the 
precise content o f this threat (i.e. which self-beliefs) also remains to be explicated by 
further research.
This picks up on the debate left in section 3.5 about where to ascribe 
behavioural causation: at the level o f explicit decision-making or implicit judgements? 
While this study has not aimed to specifically resolve such debates, and the proposals for 
future neuroimaging research may be better equipped for such a task, the theories which 
best fit the empirical data gleaned here do, nevertheless, suggest a starting point from 
which to proceed with future research. This starting point is that meat-eating behaviour 
is ‘intuitive’ rather than ‘reasoned’.
For example, first there was much evidence from the focus groups and 
quantitative results that attitudes and arguments were constructed to justify and 
rationalise existing behaviour. Some perceived inconsistent intuitions about farm 
animals’ intrinsic qualities were difficult to express and explain in comparison to 
meat-eating behaviour. This supports the implicit/intuitive attitude approach where 
decisions are made non-consciously. However, second was the variation in cognitive 
dissonance responses found in patterns o f arguments in the focus groups and
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unexpected results in the quantitative data. This supports Stone and Cooper’s (2000) 
flexible approach to cognitive dissonance based on the interpretation o f the meaning of 
behaviour. It is not clear if this ‘interpretation’ can be considered a conscious function or 
is, as is perhaps more likely, also an intuitive judgement, but it does suggest an interactive 
process between the ‘top-down’ implicit attitudes and the ‘bottom-up’ world providing 
stimulation for interpretation.
The view which most fits the data, especially based on the apparent difficulty 
with which focus group participants struggled in understanding and explaining their own 
attitudes, is that much behaviour is driven implicitly. However, conscious reasoning may 
affect judgements when dissonance demands attention, as has been discussed here.
There are complementarities and debates with other theories that also consider 
the possibility that people hold inconsistent ideas. One o f these theories is cognitive 
polyphasia (e.g. Moscovici, 1963,1973, 1976; Jovchelovitch, 2002). While attitudes have 
been pursued here because o f their clarity of explication and measurement strengths, 
cognitive polyphasia embraces the fluidity and plurality o f representations through which 
attitude theory traditionally attempts to steer in search o f a single, measurable, attitude.
Cognitive polyphasia conceives of different simultaneous rationalities. 
According to Jovchelovitch (2002), the context means that knowledge is never a closed 
concept, but one that is constantly changing. Indeed this is similar to the conclusion 
derived from this study in Figure 3, where the content and context may affect ‘self- 
presentational forces’ to produce explicit attitudes that do not mirror implicit attitudes. 
Different outcomes from cognitive dissonance have been postulated baed on the level o f 
interpretation o f the meaning o f behaviour. Further, Eder’s (1996) theory, introduced in 
section 2.5, prioritises the culturally embedded status o f knowledge and morality. But 
where cognitive polyphasia differs is in the rejection of fairly static intrapersonal 
concepts, like ‘self-presentational forces’ and ‘rationalisations’, that more mid-range 
psychological theories like attitude and cognitive dissonance theories consider distort 
knowledge. Rather, ‘distortion’ becomes a void idea when: “ ... knowing is an activity 
that can only be understood in relation to a context from which it derives its logic and 
the rationality it contains ... all knowledge is constituted by a desire to represent” 
(Jovchelovitch, 2002, p.5). For cognitive polyphasia, there are infinite forms o f social 
knowledge and logic because there are infinite forms o f context that are not mutually
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exclusive or continuous. Hence, they do not replace each other on a progressive scale o f 
poor-to-better knowledge.
Near the opposite end o f the social psychological spectrum from cognitive 
polyphasia are views o f modularity (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Chomsky, 1984; Kurzban and 
Aktipis, 2007). Both modularity and cognitive polyphasia see potentially many 
co-existing representations as inevitable and theoretically unproblematic. However, 
according to the modular view, differing representations stem from the different 
functions o f specialised information-processing mechanisms. Consequently, “a brain can 
simultaneously represent two mutually contradictory states o f affairs” (Kurzban and 
Aktipis, 2007, p. 133). Although a mechanism may present a unified view of the self, this, 
say Kurzban and Aktipis (2007), is to gain social advantages, not to appease any angst 
internal to the non-existent ‘self, as envisaged by cognitive dissonance theory. 
Theoretically this could incorporate Stone and Cooper’s (2000) idea, explored in Chapter 
3, that different levels o f interpretation o f behaviour lead to qualitatively different 
dissonance processes. The interpreted level o f personal relevance could each involve an 
independent module rather than one master motive. Kurzban and Aktipis (2007) 
propose the idea o f a module between ‘the brain’ and the social world that operates like a 
press secretary, ‘spinning’ the individual’s actions in a positive light. This is an 
explanation o f the frequently observed tendency o f research participants to work 
backwards from behaviour when explaining their attitudes (see Chapters 2 and 3 and the 
analysis o f this study’s focus groups).
Kurzban and Aktipis (2007) accept that they cannot answer all of the evidence 
for cognitive dissonance theory, such as that reviewed in Chapter 3, including the 
evidence for neurological arousal and some o f the subtler measurements o f post- 
dissonance-resolution attitude change. However, it remains an interesting alternative and 
contextualises the interpretation o f evidence here as one option among potential others.
Cognitive polyphasia and theories o f modularity do not argue with this study’s 
results, but interpret them from a different position. However, it has been argued here, 
in tune with the conception o f cognitive dissonance theory that emphasises content- and 
context-dependent dissonance, that consistency in real life is not an ‘all-or-nothing affair’ 
(see p.159). Here the theories converge. Despite different underlying explanations 
between theories o f cognitive dissonance, polyphasia and modularity, there is 
commonality in their views o f cognitive and experiential outcome. As the remaining
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paragraphs in this Chapter demonstrate, cognitive dissonance theory still has much to 
contribute, including some worthwhile practical implications.
This research has demonstrated how people handle their perceived 
inconsistency about an empirically-widespread real-world phenomenon. Meat-eaters’ 
eating behaviour was consistent with their positive attitudes towards eating meat. 
However, they were inconsistent in evaluating farm animals more positively than 
meat-eating and in reducing their evaluations o f meat-eating and animals’ slaughter 
following dissonance. This did not restore consonance and in fact meant that their 
attitudes towards eating meat were less well-aligned at the end o f the research than at the 
beginning. Absolute uncertainty, rather than polarisation, may ensue (although relative 
polarisation did occur) and as a result consonance may not be restored. These results 
challenged traditional cognitive dissonance theory, demanding that it become flexible to 
accommodate the data that responded to dissonance by moving in the opposite direction 
to that hypothesised. Cognitive dissonance theory can accommodate the data if it accepts 
that socially- and psychologically-complex topics may not follow the prescribed 
dissonance reduction routes o f laboratory-bound research designs. While this research 
builds on Stone and Cooper’s (2000) theory, there is more empirical work needed before 
the boundaries o f cognitive dissonance theory are properly defined. The theory has 
adapted to pressures to increase its flexibility in response to variation found in the 
content and context o f dissonance stimulation and the interpretation o f that stimulation, 
but the full extent o f that flexibility remains to be exhaustively tested.
A specific methodological lesson can be learnt from the factor analysis which 
reduced the dissonance measures (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered) to one factor. 
Researchers may therefore simplify future research to use only one factor: 
“uncomfortable” may be the best as it most closely follows the definition of dissonance. 
The dissonance method used here also demonstrates that researchers need not be 
restricted to the induced compliance paradigm or post-hoc explanations. This study’s 
method combined greater ecological-validity with testability to demonstrate variable 
cognitive dissonance responses to real-world phenomena.
It is possible that findings from this research may be cautiously extrapolated to 
other topics, for example attitudes towards euthanasia, environmental issues, healthy 
living, or other dilemmas where accepted and ordinary lifestyles may be at odds with a 
complex range o f attitudes. However, the results are likely to be fairly content and
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context specific as this is the explanation for the unpredicted results here. The potential 
for generalising from them is therefore limited; but indeed this is the point and interest 
o f researching other ecologically valid topics, featuring people’s own genuine attitudes, 
rather than contrived dilemmas.
Further, the implications o f research such as that undertaken in this study are 
potentially wide-ranging, affecting many disciplines and having applications beyond 
academia. While social psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists welcome 
contributions between their fields, Frank (2002) (see page 62 in Chapter 3) highlighted 
the implications for policy-makers. Policies should be both informed by empirical 
evidence and sensitive to people’s beliefs. Greene (2003) argues that scientific facts have 
profound moral implications yet moral philosophers have ignored the natural sciences,
“ ... the scientific investigation o f human morality can help us to understand human 
moral nature, and in so doing change our opinion o f it” (Greene, 2003, p.847). The 
status o f ethics as a whole must, like psychology, appreciate its own motivation.
Rollin (1992) too points out that moral theorists must learn from what humans are 
psychologically capable of, otherwise “ ... our arguments degenerate into merely 
scholastic exercises or intellectual oddities” (1992, p.79). Indeed, Richards (2000) notes 
that while philosophers have traditionally regarded strong intuitions as guides to truth, 
psychological explanations o f why people have strong intuitions in the first place 
recommend a review of such ‘guides to truth’. This was endorsed by the theories of 
implicit attitudes (and similar ideas) explored here, and the IAT’s demonstration that 
some focus group patterns appear like rationalisations in comparison to 
automatic responses.
Frank’s (2002) earlier comments that consumers act out o f ‘ignorance’ can be 
partly supported due to the focus group results, but should also include the normal 
operation o f denial to exclude animals from attitudes about consuming meat. The 
implications o f his arguments remain. He asks whether ignorance is a preferred state for 
society, to this can be added: do we want a culture where many consumers’ behaviour is 
enabled by automatic (and sometimes deliberately manipulated) denial? With 
psychological contributions, policy makers can become better informed and make more 
relevant and appropriate decisions.
The possibility that explicit concern for animals’ perceived mistreatment in 
intensive farming, for example, may actually form a defence to remove an animal’s wider
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experience, including their slaughter, from the focus o f concern should also be explored. 
The implications o f such further study are potentially profound, not just for Fearnley- 
Whittingstall’s (2009) campaigns, but the RSPCA’s (Anon, 2009b) ‘freedom foods’ 
campaigns which are also heavily promoted and gathering consumer support.
Another example o f the relevance o f understanding these attitudes and their 
effects concerns the application to workers suffering PiTS (Rholf and Bennett, 2005). 
This research has lent weight to worries about the mental health o f people who work 
with animals. The positive attitudes towards animals and denial about their experiences 
observed in the focus groups among people who did not work with animals, suggests 
that PiTS could be widespread in some industries among people who do work with 
animals and that psychological support is crucial.
Finally, Chapter 3 outlined Ryder’s (2000) theory that our huge reliance on, and 
fascination with, other species defines our lifestyles. He assumes that our use o f animals 
will change. The evidence from this research is that, under certain specific conditions—  
not prevalent in modem Britain— where animals’ slaughter is entwined with people’s 
beliefs about meat, Ryder (2000) might be right. However, even after dissonance in these 
experiments, meat-eaters’ attitudes towards eating meat remained positive (reduced, but 
positive nonetheless). This suggests that a cultural change would be necessary to produce 
and sustain conditions for dissonance to demand meat-eaters’ attention, against all their 
denial strategies, for long enough whereby attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and 
cognitive dissonance spirally interact to repulse them from meat. Nevertheless, this is 
happening to some individuals and, o f course, if sufficient numbers o f people became 
vegetarian, then their influence could produce a cultural paradigm shift. The evidence 
from the research in this study is that modern Britain is some way off from such a shift 
and that these cultural conditions are by no means certain o f ever being reached.
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Schedule for design  1
W hat occup ies participants* conscious attention and how  does it get there?
The following questions were presented for group discussion which took up 
the first half o f the hour:
Propose answers to the following questions and discuss them in the group.
Guess or imagine the answers if you’re unsure.
1. What sort of things do you think take up most of your thinking time?
2. In what ways do these things grab and hold your attention?
Participants were told that objectively true answers were not expected to these 
questions and that they should perhaps consider ‘types o f things’ rather than specific 
examples that they might feel to be too personal.
H o w  m any o f  the participants eat m eat and value anim als
Participants answered a series o f questions, presented as a questionnaire, 
embedded within which were the two target statements “I eat meat” and “I like 
animals”. The following questions were then presented for group discussion:
What did you take these statements to mean?
“I eat meat” (or “I don’t eat meat”)
“I like animals” (or “I don’t like animals”)
Followed by:
When someone is described as an “animal-lover”, what do you think 
this means?
W hat reasons for and against eating m eat and positively evaluating anim als do  
the participants have and how  good  do they think these reasons are?
This task elucidates participants’ own reasons for and against eating meat and 
positively evaluating animals. Ostensibly this task should identify why people eat meat 
and positively evaluate animals, but interpretations must be cautious as participants may 
be unable to access all o f their reasons and evaluate them in this way. Nevertheless, 
people’s reasons show some o f the tools available to their conscious resources for 
combating cognitive dissonance.
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The group was split into two and each group’s discussion was separately 
tape-recorded. One group created reasons in  favour o f meat-eating and the other group 
created reasons against meat-eating.
Using the post-it notes provided, write one reason per post-it in favour of, 
or against, meat-eating (depending on which group you are in).
When you have finished, arrange the post-its in order of how good each 
reason is. Place the most important or persuasive reasons at the top and the 
poorer reasons toward the bottom.
The groups repeated the task in respect o f liking animals. The post-it notes 
were numbered to retain the priority participants gave each argument.
Using the post-it notes provided, write one reason per post-it in favour of, 
or against, liking animals (depending on which group you are in).
When you have finished, arrange the post-its in order of how good each 
reason is. Place the most important or persuasive reasons at the top and the 
poorer reasons toward the bottom.
Schedule for d esign  2
Participants’ basic moral ideas were contrasted with those regarding other
animals.
W hat are participants* basic moral ideas?
All o f the questions were entirely fictitious except the last one. The life o f the 
yellow alien is based on a factory farmed pig’s life (factory farming accounts for 95% of 
pig-meat in the UK, Anon, 2003c). (Thanks to Alistair Currie o f VTVA! for reviewing 
and commenting on the accuracy of this scenario.)
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Figure 15: Rationale behind posed questions
Rationale P osed  questions
Your good fairy offers you one 
wish for anything you want. What 
would you wish for?
Each of you should state your 
wish, then the group must choose 
only one wish out of those options 
and state why it’s the best wish 
possible.
Followed by:
Your good fairy’s powers have 
been changed, she can only grant 
you one wish: to prevent the worst 
thing that you can imagine. What 
would you wish to prevent?
Each of you should state your 
wish, then the group must choose 
only one wish out of those options 
and state why it’s the best wish 
possible.
When you think about how 
disadvantaged people should be 
treated (e.g. ‘the poor’, children, or 
people with severe and irreparable 
brain injuries) what are the 
important criteria to consider?
What constitutes suffering?
If suffering can be defined in any abstract physical and/or 
psychological form it can be contrasted both with the 
earlier questions of how participants measure ‘goods’ and 
‘bads’ and how participants evaluate farmed animals’ 
experiences.
H o w  do you w eigh  opposing interests against 
each other?
People implicitly answer this question by evaluating their 
preference for meat over another animals’ ‘preference’ for 
life and happiness or vice versa. This question ascertains 
how participants interact with issues of fairness. For 
example, they could pick either Jack or Jill’s preference 
on purely prejudiced or arbitrary grounds. Alternatively 
they could consider issues such as who is likely to be 
most affected by the colour—for example, if Jack spends 
more time in the house than Jill, then his interests in the 
colour scheme could be greater than hers.
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Jack is reported to be suffering. 
What might he be experiencing and 
why?
Jack and Jill share a house. Imagine 
you have to paint their house. You 
have only red and blue paint and 
cannot mix or change the colours. 
Jill loves blue and hates red. Jack 
loves red and hates blue. What 
things would you consider in 
deciding what colour to use if the 
couple refuse to compromise?
W hat m akes som ething good  or bad?
These questions evaluate Ryder’s statement that people 
really positively evaluate happiness and that all other 
‘goods’ are only good to the extent that they enable 
happiness. In other words, happiness alone has intrinsic 
quality. I f  this is so, then whether participants veer 
towards hedonism or utilitarianism indicates how their 
views towards other species could shape up. Thus, 
participants were prompted to state in what way 
something is good until they reach the point at which they 
can go no further: “it just is”.
What criteria are considered in decid ing how  
others should be treated?
Underlying principles about how others ’ interests are 
evaluated can be contrasted with how other species’ 
interests are evaluated.
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Is the life o f  a ‘factory farmed* p ig  worth living?
A hard copy of the following scenario was given to each participant and is 
replicated below.
The scenario distorts some descriptions about factory farmed pigs’ lives so that 
people answered the question based on the facts rather than possibly distorting their 
answers to appear consistent. It tried to evaluate whether people agreed with Singer’s 
(1993) position that farmed animals’ lives are so miserable that they are not worth living, 
or Appleby’s (1999) position that farmed animals have a net positive experience simply 
by being alive.
As with the other questions in this task, how the answers to this question 
compared to specific questions about other animals (and where and why any differences 
occur) is crucial to understanding meat-eaters.
P osed  scenario
In the year 2050 astronauts land on a previously-unknown life-supporting planet. After an Earth 
month on the planet, the Captain’s log sends the following entry back to Earth.
“This planet is far from barren. It has an interesting, textured landscape and much ‘vegetation’ 
and natural resources for its inhabitants. There are two types of life-forms with different colours, 
shapes and levels of intelligence. The aliens are perfectly adapted to their surroundings and are 
clearly contented and entertained by the natural stimulation this rich planet naturally offers. 
Nothing on this planet threatens Earth.
All the aliens are warm-blooded mammalian-like creatures. We struggle to understand their 
languages and culture, but contact with the aliens has been friendly. In human terms, long red 
aliens are the most intelligent life-form on this planet; nevertheless our tests read their IQ at 80— 
lower than the average human. Square yellow aliens are untestable by our measures but their 
intelligence level seems to be similar to that of an Earth dog.
There is no government on this planet with vast areas sparsely occupied by both types of aliens 
who live simply, freely and sociably in groups of their own kind without any manufactured energy 
systems. In some areas there is an accumulation of long red aliens who run a rudimentary energy 
system powered by the excrement of young square yellow aliens.
In contrast to their free lifestyles, the yellow aliens captured in these ‘towns’ are forced in to 
enclosures. Some enclosures are inches larger than the yellow aliens’ bodies, meaning that they 
only stand or lie down and stare at a blank wall. As far as our equipment can ascertain these 
conditions do not suit the yellow aliens’ natural instincts, and they appear discontented and 
stressed. Unlike their free counterparts they also appear vulnerable to disease and infection.
Some of these yellow aliens have a range of illnesses which the Ship’s Doctor has interpreted as 
like pneumonia, dysentery, wasting syndrome, meningitis, enteritis, broken limbs, abscesses and 
ruptured stomachs. By no means all of the captured yellow aliens, but certainly some, give birth 
in their own excreta and live coated in their own faeces and blood. They drag themselves around, 
unable to mobilise themselves like their free counterparts. Ship’s Doctor measures the yellow 
aliens’ experience of pain as ‘highly-developed’.
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After five or six Earth months (a fraction of a free yellow alien’s life) their excreta loses its power, 
so the red aliens kill the yellow aliens in the following manner. They injure their brain to render 
them unconscious (but Ship’s Doctor measures occasional failure, meaning that some yellow 
aliens remain partially or fully conscious). The red aliens then cut through the yellow aliens’ main 
arteries and turn them upside down to bleed to death before plunging them into a boiling liquid 
to kill bacteria. The inefficiency of this practice means that some yellow aliens visibly struggle in 
their restraints as they hit the boiling liquid.”
On reading this entry, the communication from Earth’s Leading Council asks the Captain:
“Re: the square yellow aliens used for power by the long red aliens:
Are their lives worth living?”
If you were the Captain, how would you answer this question? Discuss with the group. 
Participants were then asked:
What do you think distinguishes a morally right action from a morally 
wrong action?
W hat are participants’ m eat-eating and anim al-evaluating ideas?
This task compared the ‘basic philosophy’ questions to those specific about 
animals. The design was kept flexible to avoid repetitions, the following is a rough 
schedule. Because these questions depended on participants’ previous answers, they were 
not given hard copies.
Earlier you said that the criteria for deciding how people with different 
levels of awareness should be treated was [ ] /  [is this how you would treat 
animals with a similar level of awareness?].
Why not?
If and makes things good or bad, are and good and bad to animals too?
If constitutes suffering, can animals suffer?
If and is important in weighing up different demands, how does this 
compare to weighing up an animal’s experience against our need for meat?
Is meat-eating morally justified?
Participants were advised that the alien thought experiment was based on the 
life o f a factory farmed pig and asked:
On the whole, do you think that ‘factory farmed’ pigs lead a worthwhile life?
Connections with their earlier answers were made where possible and 
participants explored any topics that they wished to make clearer.
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Schedule for design  3
W hat are participants’ beliefs about farm ed anim als’ treatment; what are their 
p hilosophies about m eat and farmed anim als; how  do they evaluate animals; h ow  
do those view s fit together?
The group chose a ‘correct’ statement from opposite pairs which are presented 
as numbered cards. Participants were allowed roughly 5 minutes per pair.
B eliefs
When they are 
slaughtered for meat, 
most animals suffer
Animals experience pain 
and fear and pleasure and 
happiness
Meat is unnecessary in a 
healthy diet
Most farm animals live 
miserable lives
When they are 
slaughtered for meat, 
most animals do not 
suffer
Animals cannot 
experience pain and fear 
or pleasure and happiness
Meat is necessary in a 
healthy diet
Most farm animals live 
contented lives
M oral ideas
All animals are equally 
important
People should be limited 
in what they are allowed 
to eat
Some animals are more 
important than others
People should be allowed 
to eat whatever they want
Evaluating anim als
Most people don’t want 
animals to be harmed
It is important to care for 
animals’ well-being
Most people don’t care if 
animals are harmed
Caring for animals’ well­
being is unimportant
In /co n sisten cy
It makes no difference If an animal was bred just
whether an animal was to be eaten, then eating it
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bred to be eaten or not
Most people would not 
kill animals for their own 
food if slaughterworkers 
went on strike
Eating meat causes 
animals to be harmed
is different to eating a pet
Most people would kill 
animals for their own 
food if slaughterworkers 
went on strike
Eating meat does not 
cause animals to be 
harmed
Schedule for design  4
H o w  do participants respond to questions about in /co n sisten c ies?
Theoretical arguments, popular news articles and feedback from a pilot group 
identified the questions shown below.
In what ways are humans and animals different to each other which justify 
treating them differently? (In other words, what are the morally-relevant 
differences between humans and animals?)
In what circumstances would you eat dogs and cats?
If meat was unavailable in shops would you kill animals for meat yourself?
On the whole, is it cruel to eat meat?
Is being an animal-lover at odds with being a meat-eater?
Do you care about some animals more than others? If so, in what ways do 
you care about some animals more than others?
Is being a compassionate person at odds with being a meat-eater?
Have you ever thought about these questions before? How much/deeply?
What made you think about them?
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Atlas.ti code networks
(original images also on associated CD)
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life w orth living {7-10} g e t something back {4-11}
animals' experiences {40-39} attrac tiveness  {9-19}
individuals vs unknown {7-22} animal suffering definition {22-37}
anthropom orphism  {8-16} valuing lives {26-38}
p ets  v farm  animals {24-29}
affection {7-18}
Please refer to original im ages on CD to enlarge any of the networks in this Appendix 
N etw ork View on affection
natura l/eco  balance {6-13}
a n irra l
animal lover {17-32} N
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27} in/consistency {34-44}
trea tm en t {56-46}
animal not m eat { 8 - 2 ^ ---------------  intrinsic value {57-44}
instrumental value {41-43}
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N etw ork View  on animal lover
phll-moral relativism  {18-21} 
b y-products unjustified {8-23}
anthropom orphism  {8-16} attra c tiv e n e ss  {9-19}
hum ans v  animals {18-21} animal no t m ea t {8-27}
affec tion  {7-18} individuals v s unknown {7-22}
right/w rong {30-35} personal d is tress  {28-35}
animal lover {17-32}
instrum ental value {41-43}
econom y {3-10}
7 7 7 }
upbringing {1M5J
X X X
g e t som ething back {4-
XXX\\
hunting {7 -3 }  
|_/ ■
fluffy brigade {4-8}
fa irness {4-9}
l/;isv
natu ra l/eco  balance {6-13}
m . ______
w orth Iving {7-10}
over-em otional {7-14}
38}
animals' ex p e rien c es  {40-39}
g g g g
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27}
in/consistency {34-44}
:: i/J?:
valuing lives •
animal suffering defh ition  {22-37}
m ea t-ea ting  morality {15-40}
m
p e ts  v fa rm  anim als {24-29} 
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
intrinsic value {57-44} * - p a r e d  a n ire ls  {9-13} -
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N etw ork View  on animal not meat
reducing m eat {5-18}
animals' souls {6-18}
hum ans v animals {18-21}
personal co n ten tm en t {8-25}
individuals v s  unknown {7-22}
know ledge/ignorance {14-28}
right/w rong {30-35}
animal not m ea t {8-27}
affection {7-18} ------  anthropom orphism  {8-16}
ta s te  {11-21}
U S
p e ts  v farm  anirrals {24-29}
a ttra c tiv e n e ss  {9-19}
unjustified {8-23}
m eat refusal {23-27}
Dissociation {15-29}
m
valuing lives {26-38} 
in/consistency {34-44}
squeam ishness {4-14}
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27}
consum er difficulty {14-28}
kil ow n food  {27-30}
personal d istress {28-35} 
m ea t-ea ting  morality {15-40} 
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
instrum ental value {41-43} t r  animal lover 0 7 -3 2 }  intrinsic value {57-44}
Appendix C Adas.ti code networks 200
N etw ork View  on animal suffering definition
/  IW X ,/
life w orth living {7-10}
squeam ishness {4-14} 
phil-moral relativism  {18-21}
consum er difficulty {14-28}
m eat re fu sa l {23-27}
personal co n ten tm en t {8-25}
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
animals know no d ifferen t {3-8} , fluffy brigade {4-8}
Industry dewartfcH jm
,  J /A
individuals v s  unknown {7-22}
-  Sfl
s laugh ter {1-19}
. ^
com passionate m eat-eating  {4-20}
/NX
upbringing {13-15}
unconcerned  {4-14}
//l^ k
over-em otional {7-14}
7 / m  .
animals’ souls {6-18}
X X X  xx
intellect v s . em otion {3-19}
ta s te  {11-21}
p e ts  v fa rm  animate {24-29}
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27}
unjustified {8-23}
kin ow n food  {27-30}
personal d is tress  {28-35}
n I
valuing lives {26-38}
\ \L
m eat-eating  morality {15-40}
know ledge/ignorance {14-28}
X
right/w rong {30-35}
in/consistency {34-44} 
|k\>r //""
^  animals' experiences  {40-39}
intrinsic value {57-44} 
animal lover {17-32} * —  affec tion  {7-18}
animBl suffering definition {22-37} 
intensive farming {4-14} instrum ental value {41-43}
n atu ra l/eco  balance {6-13}
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N etwork View  on animal treatment
g e t som ething back {4-11}
b y -p ro d u c ts  {8-15} ^  \ \
sq u eam ish n ess  {4-14} \ \
.»*'%/ \  \  \ \  
consum er choice {7-15} V \
Z?7»W \  \ \
S g j g j  1 8 ^ 7  Phil-moral re la tiv ism {18-21} \
{3-19}  ^
an th ropom orphism  {8-16} 
industry  d em a n d s { 11- 16} 
s la u g h te r {1- 19}
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
intrinsic va lu e  {57-4 4 }
animal suffering  definition {22-37}
animal lover {1 7 -3 2 }
in strum ental va lu e  {4 1 -4 3 }
fluffy brigade {4-8}
( upbringing {13-15}«tC^>
n a tu ra l/e c o  b ala n ce  {6-13}
over-em otional {7-14}
S  S/tw \ 
un concerned  {4-14}
/  S  /-<
animals know no different {3 -8 }
life w orth  living {7-10}
hum ans v anim als {18-21}
a ttra c tiv e n e s s  {9-19}
~.7A 
t a s t e  {11-21}
unjustified {8-23}
p erso n a l co n te n tm e n t {8-25}
-  WMl______
know ledge /ignorance {14-28}
*> —
Dissociation {15-29}
/f Im­
perso n al d is tre ss  {2 8 -3 5 }
"wrMar t^
righ t/w rong {3 0 -3 5 }|| .wr 
in /consistency  {3 4 -4 4 }
co m p a ssio n a te  m ea t-ea tin g  {4-20}
'  —  - - \  \
individuals v s  unknow n {7-22}
m ea t re fu sa l {2 3 -2 7 }
consum er difficulty {14-28}
gy ,
p e ts  v  fa rm  anim als {2 4 -2 9 }
I d  o w n  food  {2 7 -3 0 }
n w  vavm. v \\
hum an  su p erio rity /h ierarchy /con tro l 
; {1 9 -2 7 }
valuing lives { 2 6 -3 8 }
By .
anim als’ e x p e rien c es  {4 0 -3 9 } -
m ea t-ea tin g  morality {15-40}
affec tio n  {7-18} trad ition  {3-13} — intensive farming {4-14} -  anim al n o t m ea t {8-27}
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N etw ork V iew  on animals' experiences
worthless life {3-3}
animals' souls {6-18}
p e ts  v fa rm  animals {24-29}
h umains
animals' experiences {40-39}
animBl tre a tm e n t {56-46}
instrum ental value {41-43}
\  1 :/
intrinsic value {57-44} 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f e m q d e f i n i t i o n  {22-37} 
^ ^ ■ ^ jja r tm a l tover { 1 7 - 3 2 } \ \ ^ | '  /
Industry dem ands { 1 1 - 1 6 } ^ ^ % ^ J  V\ j / s 'intensive farming {4-14}
animals know no different {3-8}
/  / l>%\ 
phil-moral relativism {18-21}
/  ' /A/I
unconcerned  {4-14}
/  s?A.
intellect vs. em otion {3-19}
meat refusal {23-27}  
unjustified {8-23} 
personal co n ten tm en t {8-25} 
know ledge/ignorance {14-28} 
personal distress {2 8 -3 5 }  
m ea t-ea ting  morality {15-40}
Ifev k w itt Irving {7-10}
I t
over-em otional {7-14}
consum er choice {7-15}
individuals v s unknown {7-22} 
t a s te  {11-21}
com passionate m ea t-ea ting  {4-20}
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27}
Dissociation {15-29}
.
consum er difficulty {14-28}
anirTBls, values {10-5}more/qual
k llow n  food  {27-30}
...
valuing lives {26-38}
9^|\«
right/wrong {30-35} 
in/consistency {34-44}
fairne:
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N etw ork View  on animals know no different
right/wrong {30-35}
knowledge/ignorance {14-28} phil-moral relativism {18-21}
intensive farming {4-14} animal suffering definition {22-37}
a n im a ls  k n o w  n o  d if fe r e n t  { 3 - 8 }
animal treatm ent {56-46} animals' experiences {40-39}
intrinsic value {57-44}
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N etw ork V iew  on anim als’ souls
m eat refusal {23-27} right/w rong {30-35}
knowledge/ignorance {14-28} personal d is tress  {28-35}
unjustified {8-23} animals' souls {6-18}
meat-eating morality {15-40}
animals' ex p e rien c es  {40-39} valuing lives {26-38}
intrinsic value {57-44} animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
animal suffering definition {22-37} Dissociation {15-29}
animal not meat {8-27} -  kill ow n food  {27-30}
intellect vs. emotion {3-19}
hum ans v animals {18-21} j^  /  ==
animals' values {10-5}
human superiority /hierarchy/control
{19-27}
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N etw ork V iew  on animals' values
aninrals' so u ls  { 6 - 1 8 } m ea t-ea tin g  morality { 1 5 -4 0 }
h um an s v  anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }
anirrels' v a lu e s  { 1 0 - 5 } animals' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 -3 9 }
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
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N etw ork View on anthropomorphism
right/wrong {30-35}
attractiveness {9-19}
anthropomorphism {8-16}
affection {7-18}
pets v farm animals {24-29}
eat dogs/cats {10-19}
get something back {4-11}
individuals vs unknown {7-22}
animal lover {17-32}
animal not meat {8-27}
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27}
in/consistency {34-44}
animal treatm ent {56-46}
valuing lives {26-38}
instrumental value {41-43}
intrinsic value {57-44}
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valuing
attractiveness {9 -19}
animal not meat {8 -27}animal lover {17 -32}
anthropomorphism {8-16}affection {7 -18}
N etw ork View on attractiveness
g e t something back {4 -11} squeam ishness {4 -14}
Dissociation {15-29}consumer difficulty {14-28}
individuals v s  unknown {7 -22}personal contentm ent {8 -25}
human superiority/hierarchy/controlpersonal distress {28-35}
{19-27}
m eat-eating morality {15-40}
animal treatm ent {56-46}instrumental value {41-43}
pets v farm animals
lives {26 -38}
in/consistency {34 -44}
by-products {8-15}
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N etw ork View  on backward justification
reducing meat {5-18}
in /c o n s is te n c y  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
b ackw ard ju stifica tion  { 1 - 2 }
tradition {3-13}unconcerned {4-14}
right/wrong {30-35}
logic of larder {6-10} natura l/eco  balance {6-13}
p e ts  v  farm  aniriBls {24-29}
by-products {8-15}
intrinsic value {57-44}
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46} instrumental value {41-43} *
animal lover {17-32}
valuing lives {26-38}
Is  ....
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27}
N etw ork View on by-products
economy
a ttra c tiv en ess  {9-19}
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Netw ork V iew  on changing meats
< >
tradition {3-13}
upbringing {13-15}
eat dogs/cats {10-19}
cultural food differences {6-10}
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reducing meat {5-18}
intellect vs. emotion {3-19}
consumer difficulty {14-28}
valuing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 } p erson a l d is tr e s s  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 }
corrpassionate meat-eating {4-20}
animals' e x p e r ie n c e s  {4 0 -3 9 } animal tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
animal su ffering  defin ition  {2 2 -3 7 } intrinsic v a lu e  {5 7 -4 4 }
N etw ork View  on com passionate m eat-eating
consumer choice {7-15}
unconcerned {4-14} industry demands {11-16}
- ^ A h u m a n  superiority /h ierarchy/control 
{ 1 9 - 2 7 }
knowledge/ignorance {14-28}
personal contentment {8-25}
meat-eating morality {15-40} in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
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Netw ork View  on consum er choice
right/wrong {30-35}
consumer difficulty {14-28}
animal treatm ent {56-46}
instrumental value {41-43}
J ^ / l
meat refusal {23-27} /  / personal contentment {8-25}
personal distress {28-35} — tr
Dissociation {15-29}
in/consistency {34-44}
unjustified {8-23}
consumer choice {7-15}
intrinsic value {57-44} animals' experiences {40-39}
compassionate meat-eating {4-20}
reducing meat {5-18}
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intellect v s . em otion  { 3 - 1 9 }
unjustified  { 8 - 2 3 }reducing m e a t { 5 - 1 8 }
m eat re fu sa l { 2 3 - 2 7 }
p erson a l co n te n tm e n t { 8 - 2 5 }
consum er difficulty {1 4 -2 8 }
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
a ttr a c t iv e n e ss  { 9 - 1 9 }
N etw ork View  on consum er difficulty
in ten sive  farming { 4 -1 4 }  hum ans v  anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }  
sq u e a m ish n ess  { 4 -1 4 }
D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
V
p erson a l d is tr e ss  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
m e a t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 }
in /co n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
k n o w led g e /ig n o ra n ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }  
^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ ^ ^ t /w r n n a  {3 0 -3 5 }
instrum ental v a lu e  l 4 1 - 4 ^ ^ i ^ A ^  
animal n o t m e a t { 8 - 2 7 } anim al su ffering  defin ition  { 2 2 - 3 7 }
c o m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 -2 0 }
-
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 -1 5 }
repu lsive {2 -5 }
anim al tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }  
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
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N etw ork View on cultural food differences
eat dogs/cats {10-19} ;
slaughter {1-19} m ea t re fu sa l { 2 3 -2 7 }
tradition {3-13}
upbringing {13-15} cultural food differences {6-10}
v  farm  anim als { 2 4 -2 9 }
valuing lives { 2 6 -3 8 }named animals {9-13}
N etw ork View on dislike m eat
veggie difficulties {9-6}
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fluffy brigade {4-8}
reducing m eat {5-18}sq u ea  m istiness {4-14}
animate' souls {6-18} p e ts  v farm  animate {24-29}
intellect vs. em otion {3-19}
p ersonal co n te n tm e n t {8-25}
unjustified {8-23}
know ledge/ignorance {14-28}
m ea t re fu sa l {23-27}
Dissociation {15-29}
intrinsic value {57-44}
animate' experiences  {40-39}
N etwork V iew  on D issociation
veggie recategorisation {2-3}
valuing lives {26-38} 
in/consistency {34-44}
e a t  d o g s/ca ts  {10-19}
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ t r e a t m e n t  {56-46} 
animal suffering definition {22-37}
right/w rong {30-35}
kill own food  {27-30}
personal d is tress  {28-35} 
m ea t-ea ting  morality {15-40}
instrum ental value {41-43}
consum er choice {7-15}
; consum er difficulty {14-28} 
iss {9-19} __ industry dem ands {11-16} '
animal no t m eat {8-27}
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cultural fo o d  d iffer en ces  { 6 -1 0 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 -2 2 }
e a t  d o g s /c a ts  {1 0 -1 9 }
a ffe c t io n  { 7 -1 8 }
N etw ork V iew  on eat d o g s/ca ts
in tellect v s . em otion  { 3 -1 9 } upbringing { 1 3 -1 5 }
p erson a l d is tre s s  { 2 8 -3 5 }  
m ea t re fu sa l { 2 3 -2 7 }
p e ts  v farm  anim als { 2 4 -2 9 }  v  
instrum ental va lu e  { 4 1 -4 3 }
in /c o n s is ten cy  { 3 4 -4 4 }
sla u g h ter  {1 -1 9 }
n am ed  anim als { 9 -1 3 }
D issociation  { 1 5 -2 9 }
tradition { 3 -1 3 } anthropom orphism  { 8 -1 6 }
\
V\"
valu ing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }
V
I ow n  fo o d  { 2 7 -3 0 }
m ea t-ea tin g  morality { 1 5 -4 0 }
changing m eats  {4 -4 }
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N etw ork View on economy
tradition {3 -1 3 } p ets  v farm animals {2 4 -2 9 }
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{1 9 -2 7 }
natural/eco balance {6 -1 3 }
> e c o n o m y  { 3 - 1 0 }
by-products {8 -1 5 } instrumental value {4 1 -4 3 }
animal tover {1 7 -3 2 } animal treatm ent {56 -46}
logic o f larder {6 -1 0 } m eat-eating morality {15 -40}
N etw ork View on endangered species
n atu ra l/eco  b a lan ce {6 -1 3 } tradition { 3 -1 3 }
logic o f  larder {6 -1 0 }
instrum ental va lu e  {4 1 -4 3 } endangered species {3-5}
b y-produ cts {8 -1 5 }
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N etw ork View  on fairness
pets v farm aninrals {24-29}
p e rso n a l d is tr e s s  {28-35}
anim als' e x p e rien c es  {40-39}intrinsic value { 5 7 -4 4 }
===■
fairness {4-jH in/consistency {3 4 -4 4 }
anim al lover {17-32}instrumental va lue {4 1 -4 3 }
k n o w led g e /ig n o ran ce  {14-28} hum ans v animals {1 8 -2 1 }
N etw ork View on fluffy brigade
phii-m oral re lativ ism  { 1 8 - 2 1 } over-emotional {7-14}
va lu in g  lives { 2 6 - 3 8 } m e a t-e a tin g  m orality { 1 5 - 4 0 }
anim al tr e a tm e n t { 5 6 - 4 6 }  , anim al su ffe r in g  defin ition  { 2 2 - 3 7 }
D issocia tion  { 1 5 - 2 9 } anim al lo v er  { 1 7 - 3 2 }
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N etw ork View  on get som ething back
taste {11-21} pets v farm animals {24-29}
hurron superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27}animal tre a tm e n t {56-46}
instrum ental value {41-43}an th ropom orphism  {8-16}
animal lover {17-32}
intrinsic value {57-44}a ttra c tiv e n e ss  {9-19}
right/w rong {30-35}
N etw ork View on health
k n o w led g e /ig n o ran ce  {14-28}
ind u stry  d e m a n d s  {11-16}
s unhealthy {.
h e a lth  {13-6]
instrum en ta l v a lu e  {41-43}
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unjustified {8-23} unconcerned {4-14}
personal contentment {8-25}
valuing lives {26-38} meat-eating morality {15-40}
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27}
right/wrong {30-35}
animals' experiences {40-39}
pets v farm animals {24-29} animal not meat {8-27}
humans v animals {18-21} affection {7-18}
anthropomorphism {8-16} attractiveness {9-19}
by-products {8-15}
N etw ork View  on hum an superiority/hierarchy/control
phil-moral relativism {18-21}
i
natural/eco balance {6-13} get something back {4-11}
instrumental value {41-43} 
animal lover {17-32}
animal treatment {56-46}
715
intrinsic value {57-44} 
in/consistency {34-44}
animal suffering definition {22-37}
compassionate meat-eating {4-20}
^  1/ /
iconomy {3-10} animals' souls {6-18}
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n atu ra l/eco  balance {6-13}
individuals v s  unknown {7-22}
hum ans v animals {18-21}
in/consistency {34-44}animal no t m ea t {8-27}
consum er difficulty {14-28}
N etw ork View on hum ans v animals
animals' souls {6-18}
right/w rong {30-35} m ea t-ea ting  morality {15-40}
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27} kill own food {27-30}
personal d istress {28-35}valuing lives {26-38}
instrum ental value {41-43}intrinsic value {57-44}
animal lover {17-32}
fa irness {4-9}life w orth  living {7-10}
anim als 'values {10-5}
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46} animals' experiences  {40-39}
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N etw ork View  on hunting
in/consistency {34-44}
hunting {7-3}
instrumental value {41-43} animal lover {17-32}
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Netw ork V iew  on in /con sisten cy
kn ow led ge /ign oran ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 }
in /consisten cy  {3 4 -4 4 }
a t t r a c t iv e n e s s { 9 -1 9 }
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 - 1 5 }
s la u g h t e r { l - 1 9 }
e a t  d o g s /c a ts  { 1 0 - 1 9 }  
a ffec tio n  { 7 - 1 8 }industry d em an d s { 1 1 - 1 6 }
sq u e a m ish n ess  {4 -1 4 } anthropom orphism  { 8 - 1 6 }  
nam ed anim als { 9 -1 3 }
yeggi^yrQ O ^t^r {t-3} repulsive {2-5}
P v 1 ^  ~| upbringing { 1 3 - 1 5 }  /  unconcern ed  { 4 -1 4 }
P , { ■ > " pe
in ten siv e  farming {4 -1 4 }
intrinsic va lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
\ \t-
animals' e x p e r ie n c e s  {4 0 -3 9 }
' ’'«S? 
anirral n o t m eat { 8 - 2 7 }
con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
co m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
kill ow n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
m e a t-e a tin g  morality {1 5 -4 0 }
^Tnx\ »■
p erson a l d istress  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
anim al tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }  
ATM>/
instrum ental va lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }  
W
aninral su ffering  definition { 2 2 - 3 7 }
D issociation  {1 5 -2 9 }
>W
animal lover  { 1 7 - 3 2 }
US'
backward justification  { 1 -2 }
hunting {7 -3 }
fa irn ess  {4 -9 }
v e g g ie  difficulties {9 -6 }
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m eat re fu sa l {2 3 -2 7 }
p e ts  v  farm  anim als { 2 4 - 2 9 }
m e a t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 } p erson a l d is tr e ss  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
in /con sisten cy  {3 4 -4 4 }
a ffe c t io n  { 7 - 1 8 } e a t  d o g s /c a ts  { 1 0 - 1 9 }
sla u g h te r  { 1 - 1 9 }
N etw ork View  on individuals vs unknown
humans v animals {18-21} knowledge/ignorance {14-28}
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 -2 2 } valuing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }
righ t/w rong {3 0 -3 5 }
2 7 }
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
anthropom orphism  { 8 - 1 6 }
instrum ental va lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }
anim al n o t m e a t { 8 -
anim al tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
animal lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
  _______
nam ed anim als { 9 - 1 3 }  a ttra ctiv e n e ss  { 9 - 1 9 }
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N etwork View  on industry dem ands
slaughter {1-19}
personal distress {28-35}
right/wrong {30-35}
industry demands {11-16}
- /  intrinsic value {57-44}
in/consistency {34-44}
unjustified {8-23}intensive farming {4-14}
Dissociation {15-29}
1 Sw
^ / »  A . V v  -%■
personal contentment {8-25}
animal suffering definition {22-37}
meat-eating morality {15-40}
health {13-6} compassionate meat-eating {4-20}
anirrels' experiences {40-39}
~ y
knowledge/ignorance {14-28}
animal treatment {56-46}
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N etw ork View on instrumental qualities
fa irn ess  { 4 - 9 }
*7 \ I 
in ten sive  farming { 4 - 1 4 }
tradition { 3 -1 3 }
econ om y { 3 -1 0 }
con su m er ch oice { 7 - 1 5 } sq u e a m ish n ess  { 4 - 1 4 }
I t  n a tu ra l/eco  b a lan ce { 6 -1 3 }
 .
b y-p rod ucts { 8 -1 5 }
e a t  d o g s /c a ts  { 1 0 - 1 9 }
u nconcern ed  { 4 - 1 4 }  
anthropom orphism  { 8 - 1 6 }  
hum ans v  anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 } " ^ ^ ^
individuals v s  unknow n {7 -2 2 }^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^  
consum er difficulty {1 4 -2 8 }
D issociation  {1 5 -2 9 }
instrum ental v a lu e  {4 1 -4 3 }
health  { 1 3 - 6 }  -  v e g g ie s  unhealthy  { 3 - 4 }
hunting { 7 -3 }
/  " en d a n g e red  sp e c ie s  { 3 -5 }  
logic o f  larder { 6 - 1 0 }
4 \
w orth  living { 7 -1 0 }  
nam ed  anim als { 9 - 1 3 }
g e t  som eth ing back { 4 - 1 1 }
hum an su periority /h ierarch y/control 
{ 1 9 - 2 7 }
anim al su ffer in g  definition { 2 2 - 3 7 }
p e ts  v  farm  anim als { 2 4 - 2 9 }  
iMiimrmr 
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
!! liVMF+>&  ^
m ea t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 }
in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
{11-21}
VSSSWST* 
unjustified  { 8 - 2 3 }
__
i a ttr a c t iv e n e ss  { 9 - 1 9 }
s&sHBS ,^rr_ _  ,
p erso n a l co n te n tm e n t { 8 - 2 5 }
P skv ...
m e a t re fu sa l { 2 3 - 2 7 }
anim al n o t m e a t { 8 - 2 7 }
righ t/w rong {3 0 -3 5 }
• ».
p erson a l d istress  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
valuing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }  
vfWu
animal lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
IvHf
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
||
anim al tr e a tm e n t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
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reducing m eat { 5 -1 8 } unjustified { 8 -2 3 }
right/w rong { 3 0 -3 5 } valuing lives { 2 6 -3 8 }
intellect v s . em otion  {3 -1 9 }
animal trea tm e n t { 5 6 -4 6 } con sum er difficulty { 1 4 -2 8 }
animals' ex p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 -3 9 }
N etw ork View  on intellect vs. em otion
k n ow led ge /ign oran ce {1 4 -2 8 }
f t
p erson al d istress  { 2 8 -3 5 }
ta s te  {1 1 -2 1 }
m eat re fu sa l { 2 3 -2 7 }
<?7&LV
m ea t-ea tin g  morality { 1 5 -4 0 }
it/
D issociation  { 1 5 -2 9 } in /con sisten cy  {3 4 -4 4 }
'  animal su fferin g  definition { 2 2 -3 7 }
animals' sou ls { 6 -1 8 } com p assion a te  m eat-ea tin g  {4 -2 0 }
/ X
e a t  d o g s /c a ts  {1 0 -1 9 }
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N etw ork V iew  on intensive farming
in/consistency {34-44}
animal treatment {56-46} animals' experiences {40-39}
intrinsic value {57-44}
consumer difficulty {14-28} right/wrong {30-35}
instrumental value {41-43}
animals know no different {3-!
unjustified {8-23}
intensive farming {4-14}
phil-moral relativism {18-21} knowledge/ignorance {14-28}
industry demands {11-16}
animal suffering definition {22-37}
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N etw ork View  on intrinsic qualities
n a m e d  an im als  {9 -1 3 }  
life w o r th  living { 7 -10} fa irn ess  { 4 - 9 }~C,'K~. \5S\V'\ 
phil-m oral re la tiv ism  {1 8 -2 1 }
# . 
{ ^ J T ' o v e r-e m o tio n a l { 7 -14}
< W V \\
b y -p r o d u c ts  {8 -1 5 }
a n th ro p o m o rp h ism  {8 -1 6 }
s q u e a m is h n e ss  {4 -14}  jrv . u n c o n c e rn e d  {4 -1 4 }
c o n su m e r ch o ic e  {7 -1 5 }
a f f e c t b n  { 7 -1 8 }  
,r  m r it. "  
in d u s try  d e m a n d s  {1 1 -1 6 }
a n im a ls 's o u ls  {6 - 18}    _ "... m/////j&&i2iiBLs£a.
c o m p a ss io n a te  m e a t- e a t in g  {4 -2 0 }
re d u c in g  m e a t {5 -1 8 }
intrinsic v a lu e  {5 7 -4 4 }
in s tru m e n ta l v a lu e  {4 1 -4 3 }
p a y  m o re /q u a lity  {1-4}  an im als ' v a lu e s  {1 0 -5 }
logic o f  la rd e r  {6 - 10} anim als know  n o  d ifferen t { 3 - 8 }W gg~rm
g e t  so m eth in g  b ac k  {4 -11}
ssVV
in te n s iv e  fa rm in g  {4 -14}
I -  ^
u n ju s tif ie d  {8 -2 3 }
anim al lo v e r  {1 7 -3 2 }
54 I  ‘
p e t s  v  fa rm  an im als {2 4 -2 9 }
h u m a n  s u p e r io r ity /h ie ra rc h y /c o n tro l  
{ 1 9 -2 7 }
D issocia tion  { 1 5 -2 9 }
kill o w n  fo o d  {2 7 -3 0 }
"t a-Hi
valu in g  lives {2 6 -3 8 }
■ i* \m
m e a t- e a t in g  m orality  {1 5 -4 0 }
an im als ' e x p e r ie n c e s  {4 0 -3 9 }
s la u g h te r  {1 -1 9 }
h u m a n s  v  an im als  { 1 8 -2 1 }
t a s t e  { 1 1 -2 1 }
m e a t  r e fu s a l  {2 3 -2 7 }  
CVSSifiWW m^ 
c o n s u m e r  d ifficu lty  {1 4 -2 8 }
p e r s o n a l c o n te n tm e n t  { 8 -25}
k n o w le d g e /ig n o ra n c e  {1 4 -2 8 }  
an im al n o t m e a t  {8 -2 7 }
p e r s o n a l  d is tr e s s  { 2 8 -3 5 }  
an im al su ffe r in g  defin ition  { 2 2 -3 7 }  
in /c o n s is te n c y  { 3 4 -4 4 }
w i ,
anim al t r e a tm e n t  { 5 6 -4 6 }
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-  ^  
upbringing { 1 3 - 1 5 }  / sq u e a m ish n ess  { 4 -1 4 }
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 - 1 5 }  A e a t  d o g s /c a ts  { 1 0 - 1 9 }
reducing m e a t { 5 - 1 8 }
unjustified { 8 - 2 3 }
sla u g h te r  { 1 - 1 9 }
p e ts  v  farm  anim als { 2 4 - 2 9 }
p erson a l c o n te n tm en t { 8 - 2 5 }
k n ow led ge /ign oran ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 }
m ea t-e a tin g  morality {1 5 -4 0 }
kil o w n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
animal n ot m eat { 8 - 2 7 }
4 cultural fo o d  d if fer en ce s  {6 -1 0 }
N etw ork V iew  on kill own food
over-em otiona l {7 -1 4 }
m eat re fu sa l { 2 3 - 2 7 }
anim al tr ea tm en t {5 6 -
in /c o n sisten cy  {3 4 -4 4 }
intrinsic va lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
anim al su ffering  defin ition  {22-3 :37 }
anim als e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
anim als so u ls  { 6 - 1 8 }
\ \ v:
lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }
| f i
p erson a l d is tress  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 - 2 2 }
nam ed anim als { 9 - 1 3 }  hum ans v  anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }
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Netw ork View  on know ledge/ignorance
s la u g h te r  { 1 - 1 9 } meat refusal {23-27}
p erson a l c o n te n tm en t { 8 -2 5 }
unjustified { 8 - 2 3 }
valuing lives {26-38} personal distress
k n o w le d g e /ig n o ra n c e  { 1 4-28}
right/wrong {30-35}
con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
Dissociation {15-29}
intellect v s . em otion  { 3 - 1 9 }
animal n o t m eat { 8 - 2 7 }
industry d e ir a n d s  {1 1 -1 6 } co m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 -2 2 } anim als’ so u ls  { 6 - 1 8 }
fairness {4-9}
-  ^  \ ________________
sq u ea m ish n ess  { 4 - 1 4 }  reducing m eat { 5 - 1 8 }
animal treatment {56-46}
I w T
animals' experiences {40-39}
an im als know  n o  d if fe re n t  {3-8} -  in ten sive farming {4 -1 4 }
health  {1 3 -6 }
in/consistency {34-44} 
animal suffering definition {22-37} 
intrinsic value {57-44}
kill own food {27-
meat-eating morality {15-40}
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N etw ork View  on life worth living
humans v animals {18-21}
life w orth  living {7-10}p e ts  v fa rm  animals {24-29}
an im als 'ex p e rien c es  {40-39}
instrum ental value {41-43} animal lover {17-32}
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46} ntrinsic value {57-44}
animal suffering definition {22-37} affec tio n  {7-18}
N etw ork View on logic of larder
right/wrong {30-35} phil-moral relativism {18-21}
meat-eating morality {15-40}
natural/eco balance {6-13} tradition {3-13}
logic of larder {6-10}
by-products {8-15} instrumental value {41-43}
intrinsic value {57-44}
Appendix C Atlas.ti code networks 232
N etw ork View  on meat refusal
o ver-em otiona l { 7 -1 4 }  H an im ate'sou ls { 6 -1 8 }
reducing m eat { 5 -1 8 } unjustified  { 8 - 2 3 }
valuing lives {26-38} personal distress {28-35}
meat refusal {23-27}
D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
anim al n o t m e a t { 8 - 2 7 } con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
intellect v s .  em otion  { 3 -1 9 } pets v farm animals {24-29}
m e a t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 }
‘ t \
animal treatment {56-46}
intrinsic value {57-44}
instrumental value {41-43}
kill own food {27-30} 
in/consistency {34-44}
w
animals experiences {40-39}
s r
k n o w le d g e /ig n o ra n ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 - 2 2 }
animal suffering definition {22-37}
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 - 1 5 }  \  |  e a t  d o g s /c a ts  {1 0 -1 9 }
Vt I XT
tradition { 3 - 1 3 }  nam ed anim als { 9 -1 3 }
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N etw ork View  on m eat-eating morality
e a t  d o g s /c a ts  {1 0 -1 9 }
o ver-em otiona l { 7 -1 4 }  
industry d em an d s { 1 1 - 1 6 }  ~ x K \  :
u nconcern ed  { 4 -1 4 }
sq u e a m ish n ess  { 4 - 1 4 }
anim als' sou ls  { 6 - 1 8 }
I
pets v farm animals {24-29}
tiWSC , 
j meat refusal {23-27}
p erson a l co n te n tm e n t {8 -2 5 }
personal distress {28-35}
meat-eating morality {15-40}
pp|gj^nTStmmental value {41-43} 
kill own food {27-30}animal n ot m eat { 8 - 2 7 }
con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
^ j i n t e l l e c t  v s . em otion  {3 -1 9 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 -2 2 }  ^  
s la u g h ter  { 1 -1 9 }
logic o f  larder { 6 -1 0 }
economy {3-10} —  jnatural/eco balance {6-13}
/ /  /iwy^v ■
phil-moral relativism {18-21}
reducing meat {5-18} 
t a s t e  { 1 1 - 2 1 }
- -  
unjustified  { 8 - 2 3 }
. -
kn ow led ge /ign oran ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
' 's/1r 
right/wrong {30-35}
in/consistency {34-44}
a >
intrinsic value {57-44}
-C^- 
animate’ experiences {40-39}
D issociation {15-29}
animal treatment {56-46}
I
animal suffering definition {22-37}
\ilw
valuing lives {26-38}
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27}
co m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-ea tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
._____
flu ffy  brigade {4 -8 }
anim als' v a lu e s  { 1 0 - 5 } a ttra ct iv e n e ss  { 9 - 1 9 }
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N etw ork V iew  on nam ed animals
eat dogs/cats {10-19}meat refusal{23-27}
pets v farm animals {24-29}
personal distress {28-35}
named animals {9-13}
kill own food {27-30}
instrumental value {41-43}
animal lover {17-32}
valuing lives {26-38}
in/consistency {34-44}
individuals vs unknown {7-22}
cultural food differences {6-10} intrinsic value {57-44}
upbringing {13-15}
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N etw ork View  on natural/eco balance
affection {7-18} humans v animals {18-21}
logic of larder {6-10} tradition {3-13}
anirral suffering definition {22-37} by-products {8-15}
econorry {3-10} meat-eating morality {15-40}
human superiority/hierarchy/control 
{19-27}
animal bver {17-32}
animal treatm ent {56-46} natural/eco balance {6-13}
instrumental value {41-43}
< >
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N etw ork View  on over-em otional
animal trea tm en t {56-46}
personal con ten tm en t {8-25}upbringing {13-15}
phil-moral relativism {18-21}m eat refusal {23-27}
personal d is tress {28-35}ill own food {27-30}
valuing lives {26-38}animals' experiences {40-39}
over-em otional {7-14}m eat-eating  morality {15-40}
animal suffering definition {22-37}
/ / J ^
intrinsic value {57-44}
animal lover {17-32}
fluffy brigade {4-8}
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N etw ork View on pay m ore/quality
intensive farming {4-14}
animals' experiences {40-39} intrinsic value {57-44}
consumer difficulty {14-28}
Appendix C Adas.ti code networks 238
u nconcern ed  { 4 - 1 4 }
righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 } p erson a l d is tress  {2 8 -3 5 }
p erson al co n ten tm en t { 8 -2 5 }
co n su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
instrum ental v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }
animal n o t m eat { 8 - 2 7 }
industry d em an d s { 1 1 - 1 6 } slaugh ter  { 1 - 1 9 }
consum er ch oice { 7 - 1 5 }
T 7 -
N etw ork View  on personal contentm ent
sq u e a m ish n ess  { 4 -1 4 }
valuing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }
in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
ll I ^
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 -
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
anim al tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }  
m ea t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 }  
anim al su ffer in g  definition { 2 2 - 3 7 }
k n o w led g e /ig n o ra n ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
a ttr a c t iv e n e ss  { 9 -1 9 }  
\
over-em otiona l {7 -1 4 }
D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
w
kil ow n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
w
c o m p a ssb n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
hum an supertority /h ierarchy/control 
{1 9 - 2 7 }
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N etw ork V iew  on personal distress
p erso n a l d is tress  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
anim al su ffe r in g  defin ition  { 2 2 - 3 7 }
m e a t re fu sa l { 2 3 - 2 7 } instrum ental v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }
animal not meat {8-27} con su m er  difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
intellect vs. emotion {3-19} animal lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
slaughter {1-19}
eat dogs/cats {10-19}
over-emotional {7-14}
I
reducing meat { 5 - 1 8 }  '  p e t s  v farm  anim als { 2 4 - 2 9 }  
unjustified {& ^23^^^^^^^^V vw ong { 3 0 - 3 5 }
individuals vs unknown {7-,
animals' souls {6-18}
industry demands {11-
squeamishness {4-14}
named animals {9-13} 
\  I
m e a t-e a tin g  m orality {15-40}
*'* \\M
v alu ing  lives { 2 6 -  
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 -
Dissociattan {15-29}
knowledge/ignorance {14-28}
compassbnate meat-eating {4-20}
h um ans v  anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }
YMF
consumer choice {7-15}
Vj*
attractiveness {9-19}
i i /c o n s is te n c y  { 3 4 - 4 4 }  
a n h B l tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
m  'i«
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }  
kill ow n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
personal contentment {8-25}
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N etw ork View  on pets v farm animals
upbringing {13-15}
slau g h ter {1-19} i e a t  d o g s /c a ts  {10-19}
hurra n superiority /h ierarchy/contro l 
{19-27} m eat re fusa l {23-27}
p e ts  v  fa rm  animals {24-29}
personal d is tress  {28-35} m ea t-ea tin g  morality {15-40}
animBls' e x p e rien c es  {40-39} animal suffering  definition {22-37}
individuals v s  unknow n {7-22}
affec tion  {7-18} animal no t m ea t {8-27}
Dissociation {15-29} a ttra c tiv e n e ss  {9-19}
instrum ental value {41-43}
: i\i
h /co n s is ten cy  {34-44} 
intrinsic va lue  {57-
=  valuing lives {26-38}
O n
animal tre a tm e n t {56-46} 
/
animal lover {17-32}
nam ed anim als {9-13}
V
g e t som ething back {4-11}
anthropom orphism  {8-16} 
by -p ro d u cts  {8-15}
X
cultural food d iffe rences  {6-10} 0} fa irness {4-9} h living {7-10}
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N etw ork View  on phil-moral relativism
an im al s u f fe r in g  d e fin it io n  { 2 2 - 3 7 }  
a n im al lo v e r  { 1 7 - 3 2 }  **
phil-morality definition {2 -1}
phil -taught morals H H j
phil-lack of morals {3-1}
phil-moral comfort {3 -1}
phil-upbringing {1-
upbringing {13 -15}tradition {3 -13}
m oral re la tiv ism  { 1 8 - 2 1 }
an im als' e x p e r i e n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }in trinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
P i g h ^ r o n g { 3 0 - 3 5 4
ruTOr^ u p e n o n ty /h ie r a r c h y /c o n tr o l  
K 1 9 -2 7 *
animals know no different {3 -8}
over-emotional {7-14}
in t e n s iv e  fa r m in g  { 4 - 1 4 }
fluffy brigade {4-8}
logic of larder {6-10}
an im al t r e a tm e n t  { 5 6 - 4 6 }  
m e a t - e a t in g  m orality  { 1 5 - 4 0 }
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N etw ork View  on reducing meat
valuing lives {26-38}
intellect vs. emotion {3-19}
knowledge/ignorance {14-28}m eat refusal {23-27}
m eat-eating morality {15-40}right/wrong {30-35}
reducing m eat {5-18}personal d istress {28-35}
h/consistency  {34-44}
difficulty {14-28}Dissociation {15-29}
animal not m eat {8-27} intrinsic value {57-44}
consum er choice {7-15} —  | com passionate m eat-eating  {4-20}
backward justification {1-
N etw ork View on repulsive
personal distress {28-35}
intellect vs. emotion {3-19}m/consistency {34-44}
Iconsumer difficulty {14-28}
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N etw ork V iew  on right/w rong
unconcern ed  { 4 -1 4 } : t a s t e  { 1 1 -2 1 }
hum an su periority/h ierarchy/control 
{ 1 9 -2 7 }
valuing iv e s  { 2 6 - 3 8 }
unjustiffed { 8 - 2 3 }
k now ledge /ign oran ce {1 4 -2 8 }
right/w rong {3 0 -3 5 }
animal not m eat { 8 -2 7 }
D issociation {1 5 -2 9 }
co n su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
anim al lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
individuals v s  unknow n { 7 - 2 2 }  ^
animals' sou ls { 6 - 1 8 }
industry d em an d s { 1 1 - 1 6 }
VI"
Lr\} reducing m eat { 5 - 1 8 }  
sla u g h ter  { 1 -1 9 }
phil-moral relativism  { 1 8 - 2 1 }  f t -  in ten sive  farming { 4 - 1 4 }
animals' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
1 W
m e a t-e a tin g  morality {1 5 -4 0 }
p erson al d is tr e ss  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
animal tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
rinO
in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
■Ur/
anim al su ffering  definition { 2 2 - 3 7 }  1/
instrum ental v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }  
kill o w n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
p erson a l c o n te n tm en t { 8 - 2 5 }  
co m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
w r
hum ans v anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }
 ^
intellect v s . em otion  { 3 - 1 9 }
w/
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 - 1 5 }
b y-products { 8 -1 5 }
V*ll
anthropom orphism  { 8 - 1 6 }
i w \ i  x
logic o f  larder { 6 -1 0 }  anim als know no d ifferen t {3 -8 }
get something back {4-11}
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N etw ork View  on slaughter
slaughter {1-19}
eat dogs/cats {10-19}
cultural food differences {6-10}
industry demands {11-16}
compassionate meat-eating {4-20}
right/wrong {30-35}
animal suffering definition {22-37} 
meat-eating morality {15-40}
animal treatm ent {56-46}
upbringing {13-15}
individuals vs unknown {7-22} 
personal contentment {8-25} ^ \ animals' experiences {40-39}
knowledge/ignorance {14-28} s- kill own food {27-30}
pets v farm animals {24-29}
personal distress {28-35}
A *
in/consistency {34-44}
F
valuing lives {26-38}
intrinsic value {57-44}
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N etw ork View  on squeam ishness
p erso n a l d is tr e s s  { 2 8 - 3 5 }
m e a t-e a tin g  m orality { 1 5 - 4 0 }
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 } D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
in /c o n s is te n c y  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
anim al tr e a tm e n t { 5 6 - 4 6 }  ^
co n su m er  d ifficu lty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
; s q u e a m ish n e ss  { 4 - 1 4 }
p erso n a l c o n te n tm e n t { 8 - 2 5 }
anim al su ffe r in g  defin ition  { 2 2 - 3 7 } anim al n o t m e a t { 8 - 2 7 }
k n o w le d g e /ig n o r a n c e  { 1 4 - 2 8 }
X  I
o w n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }  
/S '
a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  { 9 - 1 9 }  ' instrum ental v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }
N etw ork View on support farmers
instrumental value {41-43}
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N etw ork View  on taste
u nconcern ed  { 4 - 1 4 }  m eat refu sal { 2 3 - 2 7 }
ta s t e  {1 1 -2 1 }
m e a t-e a tin g  morality { 1 5 - 4 0 } in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 } animal tr ea tm en t { 5 6 - 4 6 }
anim als' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }  "i righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 }
instrum ental v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 } con su m er difficulty { 1 4 - 2 8 }
p erson a l co n te n tm en t { 8 - 2 5 } animal su ffer ing  defin ition  { 2 2 - 3 7 }
animal n o t m eat { 8 - 2 7 } D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
hum an superiority /h ierarchy/control 
{ 1 9 - 2 7 }kill ow n  fo o d  { 2 7 - 3 0 }
reducing m eat { 5 - 1 8 } co m p a ssio n a te  m e a t-e a tin g  { 4 - 2 0 }
intellect v s . em otion  { 3 - 1 9 }  hum ans v anim als { 1 8 - 2 1 }
X T /
g e t  so m eth in g  b ac k  {4 -11}
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tradition {3-13}
logic of larder {6-10}
econorry {3-10}
m eat refusal {23-27}
cultural food differences {6-10}
e a t  d o g s/ca ts  {10-19}
by-products {8-15}
endangered  species {3-5}
upbringing {13-15}
instrum ental value {41-43}
N etw ork View  on tradition
animal trea tm en t {56-46}
natural/eco  balance {6-13}
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N etw ork V iew  on unconcerned
m e a t - e a t in g  m orality  { 1 5 - 4 0 } r ig h t/w r o n g  { 3 0 - 3 5 }
v a lu in g  liv e s  { 2 6 - 3 8 }
an im al t r e a tm e n t  { 5 6 - 4 6 }
b y -p r o d u c ts  { 8 - 1 5 }
compassionate meat-eating {4-20}
^  X  .V
in /c o n s is te n c y  { 3 4 - 4 4 }p e r s o n a l  c o n t e n t m e n t  { 8 - 2 5 }
u n c o n c e r n e d  { 4 - 1 4 }
an im als' e x p e r i e n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
A
h u m a n  su p e r io r ity /h ie r a r c h y /c o n tr o l  
{ 1 9 - 2 7 }
in str u m e n ta l v a lu e  { 4 1 - 4 3 }
intrinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
an im al s u ffe r in g  d efin it io n  { 2 2 - 3 7 }
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N etw ork V iew  on unjustified
industry demands {11-16}
hum an su periority/h ierarchy/control 
con su m er ch o ice  { 7 -1 5 }  /  {1 9 -2 7 }
animals' sou ls { 6 -1 8 }
k n o w led g e /ig n o ra n ce { 1 4 - 2 8 }
righ t/w rong { 3 0 - 3 5 }  2
intellect v s . em otion  { 3 -1 9 }
kill ow n  food  {2 7 -3 0 }
I
m eat re fu sa l {2 3 -
con su m er difficulty {1 4 -2 8 }
valuing lives { 2 6 - 3 8 }
D issociation  { 1 5 - 2 9 }
p erso n a l d is tress  {2 8 -3 5 }
anim als e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 - 3 9 }
&
S*23
animal treatment
anirral su ffering  definition { 2 2 - 3 7 }intrinsic va lu e  { 5 7 - 4 4 }
animal n ot m eat { 8 - 2 7 } instrum ental v a lu e  {4 1 -4 3 }
m e a t-e a tin g  morality {1 5 -4 0 }  
in /c o n sisten cy  { 3 4 - 4 4 }
in ten sive  farming { 4 - 1 4 }  animal lover { 1 7 - 3 2 }
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upbringing {13-15}
tradition {3-13}
animal suffering definition {22-37}
in/consistency {34-44} eat dogs/cats {10-19}
animal lover {17-32} slaughter {1-19}
over-emotional {7-14} named animals {9-13}
phil-moral relativism {18-21}
v farm animals {24-29}
animal treatm ent {56-46}
changing meats {4-4}
cultural food differences {6-10} valuing lives {26-38}
N etw ork V iew  on upbringing
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N etw ork V iew  on valuing lives
p -  k n o w le d g e /ig n o ra n c e  {1 4 -2 8 }  
\ u n ju s tif ie d  {8 -2 3 }
in te llec t v s . em o tio n  {3 -1 9 }
\ \  W  ^
V "  a f fe c t io n  {7 -1 8 }
\ \
e a t  d o g s /c a t s  {1 0 -1 9 }  
s la u g h te r  {1 -1 9 }  ^ p e t s  v  fa rm  an im als {2 4 -2 9 }  
p e r s o n a l d is tr e s s  {2 8 -3 5 }  m e a t-e a tin g  m orality  {1 5 -4 0 }
A Y at t r a c t i ve ne s s  {9 -1 9 }  
^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ig c o m p a ss io n a te  m e a t- e a t in g  { 4 -20}  
h u m a n s  v  an im als {1 8 -2 1 }  
n a m e d  an im als {9 -1 3 }
^ ^ j u i i E i r i c i ^  { 4 -j f l K  
upbringing  {1 3 ‘ 1 5 )^ ^
in /c o n s is te n c y  {3 4 -4 4 }
i
anim al su ffe r in g  d e fin itio n  { 2 2 - 3 ^
l*,\
r ig h t/w ro n g  { 3 0 -3 5 }
V
kill o w n  fo o d  { 2 7-30}
D issociation  {1 5 -2 9 }_ w a s
m e a t re fu s a l  { 2 3 - Z J }
IS ______
indiv iduals v s  u n k n o w n  {7 -2 2 }
\  ^  
p e r s o n a l  c o n te n tm e n t  { 8 -2 5 }
\  \ N £ ^ ^
an im als ' so u ls  {6 -1 8 }
\  \
anim al t r e a tm e n t  { 5 6 -4 6 }
11/1
in trinsic v a lu e  { 5 7 -4 4 }  
an im als ' e x p e r ie n c e s  { 4 0 -3 9 }
r j"
in s tru m e n ta l  v a lu e  { 4 1 -4 3 }  
an im al lo v e r  {1 7 -3 2 }
anim al n o t  m e a t  {8 -2 7 }
h u m an  su p e r io r ity /h ie ra rc h y /c o n tro l  
{1 9 -2 7 }
an th ro p o m o rp h ism  {8 -1 6 }
o v e r -e m o tio n a l {7 -1 4 }
re d u c in g  m e a t  {5 -18}
Is// x
b y -p ro d u c ts  {8 -15}■  ~  ■■■
v e 9 9 'e  re c a te g o r is a tio n  {2 -3}  cu ltu ra l fo o d  d if fe re n c e s  {6 -1 0 }
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N etw ork View  on vegetable life
anthropomorphism {8-16}
vegetable
consumer difficulty {14-28}
veggie difficulties {9-6}
health {13-6}
N etw ork View on veggie difficulties 
in/consistency {34-44}
■ ■ ■ ■ I- -   — — *
veggies unhealthy {3-4}
Appendix C Adas.ti code networks
tation {3-3
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N etwork V iew  on veggie propaganda
in /consistency  {34-44}
N etw ork View on veggie recategorisation
valuing lives {26-38} -----------------------------------—   veggie recategorisation {2-3}
Dissociation {15-29}
intrinsic value {57-44}
N etw ork View on veggie tem ptation
ition
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N etw ork View  on veggies unhealthy
veggie difficulties {9-6}
ii
ii
:>instrumental value {41-43} health {13-6}
N etw ork View on worthless life
w o rth less  life ■ I
ii
life worth living {7-10}animal lover {17-32}
animals' experiences {40-39}
Appendix C Adas.ti code networks
A P P E N D IX  D
Quantitative research guide
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Appendix D  > Quantitative research guide
P articipan t re ference  no:
C o n se n t  g u id e :
Following are tw o  short questionnaires and an experiment.
Your identity as a research participant is anonymous, and therefore confidential. 
Some people may find some pictures distressing. You are free to discontinue 
participation at anytime: just inform the researcher.
The questionnaires are randomly selected from a range of different projects. They 
have nothing to do with each other, but are being run together to ease the burden 
of recruiting many research participants, like yourself.
Because the questionnaires are randomly selected, some people may feel that their 
answers in one questionnaire are contradictory to their answers in a different 
questionnaire. This may not happen to you. but if it does then please don't worry: 
it s normal because people are complex. Please try not to let the first questionnaire 
influence your responses to the second questionnaire because this could invafidate 
the research.
Please don't return to change answers that you have already completed. Don't spend 
ages trying to answer 'correctly': there are no right or wrong answers. The most 
important thing is that you answer as honestly as possible.
fust respond with your 'gut reactions', working as quidcfy as you find comfortable. 
The research isn't meant to be taxing (in fact, some people have even enjoyed itj!
Thank you.
If you would like to proceed with the research please turn 
to the next page and follow the instructions ...
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Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  n u m b e r  6 :
Q u e s t i o n  1 — a b o u t  y o u r  g e n e r a l  v i e w s
Yes No
Do you think that cows have any importance at all? (please tick)
If y o u  a n s w e r e d  'y e s ', p le a s e  a n sw e r  Q u e st io n  2 b e lo w . If y o u  a n s w e r e d  'n o ', 
p le a se  turn  to  th e  n e x t  p a g e .
Q u e s t i o n  2 — e x p l o r i n g  y o u r  v i e w s
“I think that cow s are im portant because:1' Ip ease tick on e box in every row)
Strongly Strongly 
disagree Neither agree
1 value cow s’ appearance □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
a t r s r r and □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 value cows contribution to my
envronment. making up a range of | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | 
animals that ensure the countryside's future
lvalue cows'monetary value □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
lvalue rare breeds of cows □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
lvalue cows as status symbob □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
b* □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
™  “ r  *brtrt¥,°  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 thmk cows' intelligence has value ED [ U EH [HI ED 1 II II II II II 1
1 theik cows' abilities have value 1 II II II II II II II II II II 1
P l e a s e  t u r n  t o  t h e  n e x t  p a g e  . . .
z
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er  6 (continued): 
Question 3—about your general views
Yes No
Do you think that p gs have any importance at all? (please tick)
If y o u  a n sw e r e d  'y e s ', p le a s e  a n sw e r  Q u e s t io n  4  b e lo w . If y o u  a n s w e r e d  'n o ' 
p le a se  turn  to  th e  n e x t  p a g e .
Question 4—exploring your views
“I think that pigs are im portant because:* (please tick on e  box in every row)
Strongly Strongly
disagree Neither agree
I value piss appear*™  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
*srtsr3"i □□□□□□□□□□□
I value pigs' contribution to my         ,___,   , , , , ,     ,     , , , , ,
envronment. making up a range of I I I I I II  II I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I
animals that ensure the countryside's future
I value pigs monetary value □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
I value rare breeds of pigs □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
I value pigs as status symbols □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
i“ t^ , r :ha,canbe" ad'  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
value □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
ab:l,,y“  □□□□□□□□□□□
I thmk pigs intelligence has value □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
I theik pigs' abilities have value □  □  □  □  □  I I I  I I  II  I I  II  I
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 6  (continued):
Question 5 — about your general views
Yes No
Do you think that sheep have any importance at all? (please tide)
If y o u  a n sw e r e d  'y e s ', p le a s e  a n sw e r  Q u e stio n  6 b e lo w . If y o u  a n sw e r e d  'n o ', 
p le a se  turn  to  th e  n e x t  p a g e .
Question 6 — exploring your views
*1 think that sheep  are im portant because ’ (please tick on e box in every row)
Strongly Strongly 
disagree N either agree
1 value sheep s appearance □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
's&Zizr □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 value sheep s contribution to my ___  ___  _ ___ _ ___ ___  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _____ _ ___
environment, making up a range of I I 1 II  II  II  II  I I  I I  II  II  II  1 
animals that ensure the countryside s future
1 value sheep s monetary value □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
lvalue rare breeds of sheep □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 value sheep as status symbols | | |  11 | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | 
b* □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
'flXS'gU. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
° rMnv u□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 think sheep's intelligence has value O  Q  QU d ]  O  HD Q  EZI EZI 1 1 
1 thnk sh eep s abilities have value 1 II II II II II II II II II II 1
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 6  (continued):
Question 7 — about your general views
Yei No
Do you think that chickens have any importance at all? (please tick)
If y ou  a n s w e re d  'y e s ',  p le a se  a n sw e r  Q u estio n  8 b e lo w . If yo u  a n s w e re d  'n o ',  
p le a se  tu rn  to  th e  n e x t  p a g e .
Question 8 — exploring your views
•1 think that chickens are im portant because:* (p ease tick one box n every row)
Strongly Strongly 
disagree N either agree
1 .a lii, d * W  appearance □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
*" '  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 value chickens'contribution to my _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ ____, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,____ _ ___
environment, making up a range of 1 1 1 I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  1 
animals that ensure the countryside's future
1 value chickens'monetary value E H  E H  E H  E H  E H  1 I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  1
lvalue rare breeds of chickens □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 value chickens as status symbofs | | |  | |  | |  | |  | [  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | 
c" k ,ra a d * □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
£ £ £ ^ i T I 5 r  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 theik chickens' intelligence has value EH EH 1 1 1 1 1 1 EH EH EH 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 think chickens' abilities have value EH EH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I 1 I 1 I 1
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ir e  n u m b er  6  (continued):
Thinking ab out your v iew s tow ards cow s, p igs, sh eep  and chickens, 
h ow  p ositive  or n egative  w ou ld  you  say your v iew s are tow ards th ese  
anim als overall?
Extrem ely Extremely
n egative  N either p ositive
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Please turn to the next page .
Appendix D  Quantitative research guide
Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 6  (continued):
This information helps to classify your answers
Your age □ years
Your sex: (M/F) □1_________________________________________ ____
Your nat ona try
Thank you
End o f  quest ionnaire  number 6
Please turn to the next page ...
Appendix D  1 Quantitative research guide
Thank you for com pleting one questionnaire.
You can now  forget about that one and 
proceed to  the next questionnaire, which  
is unrelated to  the questionnaire you have 
just com pleted.
Please answer as honestly as possible and 
try to  avoid being influenced by the  
previous questionnaire.
Please turn to the next page .
Appendix D Quantitative research guide
Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 2:
Question 1—about your general diet
Please tick if, in the last 7 days, you have eaten:
F<sh and/or seafood □
Chicken and/or turkey and'or duck □
Beef andor burgers □
Pork andor bacon sausages, hot dogs □
Veal □
Lamb andor mutton □
Offal □
Co*d cuts □
Meat pate/paste □
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 2 (continued):
If y o u  t ic k e d  an y  o f  th e  b o x e s  in Q u e st io n  1, p le a s e  a n sw e r  Q u e st io n  2 b e lo w . If y o u  
did  n o t  tick  an y  b o x e s  in Q u e st io n  1, p le a se  ig n o r e  Q u e st io n  2 a n d  tu rn  th e  p a g e .
Question 2—exploring your diet (only answer if you ticked 
any of the boxes in Question 1)
*ln the last 7 days I ate meat and/or fish because:" (please tick one box in every row)
Strongly Strongly
disagree N either agree
I I ke its taste □□□□□□□□□□□
I thnk it's good or natural for me □□□□□□□□□□□
There was no alternative available □□□□□□□□□□□
Habit □□□□□□□□□□□
Religious reasons □□□□□□□□□□□
Other people expected me to eat it □□□□□□□□□□□
It d*dn’: occur to me not to eat <t □□□□□□□□□□□
It looked or smelled nice □□□□□□□□□□□
It was good value for money □□□□□□□□□□□
It was organic □□□□□□□□□□□
I wanted to support the butcher or farmer □□□□□□□□□□□
It was a special celebratory meal □□□□□□□□□□a
It was in something that I ate mistakenly □□□□□□□□□□a
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er 2 (continued):
If you w ere instructed not to  answ er Question 2 , please now  answ er Question 3 below  if 
you have just answ ered Question 2, please ignore Question 3 and turn to  th e  next pace
Question 3—about your general diet (only answer if you 
did not answer Question 2)
*ln th e  last 7 days I have n ot eaten  m eat and /or fish b e c a jse  'please tick o n e box in every row)
Strongly Strongly
disagree N either agree
It was unavailable (otherwise 1 would have1 £
It was too expensive □□□□□□□□□□□
Religious reasons □□□□□□□□□□□
1 dislike the taste □□□□□□□□□□□
1 disl ke the smell □□□□□□□□□□□
1 dislike the appearance □□□□□□□□□□□
Ethical reasons □□□□□□□□□□□
Health reasons □□□□□□□□□□□
EnvTonmenta! reasons □□□□□□□□□□□
Please turn to the next page ...
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Q u estio n n a ire  n u m b er  2 (continued):
Thinking ab out your v iew s tow ards ea tin g  m eat, h o w  p ositive or 
n egative  w ou ld  you say your v iew s are tow ards ea tin g  m eat overall?
Extrem ely Extremely
n egative  N either p ositive
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Thank you 
End of questionnaire number 2
Please turn to the next page ...
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How you are feeling:
Think ab ou t your v iew s tow ards farm anim als and your d ifferent v iew s  
tow ards eatin g  m eat. That is, NOT th e relationship  b e tw e en  farm animals 
and m ea t itself, but th e  relationship b e tw e e n  YOUR VIEWS ab ou t farm  
anim als and eatin g  m eat, as you  exp ressed  them  here. Try to  evaluate h o w  
thinking ab ou t your v ie w s togeth er  m akes you  fee l.
B elow  are w ord s that can describe d ifferent ty p es  o f  feelin gs. For each  
w ord , p lease  indicate h o w  much it describes h o w  you  are fee lin g  by  
marking the scales. 'O ' m eans 'd o e s  n o t apply at a ll', and '1 0 ” m eans 
'a p p lies  very much* to  h o w  you  are fee lin g  right n ow . D on’t spend  much 
tim e thinking ab out each w ord , just g iv e  a gu t-leve l resp onse ab ou t h ow  
you  are fee lin g  at th is precise m om ent ab ou t your v iew s tow ards farm 
anim als and your v iew s tow ards eatin g  m eat. (Please tick)
D oes n o t Applies
apply a t all very much
Uncom fortable □
Bothered
Please turn to the next page ...
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U n d ersta n d in g  y o u r  v ie w s :
Thinking about your view s towards farmed animals' slaughter for meat, 
h ow  positive or negative w ould you say your view s are towards animals' 
slaughter overall?
Extremely Extremely
negative Neither positive
Please turn to the next page .
Appendix D  : Quantitative research guide
Thank you
Now please tell th e researcher that you are 
ready for the experim ent.
PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER THIS PAGE:
YOU WILL BE RETURNING TO IT AFTER 
THE EXPERIMENT.
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How you are feeling:
Think about your view s towards farm animals and your different views 
towards their slaughter and eating meat. That is, NOT the relationship 
betw een  farm animals, slaughter and m eat itself, but the relationship 
betw een  YOUR VIEWS about farm animals, their slaughter and eating meat, 
as you expressed them here. Try to  evaluate how  thinking about your views 
together makes you feel.
Below are words that can describe different types of feelings. For each 
word, please indicate how  much it describes how  you are feeling by 
marking the scales. "0* means “does not apply at all*, and "10" means 
"applies very much" to  how  you are feeling right now. Don‘t spend much 
time thinking about each word, just give a gut-level response about how  
you are feeling at this precise moment about your view s towards farm 
animals, their slaughter and your view s towards eating meat.
As your feelings may have changed, try to  avoid being influenced by your 
previous answer to the same question. Concentrate only on how  you feel 
right now.
Does n o t Applies
apply  a t  all very much
U ncom fortable
Uneasy
Bothered
Please turn to the next page ...
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This research may have asked you questions  
that you haven't previously had the  
opportunity to  consider.
Because som etim es peop le prefer to  take their 
tim e over things, the next page gives you the  
opportunity to  change your mind. Your 
answers can be th e sam e as before, or different 
-  it's entirely up to  you. As always, there are no 
right or w rong answers.
Please turn to the next page ...
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From  q u e s t io n n a ir e  n u m b ers  6  a n d  2:
Thinking about your views tow ards cows, pigs, sheep and chickens, how  positive 
or negative would you say your views are tow ards these animals overall?
Extremely Extremely
negative Neither positive
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Thinking about your views tow ards eating m eat, how  positive or negative would 
you say your views are towards eating m eat overall?
Extremely Extremely
negative Neither positive
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Thinking about your views tow ards farmed animals' slaughter for m eat, how  positive 
or negative would you say your views are tow ards animals' slaughter overall?
Extremely Extremely
negative Neither positive
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Please turn to the next page ...
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How you are feeling:
Think about your view s towards farm animals and your different views 
towards their slaughter and eating meat. That is, NOT the relationship 
betw een farm animals, slaughter and m eat itself, but the relationship 
betw een  YOUR VIEWS about farm animals, their slaughter and eating meat, 
as you have just expressed them here. Try to  evaluate how  thinking about 
your view s together makes you feel.
Below are words that can describe different types of feelings. For each 
word, please indicate how  much it describes how  you are feeling by 
marking the scales. "O' means "does not apply at all", and "10" means 
"applies very much" to how  you are feeling right now. Don't spend much 
time thinking about each word, just give a gut-level response about how  
you are feeling at this precise moment about your view s towards farm 
animals, their slaughter and your view s towards eating meat.
As your view s and feelings may have changed, try to avoid being influenced 
by your previous answer to  the same question. Concentrate only on how  
you feel right now.
D oes n o t Applies
apply a t all very much
U ncom fortable
U neasy
Bothered
Please turn to the next page ...
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Thank you; the research is now  com plete
This page explains the research in which you have just participated.
If you need  to  leave now, please fee l free to com plete your prize 
draw entry form and tear this page from the pack to  take w ith you. 
Otherwise you are w elcom e to  read it here and ask any questions 
that you may have.
The research measures how people's views work together.
Previous research has found th a t sometimes people m ake their answers 
appear m ore consistent than  they really are because they perceive 
inconsistency to  be a bad thing, even though  it's normal for everyone 
sometimes. This is a problem because it means th a t research does no t gain 
valid results. Even if you m ight no t have been affected by this problem, o ther 
people m ight be. So th e  questionnaires a t th e  beginning of the  research were 
presented  as disconnected from  each o ther to  try to  avoid this problem. In 
fact, th e  results from these questionnaires win be com pared w ith the  
experim ental data to  discover how your consciously considered views relate 
to  th e  unconscious reactions recorded by th e  com puter.
The questions asking you how you w ere feeling give an idea of w hat 
effect the  research was having on you a t each stage and how you 
m anaged th a t e ffec t
Thank you so  much for com pleting th e  research. Without people  
generously contributing their tim e, research such as this w ould  
be im possible.
If you have any questions, please contact c.a.norton® lse.ac.uk
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277
Appendix E Images chosen for the IAT
Animal category
Tally: 16 v o te s  Tally: 16 v o te s  Tally: 16 v o te s
Tally: 19 v o te s  Tally: 13 v o te s  Tally: 13 v o te s
Tally: 30 v o te s Tally: 20 v o te s  Tally: 9 v o tes
Tally: 14 v o te s Tally: 10 v o te sTally: 20 v o te s
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M eat category
Tally: 15 v o te s Tally: 13 v o te s Tally: 12 v o te s
Tally: 10 v o te sTally: 28 v o te s  Tally: 10 v o te s
Tally: 13 v o te s Tally: 12 v o te s Tally: 12 v o te s
Tally: 25 v o te s  Tally: 19 v o te s  Tally: 8 v o te s
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Slaughter category 
Tally: 30 v o te s
Source: VIVA! 
Tally: 27 v o te s
Tally: 16 v o te s
Source: VIVA! 
Tally: 16 v o te s
Source: VIVA! 
Tally: 12 v o te s
Source: VIVA!
9 v o te s
Tally: 22 v o te s  Tally: 21 v o te s  Tally: 12 v o te s
Source: VIVA! S ource: CIWF
Tally: 35 v o te s  Tally: 19 v o te s  Tally: 7 v o te s
S ource: VIVA! S ource: VIVA! Source: VIVA!
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IAT stimuli
Appendix F > IAT stimuli
Words used  in the IAT
Good category
rainbow
gift
joy
warmth
laughter
health
freedom
love
Bad category
sickness
cancer
vomit
failure
agony
poison
abuse
crash
peace
friend
pleasure
honest
lucky
sunrise
happy
loyal
filth
disaster
hatred
tragedy
jail
poverty
evil
disaster
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Pictures used in the IAT
Animal category
Means based on 24 participants’ 
Mean recognition time: 557.2 ms
Mean recognition time: 564.2 ms Mean recognition time: 563.7 ms Mean recognition time: 556.8 ms
Mean recognition time: 556.4 ms Mean recognition time: 570.0 ms Mean recognition time: 548.9 ms
responses totalling around 120 responses to each image.
Mean recognition time: 572.7 ms Mean recognition time: 575.0 ms
Mean recognition time: 537.1 ms Mean recognition time: 566.0 ms Mean recognition time: 551.8 ms
V
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M eat category
Means based on 24 participants’ responses totalling around 120 responses to each image.
M ean recognition  tim e: 634.8 ms M ean recognition  time: 626.2 ms M ean recognition  tim e: 667.9 ms
M ean recognition  tim e: 617.2 ms M ean recogn ition  time: 686.4  ms M ean recogn ition  tim e: 617.4 ms
M ean recognition  time: 601.7 ms M ean recogn ition  time: 605.0  ms M ean recognition  time: 610.9 ms
M ean recognition  time: 691.5 ms M ean recogn ition  time: 604.5 ms M ean recognition  tim e: 666.1 m s
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Slaughter category
Means based on 24 participants’ responses totalling around 120 responses to each image.
M ean recognition  tim e: 669.3 m s M ean recogn ition  tim e: 624.5 ms M ean recognition  tim e: 649.6 ms
C redit VIVA! C redit VIVA! C redit VIVA!
M ean recognition  time: 666.7 ms M ean recogn ition  tim e: 674.8  ms M ean recognition  tim e: 815.8 m s
C redit VIVA!
M ean recognition  time: 691.3 m s M ean recogn ition  tim e: 624.3 m s M ean recognition  time: 653.2 ms
C redit VIVA! C redit CIWF
M ean recogn ition  time: 654.5 m s M ean recogn ition  tim e: 641.2  ms M ean recognition  tim e: 690.8 ms
C redit VIVA! C red it VIVA! C red it VIVA!
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Figure 16: Schematic descriptions and illustrations of the IAT 
Program 1: Set 1, followed by set 5, followed by set 3
Sequence 1_________________ 2_________________ 3_________________ 4_________________5_________________6_________________ 7
Task Attribute First target First First reversed First reversed S econ d  target S econ d
description discrimination discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L animal (a) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d
instructions R bad R m ea t (m) L animal (a) R anim al (a) L m eat (m) R m eat (m) L slaughter (s)
R bad R bad R bad
R m ea t (m) R animal (a) R m ea t (m)
Sample L lucky L pig (a) L pig (a) R c o w  (a) L p eace R lam b (m) L c o w  (s)
stimuli L honou r R chicken (m) L pleasure L pork (m) L chicken (m) L chicken (s) L freedom
R poison L lam b (a) L lam b (a) R pig (a) R filth R pork (m) L chicken (s)
R grief R b ee f (m) R evil R lam b (a) R c o w  (a) R chicken (m) R stink
L gift L c o w  (a) R chicken (m) L b eef (m) R accident R b eef (m) R lam b (m)
R disaster L chicken (a) L miracle R chicken (a) L pork(m ) L c o w  (s) R ab use
L happy R pork (m) R b e e f(m ) L chicken (m) L rainbow L pig (s) R pork (m)
R hatred R lam b (m) R b om b L lam b (m) R lam b (a) L lam b (s) L health
I
8 9 10 11 12 13
S econ d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se
L m eat (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L animal (a) L g o o d
R slaughter (s) L m ea t (m) R anim al (a) L slaughter (s) R slaughter (s) L anim al (a)
R bad R bad R bad
R slaughter (s) R animal (a) R slaughter (s)
R pig (s) L sunrise R lam b (a) L c o w (s ) R lam b (s) L c o w  (a)
L b ee f (m) L b ee f (m) L chicken (s) L freedom L chicken (a) L freedom
R chicken (s) R crash R pig (a) L chicken (s) R pig (s) L chicken (a)
L pork (m ) R p ig(s) R chicken (a) R stink R chicken (s) R stink
L lam b (m) R poverty R c o w  (a) R lam b (a) R co w (s ) R lam b (s)
L chicken (m) R lam b (s) LL c o w (s ) R ab use L c o w  (a) R ab use
R c o w  (s) L laughter L pig (s) R pig (a) L pig (a) R pig (s)
R lam b (s) L chicken (m) L lam b (s) L health L lam b (a) L health
(m ) =  m eat; (a) =  anim al; (s) =  s laugh ter
Appendix G Schematic descriptions and illustrations o f the IAT
Program 2: Set 4, followed by set 2, followed by set 6 
Sequence 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Task Attribute First target First First reversed First reversed S econ d  target S econ d
description discrimination discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right responsei Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d
instructions R bad R anim al (a) L m eat (m) 
R bad  
R animal (a)
R m ea t (m) L animal (a) 
R bad  
R m eat (m)
R slaughter (s) L m ea t (m )
R bad
R slaughter (s)
Sample L lucky L pork (m) L pork (m) R b ee f (m) L p eace R lam b (s) L b eef (m)
stimuli L honou r R chicken (a) L pleasure L pig (a) L chicken (a) L chicken (m) L freedom
R poison L lam b (m) L lam b (m) R pork (m) R filth R pig (s) L chicken (m)
R grief R c o w  (a) R evil R lam b (m) R b eef (m) R chicken (s) R stink
L gift L b eef (m) R chicken (a) L c o w  (a) R accident R c o w  (s) R lam b (s)
R disaster L chicken (m) L m irade R chicken (m) L pig (a) L b eef (m) R ab u se
L happy R pig (a) R c o w  (a) L chicken (a) L rainbow L pork (m) R pig (s)
R hatred R lam b (a) R b om b L lam b (a) R lam b (m) L lam b (m) L health
I
8 9 10 11 12 13
S econ d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se
L slaughter (s) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d
R m ea t (m) L slaughter (s) R slaughter (s) L anim al (a) R anim al (a) L slaughter (s)
R bad R bad R bad
R m ea t (m) R slaughter (s) R animal (a)
R pork (m) L sunrise R lam b (s) L c o w  (a) R lam b (a) L c o w  (s)
L c o w  (s) L c o w  (s) L chicken (a) L freedom L chicken (s) L freedom
R chicken (m) R crash R pig (s) L chicken (a) R pig (a) L chicken (s)
L pig (s) R pork (m) R chicken (s) R stink R chicken (a) R stink
L lam b (s) R poverty R c o w  (s) R lam b (s) R c o w  (a) R lam b (a)
L chicken (s) R lam b (m) L c o w  (a) R ab use L c o w (s ) R ab u se
R b ee f (m) L laughter L pig (a) R pig (s) L pig (s) R pig (a)
R lam b (m) L chicken (s) L lam b (a) L health L Ur ; L health
(m ) =  m eat; (a) =  anim al; (s) =  slaugh ter
Appendix G Schematic descriptions and illustrations o f the IAT
Program 3: Set 5, followed by set 3, followed by set 4 
Sequence 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Task Attribute First target First First reversed First reversed S econ d  target S econ d
description discrimination discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right responsei Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d
instructions R bad R m ea t (m) L d augh ter (s) 
R bad  
R m eat (m)
R slaughter (s) L m eat (m)
R bad
R slaughter (s)
R anim al (a) L slaughter (s) 
R bad  
R anim al (a)
Sample L lucky L pig (s) L pig (s) R c o w  (s) L p eace R lam b (a) L c o w  (s)
stimuli L honou r R chicken (m) L pleasure L pork (m) L chicken (m) L chicken (s) L freedom
R poison L lam b (s) L lam b (s) R pig (s) R filth R pig (a) L chicken (s)
R grief R b eef (m) R evil R lam b (s) R c o w  (s) R chicken (a) R stink
L gift L c o w  (s) R chicken (m) L b ee f (m) R accident R c o w  (a) R lam b (a)
R disaster L chicken (s) L miracle R chicken (s) L pork (m) L c o w  (s) R ab u se
L happy R pork (m) R b ee f(m ) L chicken (m) L rainbow L pig (s) R pig (a)
R hatred R lam b (m) R b om b L lam b (m) R lam b (s) L lam b (s) L health
t
8 9 10 11 12 13
S econ d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se
L anim al (a) L g o o d L m ea t (m ) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d
R slaughter (s) L anim al (a) R anim al (a) L m e a t(m ) R m eat (m) L anim al (a)
R bad R bad R bad
R slaughter (s) R anim al (a) R m ea t (m)
R pig (s) L sunrise R lam b (a) L b ee f (m) R lam b (m) L c o w  (a)
L c o w  (a) L c o w  (a) L chicken (m) L freed om L chicken (a) L freed om
R chicken (s) R crash R pig (a) L chicken (m) R pork (m) L chicken (a)
L pig (a) R pig (s) R chicken (a) R stink R chicken (m) R stink
L lam b (a) R poverty R c o w  (a) R lam b (a) R b ee f (m) R lam b (m)
L chicken (a) R lam b (s) L b e e f  (m) R ab u se L c o w  (a) R ab u se
R c o w  (s) L laughter L pork (m) R pig (a) L pig (a) R pork (m )
R lam b (s) L chicken (a) L lam b (m) L health L lam b (a) L health
(m) = meat; (a) = animal; (s) = slaughter
Appendix G Schematic descriptions and illustrations o f the IAT
Program 4: Set 2, followed by set 6, followed by set 1
Sequence 1______________ 2______________ 3______________ 4______________ 5______________ 6______________ 7
Task Attribute First target First First reversed First reversed Secon d  target S econ d
description discrimination discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d
instructions R bad R slaughter (s) L m ea t (m) R m eat (m) L slaughter (s) R slaughter (s) L anim al (a)
R bad R bad R bad
R slaughter (s) R m eat (m) R slaughter (s)
Sample L lucky L pork (m) L pork (m) R b ee f (m) L p eace R lam b (s) L c o w  (a)
stimuli L h onou r R chicken (s) L pleasure L pig (s) L chicken (s) L chicken (a) L freedom
R poison L lam b (m) L lam b (m) R pork (m) R filth R pig (s) L chicken (a)
R grief R c o w  (s) R evil R lam b (m) R b ee f(m ) R chicken (s) R stink
L gift L b e e f  (m) R chicken (s) L c o w  (s) R a ca d en t R c o w  (s) R lam b (s)
R disaster L chicken (m) L m irade R chicken (m) L pig (s) L c o w  (a) R ab u se
L happy R p ig (s) R c o w  (s) L chicken (s) L rainbow L pig (a) R pig (s)
R hatred R lam b (s) R b om b L lam b (s) R lam b (m) L lam b (a) L health
8 9 10 11 12 13
S econ d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se
L slaughter (s) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d
R anim al (a) L slaughter (s) R m ea t (m) L animal (a) R animal (a) L m eat (m)
R bad R bad R bad
R anim al (a) R m eat (m) R animal (a)
R pig (a) L sunrise R lam b (m) L c o w  (a) R lam b (a) L b ee f (m)
L c o w (s ) L c o w  (s) L chicken (a) L freedom L chicken (m) L freedom
R chicken (a) R crash R pork (m) L chicken (a) R pig (a) L chicken (m)
L pig (s) R pig (a) R chicken (m) R stink R chicken (a) R stink
L lam b (s) R poverty R b ee f(m ) R lam b (m) R c o w  (a) R lam b (a)
L chicken (s) R lam b (a) L c o w  (a) R ab use L b eef(m ) R ab u se
R c o w  (a) L laughter L pig (a) R pork (m) L pork (m) R pig (a)
R lam b (a) L chicken (s) L lam b (a) L health L lam b (m) L health
(m) = meat; (a) = animal; (s) = slaughter
Appendix G Schematic descriptions and illustrations o f the IAT
Program 5: Set 3, followed by set 4, followed by set 2
Sequence 1______________ 2______________ 3______________ 4______________ 5______________6______________ 7
Task Attribute First target First First reversed First reversed S econ d  target S econ d
description discrimination discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L animal (a) L g o o d L m ea t (m) L g o o d
instructions R bad R anim al (a) L slaughter (s) R slaughter (s) L anim al (a) R anim al (a) L m ea t (m)
R bad R bad R bad
R anim al (a) R slaughter (s) R anim al (a)
Sample L lucky L pig (s) L pig (s) R c o w  (s) L p eace R lam b (a) L b ee f (m)
stimuli L honou r R chicken (a) L pleasure L pig (a) L chicken (a) L chicken (m) L freedom
R poison L lam b (s) L lam b (s) R pig (s) R filth R pig (a) L chicken (m)
R grief R c o w  (a) R evil R lam b (s) R c o w (s ) R chicken (a) R stink
L gift L c o w  (s) R chicken (a) L c o w  (a) R a ca d en t R c o w  (a) R lam b (a)
R disaster L chicken (s) L m irade R chicken (s) L pig (a) L b ee f (m) R ab u se
L happy R pig (a) R c o w  (a) L chicken (a) L rainbow L pork (m) R pig (a)
R hatred R lam b (a) R b om b L lam b (a) R lam b (s) L lam b (m) L health
I
8 9 10 11 12 13
S econ d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right response
L anim al (a) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d
R m ea t (m) L anim al (a) R slaughter (s) L m eat (m) R m eat (m) L slaughter (s)
R bad R bad R bad
R m ea t (m) R slaughter (s) R m eat (m)
R pork (m) L sunrise R lam b (s) L b eef (m) R lam b (m) L c o w  (s)
L c o w  (a) L c o w  (a) L chicken (m) L freedom L chicken (s) L freedom
R chicken (m) R crash R pig (s) L chicken (m) R pork (m) L chicken (s)
L pig (a) R pork (m) R chicken (s) R stink R chicken (m) R stink
L lam b (a) R poverty R c o w  (s) R lam b (s) R b eef (m) R lam b (m)
L chicken (a) R lam b (m) L b eef (m) R ab use L c o w  (s) R ab u se
R b e e f(m ) L laughter L pork (m) R pig (s) L pig (s) R pork (m )
R lam b (m) L chicken (a) L lam b (m) L health L lam b (s) L health
(m) = meat; (a) = animal; (s) = slaughter
Appendix G Schematic descriptions and illustrations o f the IAT
Program 6: Set 6, followed by set 1, followed by set 5
Sequence
Task
description
Attribute 
discrimination  
Left/Right resp on se
First target 
discrimination 
Left/Right resp on se
First
com b in ed  task  
Left/Right resp on se
First reversed  
target discrimination 
Left/Right response
First reversed  
com b in ed  task  
Left/Right response
S econ d  target 
discrimination  
Left/Right resp on se
S econ d  
com b in ed  task  
Left/Right resp on se
Task L g o o d L animal (a) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L anim al (a) L g o o d
instructions R bad R slaughter (s) L anim al (a) R animal (a) L daugh ter (s) R m ea t (m) L anim al (a)
R
R
bad
slaughter (s)
R
R
bad
animal (a)
R
R
bad
m eat (m)
Sample L lucky L pig (a) L pig (a) R c o w  (a\ L p eace R lam b (m) L c o w  (a)
stimuli L honou r R chicken (s) L pleasure L pig (s) L chicken (s) L chicken (a) L freedom
R poison L lam b (a) L lam b (a) R pig (a) R filth R pork (m) L chicken (a)
R grief R c o w  (s) R evil R lam b (a) R c o w  (a) R chicken (m) R stink
L gift L c o w  (a) R chicken (s) L c o w  (s) R aca d en t R b ee f (m) R lam b (m)
R disaster L chicken (a) L m irade R chicken (a) L pig (s) L c o w  (a) R ab u se
L happy R pig (s) R c o w  (s) L chicken (s) L rainbow L pig (a) R pork (m)
R hatred R lam b (s) R b om b L lam b (s) R lam b (a) L lam b (a) L health
r
8 9 10 11 12 13
Secon d  reversed S econ d  reversed Third target Third Third reversed Third reversed
target discrimination com b in ed  task discrimination com b in ed  task target discrimination com b in ed  task
Left/Right response Left/Right resp on se Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right response Left/Right response
L m ea t (m) L g o o d L slaughter (s) L g o o d L m eat (m) L g o o d
R anim al (a) L m ea t (m) R m ea t (m) L slaughter (s) R slaughter (s) L m eat (m)
R bad R bad R bad
R anim al (a) R m eat (m) R slaughter (s)
R pig (a) L sunrise R lam b (m) L c o w  (s) R lamb (s) L b eef (m)
L b eef (m) L b ee f (m) L chicken (s) L freedom L chicken (m) L freedom
R chicken (a) R crash R pork (m) L chicken (s) R pig (s) L chicken (m)
L pork (m) R pig (a) R chicken (m) R stink R chicken (s) R stink
L lam b (m) R poverty R b ee f (m) R lam b (m) R c o w (s ) R lam b (s)
L chicken (m) R lam b (a) L c o w  (s) R ab u se L b eef (m) R ab use
R c o w  (a) L laughter L pig (s) R pork (m) I  pork (m) R pig (s)
R lam b (a) L chicken (m) L lam b (s) L health L lam b (m) L health
(m) = meat; (a) = animal; (s) = slaughter 
Based on Grcenwald et. al. 1998, p. 1465
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A P P E N D IX  H
Quantitative results tables
Table 8: H ow  farm animals are evaluated: correlations
Bodies Biodiversity Money Appearance Rarity Affection Status Sentience Abilities Intelligence Souls
Meat
consumption
Animal
overalh
Meat
overalh
Slaughter
overalh
M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie M-eater Veggie
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.21T 
.095 _ 
1
.101
.730
436' .779'
000 .001
.213
.092
-.101
.731
.286
.321
-.351
.219
1
.305*
.014
.472’
.000
.511'
.000
.579*
.000
1
.300
.298
.170 -.617*
178 .019
.193
.127
.025
933
.131
.303
-.433
.122
.186 -.417
.141 .138
.454’ 396
.000 It
.21 -.409
096 .146
.430’ .358
.000
.276* 392
.027 I
.496' .597*
.000 .024
.218 -.138
.083 .638
.714' .795’
.000 .001
1 1
.159 -.464
.210 .095
.414’
.001 I 
124 -.446
_328_ _ .110 
.472’
.000
.421* .378
.001 132
.593' .615*
.000 .019
.279* -.145 
.025 62 2
.862’ .796’
.000 .001 
.785* .995’
.000 .000 
1 1
.138 -.231
.277 .427
.385* 373
.002 .188 
.143 -.367
_258_ _ __197_ 
.492’ 427
.000 .128 
.363’ 329
.003
.608' .400
.000
.370'
.003
.739’ .836*
.000  .000 
.565’ .858*
.000 .000 
.711’ .854*
.000 .000 
1 1
.379*
.002
.129 -.151
.309 607
.261* .764’ 
.037 .001
.337*
.006 .486
.434* 486
.000 078
.295* 138
.018___ .639
.373’ 186
.002
.220 -.373
.081 .189
.311* .713’
.013 .004
.363* 513
.003___ 061_
.294* .518
.018
.266* .607
.034 .021
.111 na
.382 _ _na_
1 I
.096 .512
.451 .061
-.167 .053
.187 857
.01 .201
.936 .491
-.273*
.029
-.142 .041
.263 889
-.288* -.167 
.021 569
-.067 -.171
.597 .558
-.524*
.000
-.408* .005
.001
-.535’ .007
.000
-.370’ -011  
.003
.089 na
.487 na
-.043 .189
736 .518
1 1
1 .659*
.087 .010
-.297* -0 9 5  
.017 747
0 7 1 .568*
.579 .034
- 1 0 4  -.046
.414 .876
-.086 .328
.499 .253
Biodiversity Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
2 1 1
.095
.101
.730
517’
000
.247
394
.449’
.000
.409
.146
.481’
.000
.027
.926
.222
.078
.094
.750
.468’
.000
.420
.135
.015
.907
Money Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.436’ .779*
.000 .001
.517*
.000
.247
.394
.354*
.004
.466
.093
224 -.641’
.075 .013
.448’
.000
.329
.250
.369
.195
.224
.076
Appearance Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.213 -.101
.092 .731
.449’
.000
.286
.321
354’
004
.351
.219
-.005
988
I
.697’ .603’
.000 .022
.411’
.001
.125
.670
.502’
.000
.462
.097
.250*
.046
Rarity Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.305*
.014
.300
.298
.472’
.000
.409
.146
511’
000
.466
.093
.579’
.000
-.005 .625’ 068
.000
1 1
.551’ 279
.000 334
.448'
.000
.262
.365
.19
.132
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
1 0 -.617’
.178 .019
.481’
.000
.027
.926
224 -.641’
.013
.697’
.000
.603’
.022
.625’
.000
.068
.817
.528’ 295
.000 306
.558'
.000
,445
.111
.183
.147
-.260*
.038
-.138  
.277 _
-.395*
.001 
-.264*
.035 
-.439*
.000 
-.310*
.013 
.146 na
.250 na
.095 -.273
_456___34_5_ 
.615’
.000 
1 1
389
169
003
993
210
471
145
621
222
445
108
712
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.193
.127
.025
.933
.222
.078
.094
.750
448’
000
.329
.250
.411*
.001
.125
.670
.551’
.000
.279
.334
.528’
.000
.295
.306
237
.060
.264
.363
I
.141
.265
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.131 -.433
.303 .122
.468*
.000
.4 2 0
.135
.186
.142
-.369
.195
.502’
.000
.462
.097
.448’
.000
.262
.365
.558’
.000
.445
.111
.237 -.264
.060 .363
-.072
.57
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.186 -4 1 7
.141 138
.454’
.000
.396
.161
.21
.096
-.409
.146
.430*
.000
.358
.209
.276*
.027
.392
.165
.496’ .597*
.000 .024
.218 -.138
.083 ,638
.7 1 4 '
.000
.795*
.001
.015
.904
Intelligence Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.159 -.464
.210 .095
.414’
.001
.377
183
124
.328
■446
.110
.472’
.000
.346
.226
.421*
.001
378
.182
.593* .615’
.000 .019
.279*
.025
-1 4 5
.622
.862’
.000
.796’
.001
.785’ .995*
.000 .000 
.565’ .858’
.000 .000
.015 na 
.904 na 
.363'
.003
-.408’ 005
.001 986
-.264* 145
■037
.774
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.138
.277
-.231
.427
.385’
.002
.373
188
143
.2 5 8
•367
.197
.492'
.000
.427
.128
.363*
.003
32 9
.250
.608* .400
.000
.370' 4 1
.003 138
.739’
.000
.836’
.000
.711* .854’
.000 .000
-.037 na 
.774 na 
.294* I 
.018 058
-.535* .007
.000 
-.439’
.000 .445
"64"" 7 4 "
.101
.425
1Meatconsumption
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.379’
.002
.015
.907
.224
.076
.250*
.046
.190
.132
.183
.147
141
.265
-.072
.570
.101
.425
Animal overalh Pearson
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.129
3 0 9
-.151
.607
.261*
.037
.764’
.001
.337*
.006
-.203
.486
.434'
.000
.486
.078
.295*
.018
138
.639
.373* .186
.002
.220
.081
-.373
.189
.311*
.013
.7 1 3 ’
.004
.266*
.034
.6 0 7 '
.021
.111
.382
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.960
.451
.512
.061
-.167
.187
.053
.857
.010
.936
.201
.491
-.273*
.0 2 9
.073
.805
-.142
.263
.041
.889
-.288*
.021 .569
-.067
.597
•171
.558
-.5 2 4 ’
.000
-.074
.803
-.370’ 011
.003  .970
.089
.487
-.043
.736
.189
.518
Slaughter
overall!
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.216
.087
.659’
.010
-.297*
.017
-.095
747
.071
.579
.568’
.034
•1 0 4
4 1 4
-.046
.8 7 6
- 0 8 6
.499
.328
.2 5 3
-.260*
.038 .169
■138
.2 7 7
.003
.993
.395*
.001
.210  
.471 
~1~4 '
.035 
6 4 '"
621 
" 74 ~
-.310*
.013
' 6 4 "
-.108
.712 .250
’ 6 4 "
.456
6 4 "
.345
' 7 4 '
.615’
.000
' 64"
.086  
.770  
' '{4  'N 64 14
Correlation is significant at the 0 
Correlation is significant at the 0
64  
01 level 
05 level
74 i 64  
(2-tailed test 
(2-tailed test
74 I 64  
to measure 
to measure
74 , 64
correlations 
correlations
74
in both 
in both
6 4  74 ,
positive and 
positive and
64 74 , 64
negative directions) 
negative directions)
64 74
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Table 9: Why meat-eaters eat meat: correlations
Taste Natural
Look/
smell Habit Value
Didn't
occur Organic Celebration
No
alternative
Butcher/
farmer Religious Others Mistake
Meat
consumption
Animal
overall
Meat
overall
Slaughter
overall
Taste Pearson Correlation .487* .451* .071 0 4 0 -.0 2 8 -.026 -.001 -.329’ - 108 -.087 -.159 -.1 4 0 .273* .168 .173 087
Sig. (2-taiied) .000 .000 .580 .754 .825 .836 .993 .008 .394 .495 .211 .270 .029 .186 .171 .496
Natural Pearson Correlation •487t 1 .461’ .112 .146 .209 .077 -.013 -.292* -.0 4 4 -.063 .048 -.2 2 9 .100 .094 .166 .042
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .378 .249 .098 545 .920 .019 .729 .621 .709 .069 .431 .461 .190 .7 3 9
Look/smell Pearson Correlation .451* .461* l .034 148 .337’ -.046 .008 - 103 -.093 -.1 3 9 -.063 -.1 9 4 .295* -.028 .146 -.023
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .787 .244 .006 .721 .951 4 1 8 .464 .274 .620 .125 .018 .827 .250 .855
Habit Pearson Correlation .071 .112 .034 1 .219 .378’ .074 -.266* .006 .1 6 4 -.021 -.2 2 2 -.264* .203 -.107 .407* .226
Sig. (2-tailed) .580 .378 .787 0 8 2 .002 .564 .033 .966 .196 .869 .0 7 7 .035 .108 .401 .001 .072
Value Pearson Correlation .040 .146 .148 .219 1 .091 .051 .021 ,061 .224 .073 .040 -.129 137 -.009 128 .017
Sig. (2-tailed) .7 5 4 .249 .244 .082 .474 .689 .872 .632 .075 .566 .753 .311 .279 .943 .312 .392
Didn't occur Pearson Correlation -.0 2 8 .209 .337’ .378’ .091 1 .019 -.174 - 120 .029 .022 -.037 -.2 0 8 .053 -.074 .192 .066
Sig. (2-tailed) .825 .098 .006 .002 .4 7 4 .883 .168 .344 .823 .861 .773 .099 .677 .560 .129 .606
Organic Pearson Correlation -.026 .077 - 046 .074 .051 .019 1 -.042 .119 .483’ .427* .158 .296* .067 .174 .133 .179
Sig. (2-tailed) .8 3 6 .545 .721 564 .6 8 9 883 .742 .348 .000 .000 .211 .018 60 0 .170 .295 .157
Celebration Pearson Correlation -.001 -.013 .008 -.266* .021 -.1 7 4 -.042 1 .346’ .302* .236 .473’ .485* -.043 .240 -.269* -.1 9 0
Sig. (2-tailed) .993 .920 951 .033 872 .168 .742 .005 .015 .060 .000 .000 .7 3 6 .056 .032 .133
No alternative Pearson Correlation -.329t -.292* -.103 .006 .061 -.1 2 0 .119 .346’ 1 .240 .276* .243 .397’ -.073 -.016 -.097 .019
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .019 .418 .966 .632 .344 .348 .005 .056 .027 .053 .001 .5 6 8 .899 .448 .880
Butcher/farmer Pearson Correlation -.108 -.044 -.093 .164 .224 .029 .483* .302* .240 1 .407’ .342’ .440’ .211 .082 -.0 9 4 -.073
Sig. (2-tailed) .394 .729 .464 .196 .0 7 5 .823 .000 .015 .056 .001 .006 .000 .094 .522 .458 .565
Religious Pearson Correlation -.087 -.063 -.139 -.021 .073 02 2 .427’ 23 6 .276* .407* 1 .306* .578’ -.1 0 9 .077 -.0 1 8 .093
Sig. (2-tailed) .495 621 .274 .869 .566 .861 .000 .060 .027 .001 .014 .000 .390 .547 ,889 .466
Others Pearson Correlation -.1 5 9 .048 -0 6 3 -.222 0 4 0 -.037 .158 .473* .243 .342* .306* I .414’ -.041 -.022 -.1 3 9 .0 3 9
Sig. (2-tailed) .211 .7 0 9 .6 2 0 .077 .753 .773 .211 .000 .053 .006 .014 .001 .748 .863 ,275 .762
Mistake Pearson Correlation -.140 -.229 -.194 -.264* -.1 2 9 -.2 0 8 .296* .485’ .397* .440* .578* .414’ 1 .043 .027 -.2 1 9 -.0 7 8
Sig. (2-tailed) .270 .069 .125 .035 311 .099 .018 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .737 .831 .082 .539
Meat Pearson Correlation .273* .1 0 0 .295* .203 -137 .053 .067 -.043 -.0 7 3 •211 -.109 -.041 .043 1 .111 .089 .146
consumption Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .431 .018 .108 .279 .677 .600 .736 .568 .094 .390 .748 .737 .382 .487 .250
Animal overall Pearson Correlation .168 .0 9 4 -0 2 8 -.107 - 0 0 9 -.074 .174 .240 -.016 .082 .077 -.0 2 2 .027 .111 1 -.043 .095
Sig. (2-tailed) .186 .461 827 .401 943 .560 .1 7 0 .056 .899 .522 .547 .863 .831 .382 .736 .456
Meat overall Pearson Correlation .173 .166 .146 .407’ .128 .192 .133 -.269* -.097 -.0 9 4 -.018 -.139 -.2 1 9 .089 -.043 1 .615’
Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .190 .250 .001 31 2 .129 3 9 5 .032 .448 .458 .889 .275 .082 .4 8 7 .736 .000
Slaughter Pearson Correlation .087 042 -.023 .226 .017 .066 179 -.190 .019 -.073 .093 .039 -.0 7 8 .146 .095 .615’ I
overall Sig. (2-tailed) .496 .7 3 9 .855 .072 .892 .606 .157 .133 .880 .565 .466 .762 .539 .250 .456 .000
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 6 4 6 4 64 64 64
’ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test to measure correlations in both positive and negative directions)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test to measure correlations in both positive and negative directions)
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Table 10: Why vegetarians avoid meat: correlations
Ethical Environmental
Dislike
appearance Health
Dislike
smell
Dislike
taste Religious Expense Unavailable
Animal
overall
Meat
overall
Slaughter
overall
Ethical Pearson Correlation .656* .027 .623* -.106 .013 -.114 -.160 -.917*
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .928 .017 .860 .718 .440 .966 .699 .804 584 .000
Environmental Pearson Correlation .656* 1 -.348 .372 -.350 -.110 -.245 -.321 -.544* .286 -.040 -.625*
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .222 .190 .220 .709 .398 263 .044 .322 .891 .017
Dislike appearance Pearson Correlation .027 -.348 1 .023 .956* .590* .522 -.304 .016 -.081 -.300 -.116
Sig. (2-tailed) .928 .222 .939 .000 .026 .056 .291 .956 .782 .298 .694
Health Pearson Correlation .623* .372 .023 1 -.100 .042 -.055 .274 .103 -.139 -.222 -.602*
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .190 .939 .735 .886 .852 .343 .725 .636 .447 .023
Dislike smell Pearson Correlation -.052 -.350 .956* -.100 1 .634* .553* -.357 -.060 032 -.254 -.036
Sig. (2-tailed) .860 .220 .000 .735 .015 .040 .211 .839 .914 .381 .903
Dislike taste Pearson Correlation -.106 -.110 .590* .042 .634* 1 .354 -.081 -.163 -.127 .028 .134
Sig. (2-tailed) .718 .709 .026 .886 .015 .215 .783 .577 .666 .925 .648
Religious Pearson Correlation .225 -.245 .522 -.055 .553* .354 1 .244 .423 .319 .106 -.317
Sig. (2-tailed) .440 .398 .056 .852 .040 .215 .400 .132 .267 .717 .269
Expense Pearson Correlation .013 -.321 -.304 .274 -.357 -.081 .244 1 .821f -.194 .055 .126
Sig. (2-tailed) .966 .263 .291 .343 .211 .783 .400 .000 .507 .853 .667
Unavailable Pearson Correlation -.114 -.544* .016 .103 -.060 -.163 .423 .821+ 1 -.151 .008 .118
Sig. (2-tailed) .699 .044 .956 .725 .839 .577 .132 .000 .605 .978 .687
Animal overall Pearson Correlation .073 .286 -.081 -.139 .032 -.127 .319 -.194 -.151 1 .189 -.273
Sig. (2-tailed) .804 .322 .782 .636 .914 .666 .267 .507 .605 .518 .345
Meat overall Pearson Correlation -.160 -.040 -.300 -.222 -.254 .028 .106 .055 .008 .189 1 .086
Sig. (2-tailed) .584 .891 .298 .447 .381 .925 .717 853 .978 .518 .770
Slaughter overall Pearson Correlation -.917f -.625* -.116 -.602* -.036 .134 -.317 .126 .118 -.273 .086 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .017 .694 .023 .903 648 .269 .667 .687 .345 .770
N 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
1 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test to  measure correlations in both positive and negative directions)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test to  measure correlations in both positive and negative directions)
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Table 11: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and
evaluating farm animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(C o n sta n t) 6 .7 3 4 1 .0 7 0 6 .2 9 5 .0 0 0
Bodies .215 .114 .235 1.891 .064
B iod iversity -.370 .157 -.365 -2 .348 .023
Money .131 .164 .135 .798 .428
Appearance .152 .182 .136 .833 .409
Rarity .194 .172 .201 1.129 .264
Affection -.056 .257 -.044 -.217 .829
Status -.257 .190 -.210 -1.355 .181
Sentience -.137 .233 -.145 -.586 .560
Abilities .292 .202 .277 1.445 .154
In te lligen ce -.590 .273 -.567 -2 .157 .036
Souls .097 .183 .096 .529 .599
Dependent Variable: Overall slaughter value 1 
R2 = .38
Table 12: Relationship between meat-eaters’ range of meat consumption and evaluating
farm animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
Coefficients
Beta t Sig.
(C o n sta n t) 2 .2 2 5 .5 8 7 3 .7 8 8 .000
B odies .145 .062 .310 2.323 .024
Biodiversity -.109 .086 -.211 -1.266 .211
Money .067 .090 .135 .743 .461
Appearance .121 .100 .213 1.213 .231
Rarity .045 .095 .091 .476 .636
Affection .105 .141 .161 .742 .462
Status -.091 .104 -.145 -.870 .388
Sentience -.188 .128 -.389 -1.469 .148
Abilities .052 .111 .097 .471 .640
Intelligence -.077 .150 -.145 -.513 .610
Souls .141 .101 .274 1.399 .168
Dependent Variable: meat consumption 
R2 = .29
Table 13: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes towards meat-eating and farm
animals’ component evaluations: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(C o n sta n t) 9 .3 5 3 .931 1 0 .0 4 8 .0 0 0
Personal .003 .185 .002 .015 .988
Consumption & Global .214 .148 .186 1.446 .153
Intrinsic -.606 .138 -.583 -4 .400 .000
Dependent Variable: Overall meat valuel
R2 = .30
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Table 14: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and farm
animals’ component evaluations: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(C o n sta n t)  6 .8 5 6 1 .0 9 1 6 .2 8 4 .0 0 0
Personal -.004 .217 -.003 -.020 .984
Consumption & Global .213 .174 .170 1.225 .225
Intrinsic -.513 .161 -.454 -3 .180 .002
Dependent Variable: Overall slaughter valuel
R- =  .18
Table 15: Relationship between vegetarians’ attitudes towards animals and 
animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t
evaluating farm 
Sig.
(C o n sta n t) - 2 .0 1 4 .9 5 3 - 2 .1 1 4 .1 6 9
Bodies .137 .116 .189 1.175 .361
Biodiversity .863 .084 .736 10.265 .009
Money .017 .147 .022 .117 .918
Appearance .414 .237 .208 1.746 .223
Rarity -.031 .086 -.035 -.357 .755
Affection .285 .162 .259 1.759 .221
S tatu s -.518 .103 -.606 -5.021 .037
Sentience .513 .132 .533 3.875 .061
Abilities -1.468 .453 -2.013 -3.242 .083
Intelligence 1.485 .477 2.064 3.112 .090
Souls -.436 .131 -.529 -3.314 .080
Dependent Variable: Overall animal valuel 
R- =  1
Table 16: Relationship between vegetarians’ attitudes towards meat-eating and evaluating
farm animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
Coefficients
Beta t Sig.
(C o n s ta n t) - 5 .0 3 4 1 .6 2 7 - 3 .0 9 4 .0 9 0
B od ies 1.691 .199 2 .2 3 4 8.501 .014
Biodiversity -.027 .144 -.022 -.189 .868
Money -.176 .250 -.212 -.703 .555
Appearance -.517 .405 -.248 -1.277 .330
Rarity -.674 .147 -.727 -4 .597 .044
Affection .540 .276 .468 1.953 .190
Status -.198 .176 -.221 -1.121 .379
Sentience .949 .226 .940 4.196 .052
A bilities -4 .713 .773 -6 .172 -6 .094 .026
In telligen ce 5 .872 .815 7 .792 7 .203 .019
Sou ls -1 .414 .224 -1.641 -6 .300 .024
Dependent Variable: Overall meat valuel
R2 = .99
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Table 17: Relationship between vegetarians’ attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and
evaluating farm animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 2.761 .941 2.934 .099
Bodies -.398 .115 -.597 -3.461 .074
Biodiversity -.614 .083 -.567 -7.391 .018
Money .566 .145 .773 3.909 .060
Appearance 1.392 .234 .756 5.940 .027
Rarity .454 .085 .555 5.351 .033
Affection -.344 .160 -.339 -2.154 .164
Status -.488 .102 -.618 -4.786 .041
Sentience -.426 .131 -.479 -3.255 .083
Abilities 5.051 .447 7.501 11.289 .008
Intelligence -4.656 .472 -7.007 -9.873 .010
Souls -.329 .130 -.433 -2.533 .127
Dependent Variable: Overall slaughter valuel 
R 2 =  1
Table 18: Relationship between vegetarians’ attitudes towards animals and farm animals’
component evaluations: regression analysis
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 4.732 2.984 1.586 .144
Personal -.217 .383 -.141 -.568 .583
Consumption & Global .172 .280 .149 .615 .553
Intrinsic .552 .209 .656 2.643 .025
Dependent Variable: Overall animal valuel 
R2 = .42
Table 19: Why meat-eaters eat meat: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 2.638 2.381 1.108 .273
Taste .151 .243 .101 .621 .537
Natural -.009 .184 -.008 -.048 .962
Look/smell .074 .165 .073 .451 .654
H abit .398 .156 .390 2.554 .014
Value .063 .123 .068 .509 .613
Didn't occur -.002 .111 -.003 -.021 .983
Organic .177 .134 .203 1.316 .194
Celebration -.097 .144 -.111 -.674 .504
No alternative -.007 .123 -.009 -.058 .954
Butcher/farmer -.249 .170 -.247 -1.464 .149
Religious .036 .139 .042 .255 .799
Others .068 .142 .073 .481 .632
Mistake ^ .238 -.030 -.158 .875
Dependent Variable: Meat overall 1
R2 = .27
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Table 20: Why meat-eaters eat meat: factor analysed regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(C o n s ta n t) 4 .4 8 3 1 .9 3 1 2 .3 2 1 .0 2 4
Principled .058 .172 .045 .336 .738
Senses & Natural .161 .186 .108 .864 .391
N orm alised .352 .157 .280 2 .243 .029
External pressure -.212 .157 -.183 -1.348 .183
Dependent Variable: Meat overall 
R2 = .15
Table 21: Relationship between attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and 
regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t
avoiding meat: 
Sig.
(C o n s ta n t) 5 .8 4 4 1 .6 5 0 3 .5 4 1 .0 2 4
Ethical -.399 .150 -.549 -2.657 .057
Environmental .040 .192 .045 .206 .847
Dislike appearance -.008 .224 -.012 -.035 .973
H ealth -.291 .086 -.445 -3 .404 .027
Dislike smell .294 .215 .447 1.365 .244
Dislike taste .032 .131 .046 .242 .820
R elig iou s -.298 .082 -.556 -3 .632 .022
Expense .871 .379 .736 2.300 .083
Unavailable -.278 .343 -.208 -.810 .463
Dependent Variable: Slaughter overall 
R2 =  .98
Table 22: Relationship between attitudes towards animals’ slaughter and factor analysed
reasons for avoiding meat: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(C o n s ta n t) 9 .9 4 8 1 .4 9 6 6 .6 5 0 .0 0 0
Religious & Dislike -.155 .113 -.207 -1.369 .201
Meatless Meat-eater .073 .198 .055 .366 .722
Principled 8i H ealth -.770 .134 -.870 -5 .746 .000
a Dependent Variable: Slaughter overall
R2 =  .77
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Table 23: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and experience of dissonance:
regression analysis
U nstandardized Standardized
C oefficients C oefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 5.716 1.946 2.937 .005
Animal overall .152 .188 .090 .806 .423
Meat overall -.122 .159 -.108 -.767 .446
S la u g h ter  overall -.486 .147 -.466 -3 .299 .002
Meat consumption 266 .227 .131 1.172 .246
Dependent Variable: Dissonance2 
R2 = .29
Table 24: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and increase in dissonance:
regression analysis
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) -.482 1.765 -.273 .786
Animal overall .174 .171 .128 1.017 .313
Meat overall .217 .144 .238 1.506 .137
S la u g h ter  overa ll -.322 .134 -.384 -2 .414 .019
Meat consumption .153 .206 .094 .746 .459
Dependent Variable: Dissonance increase 
R2 = .10
Table 25: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and evaluating animals for intrinsic
reasons: regression analysis
Unstandardized  
Coefficients  
B Std. Error
Standardized
C oefficients
Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 4.018 1.791 2.243 .029
A nim al overa lU .503 .151 .351 3.342 .001
M eat overa lU -.404 .133 -.420 -3.041 .004
Slaughter overalU -.158 .128 -.179 -1.237 .221
Meat consumption .011 .185 .006 .059 .953
Dissonance2 .011 .103 .013 .108 .914
Normalised .125 .134 .104 .931 .356
Dependent Variable: Intrinsic 
R2 = .40
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Table 26: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and overall attitudes towards animals’
slaughter: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
C oefficients C oefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 1.803 1.893 .953 .345
Animal overall 1 .267 .164 .165 1.624 .110
M eat overa lU .471 .132 .434 3 .564 .001
Intrinsic -.165 .133 -.146 -1.237 .221
Normalised -.097 .138 -.071 -.707 .482
D isson an ce2 -.312 .097 -.325 -3 .208 .002
Meat consumption .239 .186 .122 1.283 .205
Dependent Variable: Slaughter overall 
R2 = .51
Table 27: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and overall attitudes towards eating 
meat: regression analysis
U nstandardized Standardized  
C oefficients C oefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 4.764 1.608 2.962 .004
Animal overalU .088 .152 .059 .582 .563
Intrinsic -.345 .114 -.332 -3.041 .004
N orm alised .310 .118 .247 2 .617 .011
Dissonance2 -.046 .095 -.052 -.484 .631
Meat consumption -.034 .171 -.019 -.199 .843
S la u g h ter  overalU .387 .108 .420 3 .564 .001
Dependent Variable: Meat overall 
R2 = .53
Table 28: Relationship between meat-eaters’ attitudes and overall attitudes towards farm
animals: regression analysis
U nstandardized  
C oefficients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
C oefficients
Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 5.291 1.329 3.980 .000
Intrinsic .326 .097 .466 3.342 .001
Normalised -.100 .108 -.118 -.921 .361
Dissonance2 .053 .083 .090 .640 .525
Meat consumption .094 .148 .078 .632 .530
Slaughter overalU .166 .102 .268 1.624 .110
Meat overalU .067 .115 .100 .582 .563
Dependent Variable: Animal overall 
R2 = .21
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Table 29: Relationship between vegetarians’ attitudes and overall attitudes towards farm
animals: regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 5.838 2.113 2.763 .022
Intrinsic .503 .203 .597 2.481 .035
Dissonance2 -.157 .162 -.236 -.971 .357
Slaughter overalU -.227 .262 -.209 -.864 .410
Meat overall! .253 .232 1.090 .304
Dependent Variable: Animal overall 
R2 = .50
Table 30: Reliability statistics of meat-eaters’ Intrinsic component
Reliability S tatistics
C ronbach’s
Alpha N of Items
.915 4
Item-Total S tatistics
S cale  Mean if 
Item Deleted
S cale  V ariance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation
C ronbach 's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
Souls 15.8398 63.693 .728 .916
Sen tience 14.9062 56.120 .868 .867
Intelligence 15.5820 59.460 .890 .861
Abilities 14.9258 64.874 .747 .909
Table 31: Reliability statistics of meat-eaters’ Normalised component/Habit variable and
variance explained
Reliability S tatistics
C ronbach 's
Alpha N of Items
.456 3
Item-Total S tatistics
S cale  Mean if 
Item Deleted
S cale  V ariance if 
Item Deleted
C orrected Item- 
Total Correlation
C ronbach’s 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
Habit 13.08 23.406 .414 .163
Value 13.64 27.155 .173 .528
Didn't occur 13.97 18.475 .291 .358
Com m unalities
Initial Extraction
Habit 1.000 .668
Value 1.000 .263
Didn't occur 1.000 .549
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Communalities
Initial Extraction
Habit 1.000 .668
Value 1.000 .263
Didn't occur 1.000 .549
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Compo Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
nent Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 1.480 49.326 49.326 1.480 49.326 49.326
2 .922 30.729 80.055
3 .598 19.945 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 32: Reliability statistics of vegetarians' Intrinsic component
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha N of Items
.957 4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
Vsouls 22.5179 75.101 .888 .946
Vsentience 21.3036 84.079 .834 .965
V intelligence 22.6607 66.169 .945 .930
Vabilities 22.6607 66.775 .947 .928
Table 33: Reliability statistics of vegetarians' Principled & Health component/Ethical 
variable and variance explained
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha N of Items
.779 3
304
Appendix H Quantitative results tables
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
VEthical 15.86 23.824 .765 .526
VHealth 17.50 25.346 .559 .784
VEnvironmental 16.21 33.104 .562 .765
Component Matrix3
Component
1
VEthical .918
VHealth .786
VEnvironmental .806
Extraction Method: Principal 
Com ponent Analysis, 
a. 1 com ponents extracted.
Table 34: Relationship between meat-eaters’ dissonance and factor analysed components of
evaluating farm animals: regression analysis
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .343a .118 .073 2.913
a - Predictors: (Constant), Mintrinsic, MConsumption & 
Global, MPersonal
ANOV/P
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 67.804 3 22.601 2.664 .056a
Residual 509.057 60 8.484
Total 576.861 63
3. Predictors: (Constant), Mintrinsic, MConsumption & Global, MPersonal
b- Dependent Variable: MDissonance2
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Coefficient^
Model
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Siq.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 3.937 1.181 3.335 .001
MPersonal .090 .235 .063 .381 .705
MConsumption & Global -.310 .188 -.237 -1.646 .105
Mintrinsic .382 .175 .324 2.184 .033
a- Dependent Variable: MDissonance2
Table 35: Relationship between meat-eaters’ dissonance increase and overall attitudes
towards eating meat, farm animals and animals' slaughter, and 
meat consumption: regression analysis
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .318a .101 .040 2.38706
3- Predictors: (Constant), MMeat consumption, MMeat 
overalU, MAnimal overalU, MSIaughter overalU
ANOWtf*
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 37.807 4 9.452 1.659 .172a
Residual 336.186 59 5.698
Total 373.993 63
a - Predictors: (Constant), MMeat consumption, MMeat overalU, MAnimal overalU, 
MSIaughter overalU
b- Dependent Variable: m eatdissonanceincrease
Coefficients?
Model
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Siq.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -.482 1.765 -.273 .786
MAnimal overalU .174 .171 .128 1.017 .313
MMeat overalU .217 .144 .238 1.506 .137
MSIaughter overalU -.322 .134 -.384 -2.414 .019
MMeat consumption .153 .206 .094 .746 .459
a - Dependent Variable: meatdissonanceincrease
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Table 36: Relationship between meat-eaters’ reasons for evaluating animals and meat
consumption: regression analysis
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R S quare
Std. Error of 
the  Estim ate
1 .536a .287 .136 1.381
a - Predictors: (Constant), Mabilities, Mbodies, M status, 
Menvironment, M appearance, Msouls, Mmoney, 
Mrarity, M affection, M sentience, M intelligence
ANO V /£
Model
Sum  of 
S quares df Mean S quare F Sig.
1 R egression 39.883 11 3.626 1.902 .060a
Residual 99.117 52 1.906
Total 139.000 63
a - Predictors: (Constant), Mabilities, Mbodies, M status, Menvironment, M appearance, 
Msouls, Mmoney, Mrarity, M affection, M sentience, M intelligence
b- D ependent Variable: MMeat consum ption
Coefficients*1
Model
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Siq.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 2.225 .587 3.788 .000
M appearance .121 .100 .213 1.213 .231
M affection .105 .141 .161 .742 .462
Menvironment -.109 .086 -.211 -1.266 .211
Mmoney .067 .090 .135 .743 .461
Mrarity .045 .095 .091 .476 .636
Mstatus -.091 .104 -.145 -.870 .388
Mbodies .145 .062 .310 2.323 .024
Msouls .141 .101 .274 1.399 .168
Msentience -.188 .128 -.389 -1.469 .148
M intelligence -.077 .150 -.145 -.513 .610
Mabilities .052 .111 .097 .471 .640
a - D ependent Variable: MMeat consumption
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Table 37: Increase in cognitive dissonance during the study
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
M VDissonancel & 
M VDissonance2 78 .660 .000
Pair
2
M VDissonancel & 
M VDissonance3 78 .620 .000
Pair
3
M VDissonance2 & 
M VDissonance3 78 .959 .000
Pair
4
M D issonancel & 
M Dissonance2 64 .626 .000
Pair
5
M D issonancel & 
M Dissonance3 64 .586 .000
Pair
6
M Dissonance2 & 
M Dissonance3 64 .956 .000
Pair
7
V D issonancel & 
V D issonance2 14 .694 .006
Pair
8
V D issonancel & 
V D issonance3 14 .657 .011
Pair
9
V D issonance2 & 
V D issonance3 14 .966 .000
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair
1
MVDissonancel - 
MVDissonance2 -1.333 2.476 .280 -1.892 -.775 -4.756 77 .000
Pair
2
MVDissonancel - 
MVDissonance3 -1.231 2.685 .304 -1.836 -.625 -4.048 77 .000
Pair
3
MVDissonance2 - 
MVDissonance3 .103 .936 .106 -.108 .314 .968 77 .336
Pair
4
MDissonancel - 
MDissonance2 -1.323 2.436 .305 -1.932 -.714 -4.344 63 .000
Pair
5
MDissonancel - 
MDissonance3 -1.250 2.627 .328 -1.906 -.594 -3.807 63 .000
Pair
6
MDissonance2 - 
MDissonance3 .073 .925 .116 -.158 .304 .631 63 .530
Pair VDissonancel -
-1.882 13 .0827 VDissonance2
Pair
8
VDissonancel - 
VDissonance3 -1.143 3.043 .813 -2.900 .614 -1.405 13 .183
Pair VDissonance2 -
.884 13 .3939 VDissonance3
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Table 38: Differences between overall explicit attitudes towards eating meat, farm animals
and animals' slaughter
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
MAnimal overalU & 
MMeat overalU 64 -.043 .736
Pair
2
MMeat overalU & 
M SIaughter overalU 64 .615 .000
Pair
3
VAnimal overalU & 
VMeat overalU 14 .189 .518
Pair
4
VAnimal overalU & 
VSIaughter overalU 14 -.273 .345
Pair
5
VMeat overalU & 
VSIaughter overalU 14 .086 .770
Pair
6
MAnimal overalU & 
M SIaughter overalU 64 .095 .456
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair
1
MAnimal overalU - 
MMeat overalU .563 3.280 .410 -.257 1.382 1.372 63 .175
Pair
2
MMeat overalU - 
MSIaughter overalU 2.063 2.455 .307 1.449 2.676 6.721 63 .000
Pair
3
VAnimal overalU - 
VMeat overalU 5.571 3.106 .830 3.778 7.365 6.711 13 .000
Pair
4
VAnimal overalU - 
VSIaughter overalU 6.143 3.655 .977 4.032 8.253 6.288 13 .000
Pair
5
VMeat overalU - 
VSIaughter overalU .571 3.180 .850 -1.264 2.407 .672 13 .513
Pair
6
MAnimal overalU - 
MSIaughter overalU 2.625 3.264 .408 1.810 3.440 6.435 63 .000
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Table 39: Differences between implicit attitudes towards eating meat, farm animals and
animals’ slaughter
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
F Siq. t df Siq. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
ANIMALGMEATB Equal variances 
assumed 6.678 .012 1.894 76 .062 136.5271 72.0663 -7.0054 280.0596
Equal variances 
not assumed 2.889 40.883 .006 136.5271 47.2625 41.0702 231.9840
MEATGANIMALB Equal variances 
assumed 1.061 .306 -.186 76 .853 -20.09127 108.07929 -235.350 195.16728
Equal variances 
not assumed -.290 43.717 .773 -20.09127 69.23176 -159.644 119.46166
SLAUGHTERGMEATB Equal variances 
assumed 1.533 .219 1.101 76 .275 97.04650 88.16800 -78.55529 272.64830
Equal variances 
not assumed 1.625 37.445 .113 97.04650 59.72797 -23.92538 218.01838
MEATGSLAUGHTERB Equal variances 1.824 .181 -.351 76 .726assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed -.437 25.799 .666
----- ----- ----
SLAUGHTERGANIMALB Equal variances .470 .495 .572 76 .569assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed .728 26.916 .473
----- ----- ---- ----
ANIMALGSLAUGHTERB Equal variances 
assumed .322 .572 .949 76 .345 82.67842 87.09678 -90.78985 256.14670
Equal variances 
not assumed 1.365 35.015 .181 82.67842 60.57329 -40.29006 205.64691
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Siq.
Pair
1
MAN IMALG M EATB & 
M MEATGANIMALB 64 .491 .000
Pair
2
MSLAUGHTERGMEATB & 
MMEATGSLAUGHTERB 64 .617 .000
Pair
3
MSLAUGHTERGANIMALB
&
MAN IMALGSLAUGHTERB
64 .555 .000
Pair
4
VAN IM ALG M EATB & 
VMEATGANIMALB 14 .705 .005
Pair
5
VSLAUGHTERGMEATB & 
VMEATGSLAUGHTERB 14 .802 .001
Pair
6
VSLAUGHTERGANIMALB
&
VANIMALGSLAUGHTERB
14 .601 .023
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Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Siq. (2-tailed)
Pair
1
MANIMALGMEATB - 
MMEATGANIMALB -151.664 349.82440 43.72805 -239.048 -64.28094 -3.468 63 .001
Pair MSLAUGHTERGMEATB - 4.693 63 .0002 MMEATGSLAUGHTERB
Pair
3
MSLAUGHTERGANIMALB
MANIMALGSLAUGHTERB
-------- *********** ******** -------- -------- 6.511 63 .000
Pair VANIMALGMEATB - -8.927 13 .0004 VMEATGANIMALB
Pair VSLAUGHTERGMEATB - 1.032 13 .3215 VMEATGSLAUGHTERB
Pair
6
VSLAUGHTE RGANIMALB
5.628 13 .000
VANIMALGSLAUGHTERB
Table 40: Change in overall explicit attitudes towards eating meat, farm animals and
animals’ slaughter during the study
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair
1
MAnimal overalU - 
MAnimal overall2 .328 1.861 .233 -.137 .793 1.411 63 .163
Pair
2
MMeat overalU - 
MMeat overall2 .688 1.833 .229 .230 1.145 3.000 63 .004
Pair
3
MSIaughter overalU - 
MSIaughter overall2 .641 2.003 .250 .140 1.141 2.559 63 .013
Pair
4
VAnimal overalU - 
VAnimal overall2 .000 .392 .105 -.226 .226 .000 13 1.000
Pair
5
VMeat overalU - 
VMeat overall2 1.071 2.303 .615 -.258 2.401 1.741 13 .105
Pair
6
VSIaughter overalU - 
VSIaughter overall2 .714 1.684 .450 -.258 1.686 1.587 13 .136
Table 41: Regression weights and squared multiple correlations for path analysis
Estimate
Ml <— I -.469
Ml <— Habit .344
51 < - -  Ml .615
D2 < - -  SI -.505
52 < - -  D2 -.665
M2 <— S2 .662
Estimate 
Ml .382
51 .378
D2 .255
52 .443
M2 .438
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A P P E N D IX  I
Focus group transcripts 
(see associated CD)
A P P E N D IX  J
IAT programs (see associated CD)
A P P E N D IX  K
Quantitative data (see associated CD)
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